

Universitatea “Aurel Vlaicu” Arad
L’Association Française de Psychologie Politique
Asociația Română de Ecologie Politică



Societal and Political Psychology International Review
Revue internationale de psychologie politique sociétale
Revista internațională de psihologie politică societală
Revista international de psicologia politica societal

Anul I
Nr. 1/2010

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Why does one need societal political psychology?

The answer to this question is simple: by need. It is a theoretical and practical need. In front of the fragmentation of social sciences and the absence of a transverse and multi-field vision, it is important to build a federator paradigm.

Political psychology studies overall the actions of people in society: power, democracy and totalitarianism, crises and revolts, political change, authority and charisma of the leaders, propaganda, political discourse and communication, psychological warfare and diplomatic action, electoral processes, social influence and collective memory, ideology and beliefs, racism, technological and geopolitical impact. All these topics, in edge of classical academic research, challenge the contemporary culture.

Various psychological levels of analysis and various fields in politics configure the archipelago of the new discipline. Any reference to these “fields of work” is a response to the multi-field and intercultural synergy to which take part today psychologists, philosophers, linguists, historians, anthropologists, sociologists and political science scholars. Now they no longer can ignore each other.

Zoon politikon of our century – the planetary citizen – is the product of different political regimes. In fact, at the “global village” where men are bound by the media, both politics and psychology are of high importance.

For this reasons we think that the project of an international political psychology review is necessary and viable. Who will need it? Who will be our interlocutors? The optimistic answer is encouraging: all those interested in the search of the just society and the way in which psychology mixes with politics.

Pourquoi faut-il une psychologie politique sociétale?

La réponse à cette question est simple : par nécessité. C'est un besoin théorique et pratique. Devant la fragmentation des sciences humaines et sociales et l'absence de vision transversale et pluridisciplinaire, il importe de construire un paradigme fédérateur.

La psychologie politique traverse globalement les actions des hommes en société : le pouvoir, la démocratie et le totalitarisme, les crises et les révoltes, les changements politiques, l'autorité et le charisme des leaders, la propagande, la communication et le discours politique, la guerre psychologique et l'action diplomatique, les processus électoraux, l'influence sociale et la mémoire collective, l'idéologie et les croyances, les formes diverses de racisme, l'impact technologique et géopolitique. Ces thèmes, en lisière de la recherche universitaire classique, interpellent la culture contemporaine.

Divers niveaux d'analyse psychologiques et divers champs de la politique configurent l'archipel de la nouvelle discipline. Toute référence à ces « champs » de travail est une réponse à la synergie pluridisciplinaire et interculturelle dans laquelle s'insèrent aujourd'hui les psychologues, les philosophes, les linguistes, les politologues, les historiens, les anthropologues, et les sociologues. Ni les uns et les autres ne peuvent plus s'ignorer.

L'homme politique de notre siècle, citoyen planétaire, est le produit des régimes politiques divers. De fait, au « village planétaire », les hommes liés par les médias, le politique et le psychologique ont un rôle à jouer d'un haut intérêt.

Voilà pourquoi nous pensons que le projet d'une revue internationale de psychologie politique sociétale est nécessaire et viable. Qui peut en avoir besoin ? Qui seront nos interlocuteurs ? La réponse optimiste est encourageante : tous ceux qui s'intéressent à la quête de la société juste et à la façon dont la psychologie se mêle au politique.

De ce trebuie o psihologie politică societală?

Răspunsul la această întrebare este simplu: din necesitate. Este o nevoie teoretică și practică. Față cu fragmentarea științelor socio-umane și cu absența unei viziuni trans-versale și pluridisciplinare, devine importantă construirea unei paradigme federatoare.

Psihologia politică întretaie în ansamblu acțiunile oamenilor în societate: puterea, democrația și totalitarismul, crizele și revoltele, schimbările politice, autoritatea și charisma liderilor, propaganda, comunicarea și discursul politic, războiul psihologic și acțiunea diplomatică, procesele electorale, influența socială și memoria colectivă, ideologia și credințele, diversele forme de rasism, impactul tehnologic și geopolitic. Aflate în zona de graniță a cercetării clasice universitare, aceste teme solicită acum cultura contemporană.

Diverse niveluri de analiză psihologică și diverse câmpuri ale politicului configurează arhipelagul noii discipline. Orice referință la aceste „șantiere” ale sale constituie un răspuns dat sinergiei pluridisciplinare și interculturale în care se integrează astăzi psihologii, filosofii, lingviștii, politologii, istoricii, antropologii și sociologii. Nu se mai pot ignora unii pe alții.

Omul politic din secolul nostru, cetățean planetar, este produsul diferitelor regimuri politice. În „satul planetar”, al oamenilor legați prin mas-media, politicul și psihologicul vor juca, în fond, un rol deosebit de important.

Iată de ce credem că proiectul unei reviste internaționale de psihologie politică societală este necesar și viabil. Cine are nevoie de ea? Cine vor fi interlocutorii noștri? Răspunsul optimist e încurajator: toți cei interesați de căutarea unei societăți echitabile și de maniera în care politicul implică psihologia.

¿Porque hace falta una psicología societal?

La respuesta a esta pregunta es simple: por necesidad. Hay una demanda teórica y practica. Ante la fragmentación de las ciencias humanas y sociales, y la ausencia de una visión transversal y pluridisciplinaria se hace indispensable un paradigma federado.

La psicología politiquee penetra globalmente las acciones de los hombres en sociedad: poder, democracia, totalitarismo, crisis et revueltas, caminos políticos, autoridad y carisma de lideres, propaganda, comunicación et discursos, guerra psicológica y acción diplomática, procesos electorales, influencia social, memoria colectiva et ideología, creencias y racismo, impacto tecnológico y geopolítica. Todos estos temas son marginales en la investigación e interpelan la cultura contemporánea.

Diversos niveles de análisis psicológicos y diversos terrenos políticos configuran el archipiélago de la nueva disciplina. Toda referencia a esos campos de trabajo es una respuesta a la sinergia pluridisciplinaria e intercultural en la cual se insertan hoy en día: psicólogos, filósofos, lingüistas, politólogos, historiadores, antropólogos, et sociólogos. De hecho, ni los unos ni los otros pueden ignorarse.

El hombre político de nuestro siglo, ciudadano planetario, es el producto de los diverso régimen politiquees. De hecho, en la «aldea planetaria, los hombres ligados por los medios, la política y la psicología, tienen un rol que jugar del mas grande interés.

He aquí porque pensamos que el proyecto de una revista internacional de psicología política societal es necesario y viable. ¿Quienes la necesitan? ¿Quienes serán nuestros interlocutores? La repuesta optimista es alentadora: todos aquellos que se interesan en la búsqueda de una sociedad justa et en la manera como la psicología se mezcla con la política.

Using psycho-semantic methods in political psychology

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Abstract

This article concerns the relatively new and specifically developed in Russia methodology of research of social consciousness. The purpose and in the same time the method of the research using this methodology is reconstruction of the system of categories (superordinate personal constructs in the terminology of G. Kelly) through which people perceive world and events around him (her). Especially it is a very powerful method when dealing with political and socio-cultural issues, because it allows explaining implicit stereotypes which typically are very deep and difficult for diagnostic. Several examples from different topics of political psychology will be presented.

Keywords: *Psycho-semantics, semantic space, political parties, political leaders, psychology of religion.*

Introduction in psycho-semantics

According to G. Kelly's theory of personal constructs each person is an unsophisticated or common-sense psychologist, economist, lawyer, etc., i.e. has own individual system of views and notions in various spheres of human life. It may strikingly differ from the scientific picture of the world, nevertheless it determines individual's decision making and behaviour. Bruner and Tagiuri (1954) called this system of views and notions "implicit personal theory" (in a given area of knowledge). It is called implicit, because an individual self is, as a rule, unaware of the categorizational structures through which that reality is perceived.

Let us illustrate this idea by the example of linguistics. Linguists specify the concepts of "language performance" and "language competence". A child may perfectly speak the native language ("language performance"), but be unaware of its grammar ("language competence"). An adult, similarly, may be unaware of his own "implicit model" of politics and economy and its underlying categories with the help of which events are identified.

The private and public life of an individual provides many examples of the use of little-reflected knowledge. Every person builds his/her relationships with other people like a "naive psychologist," plans his/her budget like a "natural economist," and hav-

ing his/her own political prejudices somehow orders his/her representations on power, authorities, state, and political parties. Ethnical values, representations of good and evil, honor, and duty are also cognitively reflected. To denote this prescientific knowledge, everyone possesses the notion of own “implicit theory (model)”, about every subject matter.

Experimental psycho-semantics is a relatively new field of Russian psychology (see Petrenko 1983, 1988, 2005; Petrenko, Mitina 1997; Shmelev 1983, 2002; Artemieva 1999). It uses the methodology of constructing subjective semantic spaces as operational models of categorical structures of individual and public consciousness, and it intends to reconstruct the image of the world in different areas of human life, according to Moscovici (1988) psycho-semantics studies, in particular, accepted social representations. The task of psycho-semantics includes a reconstruction of an individual system of meanings through which the subject perceives the world, other people, him- or herself, and also the genesis, structure, and functioning of such system.

The experimental paradigm of psycho-semantics originates from Ch. Osgood's (Osgood, Suci, & Tannenbaum, 1957) construction of semantic spaces (the so-called semantic differential technique) and Kelley's personal construct psychology (repertory grid technique; Kelly, 1955). It includes multivariate statistical methods for the elicitation of a subject's consciousness categorical structure. Russian psycho-semantics is founded on the methodological basis of the schools of L. Vygotsky (1987), A. Leontiev (1978), A. Lurija (1981), and S. Rubinshtein (1973), and is connected with the problem of the reconstruction of everyday common consciousness.

Psycho-semantics, being a psychological discipline, has nevertheless a clear interdisciplinary character, linked with philosophy and sociology.

The task of experimental psycho-semantics, which originates from the works of G. Kelly, Ch. Osgood, Fransella, Bannister etc., repertory grid technique, semantic differential and semantic space construction techniques, is to reveal these cognitive structures.

The construction of subjective semantic spaces is a method of psycho-semantics and at the same time a form of representation of the categorical structures of a subject's consciousness (his/her picture of the world). Psycho-semantic experiment investigates the subject's knowledge, his system of meanings and constructs in action, and not in introspection. A subject (respondent, interviewee) assesses scales, classifies, makes judgments on similarity or difference of the analyzed objects, produces associations, etc. On the basis of the subject's judgments and evaluations the researchers construct a data matrix which reflects respondent's experience in a certain sphere (in our case it economy and politics). Then the obtained data matrix is processed by multidimensional statistics procedures - factor and cluster analyses, multidimensional scaling and latent analysis, etc.

The impossibility of direct access to this knowledge and the limitations of introspection imply using an indirect method for their analysis and revelation, the method of operational mediation. The specificity of psycho-semantic approach lies in the fact that the analysis of categorical structures of consciousness, the reconstruction of a system of meaning through which the subject perceives the world, is performed in their operation. The subject classifies something, evaluates or scales things, makes judgments on the similarity and difference of objects, etc.

The revealed structures, inherent in data matrix, are interpreted as the categorical structures of subject's consciousness. Being the structures of the individual's realization of the world, the "fundamental blocks", the framework of the respondent's picture/image of the world, they may remain unrealized as such by the subject (i.e. not revealed by self-observation and introspection). Similarly, a child may speak the native language and be unaware of its structure (grammar), though correctly producing utterances on the basis of implicit grammar rules.

The subject's execution of a certain activity (assessment, classification, making judgment on similarity and difference) enables the researcher to actualize the studied cognitive structures, and these structures are projected to and implicitly contained in the "product" of this activity - the data matrix. The application of multidimensional statistics techniques enables the revelation of these structures and contributes to their further interpretation.

The interpretation of the revealed structures is performed by determining a semantic invariant of such elicited factors. To formulate a hypothesis concerning the meaning of factors, the researcher invokes competent experts (the method of independent judges), and to improve interpretation one introduces etalon objects into the initial set of objects, etc.

For instance, factor analysis allows to reveal the "bunches" of intercorrelated features, constructs and thus to reduce the original basis of descriptive features to certain generalized categories - factors, which constituent the coordinate axes of the semantic space. Factor loads of each descriptive feature show the extent to which a given integrative dimension is expressed in this feature and geometrically correspond to its projection on the factor axis. The sign of a factor loading doesn't bear any substantial meaning, but shows to which factor axis extreme (left or right) the scale/feature belongs.

Under such geometric representation personal or cognitive-cultural constructs revealed by factor analysis form the axes of a certain n -dimensional space, and the analyzed objects are represented as points in this space. The magnitude of the object's projection on the semantic axes shows the extent to which the meaning represented by the factor (construct) is expressed in the object (notion, image).

From a mathematical point of view, the construction of a semantic space means the reduction of larger dimensions (features, scales, descriptors) to smaller ones, formed by factor categories. Semantically, factor categories provide a certain metalanguage for the description of meanings, which is why semantic spaces enable us to break down meaning into a fixed alphabet of factor categories, to perform a semantic analysis of these meanings, to make judgments about their similarity or dissimilarity, and to calculate semantic affinity between different meanings by computing the distance between the corresponding coordinate points in the n -dimensional space.

Psycho-semantics implement the principle of operational analogy between some parameters acting as operational correlates of cognitive structures. The dimension of a semantic space (the number of independent or weakly correlated factors) reflects the cognitive complexity of individual or group consciousness. Education and personal development lead to the increase of the dimension of consciousness and the appearance of new meaningful factors. On the other hand, the presence of an affect leads to the reduction of semantic spaces dimension and transition to more primitive forms of categorization.

Also individual consciousness is heterogeneous and the subject may have high cognitive complexity in one sphere and low - in another. For example, in Ch. Osgood's semantic space, constructed to investigate the perception of political parties by an ordinary American ("a man from the street") in the end of the sixties, only one factor was revealed. It was interpreted as "benevolent dynamism - powerless malice", and political parties were dispersed along the only axis of such "one-dimensional" semantic space. The situation resembles a "black-white" consciousness of some politicians with "ours - not ours" classification.

On the other hand, on the material of the same "average" Americans Osgood revealed from 7 to 9 independent factors of the perception of "existential concepts" implying significant others or introjects (the characters of the internal dialogue): "my father", "my inner Self", "my friend", "my enemy", etc. So, the cognitive complexity of consciousness in this sphere was essentially higher. However, it is obvious that if the subjects had not been "people from the street", but the political scientist from Columbia University, then the dimension of political semantic space would also have been rather high.

Another operational correlate of semantic spaces is the power of the factors revealed (factors' share of the dispersion/variance) which reflects subjective significance of a given categorization basis (represented by the corresponding factor) in the consciousness of the subject. The power of a factor as an indicator of subjective importance of a given basis of categorization, certainly, doesn't determine the position of the respondents in relation to this problem (their coordinates on the axis of this factor). For instance, the factor of "religiousness" would be equally powerful for a religious fanatic and utter atheist.

The content of the revealed factors - the grouping of certain meaningful features (personal constructs in G.Kelly's terminology) - reflects the specificity of a subject's categorization, his way to conceive the world. When a child says that "a dirty shirt is warmer" (Chukovsky 1970), it is his specific personal construct linking the two characteristics of his experience. When a politician asserts that "privatization is a criminal form to transfer people's property into the hands of comprador bourgeoisie and transnational monopolies", it is also his specific personal construct, reflecting his understanding of the economic reform and his perception of the world.

Finally, analyzed objects (for instance, political parties, prominent political leaders, political values, countries, etc.) are represented (on the basis of their evaluations by respondents) as coordinate points in semantic space, which enables to describe and understand the perception of these objects "by the eyes" of the respondents.

The functioning of human consciousness and subconsciousness is primarily determined by the subject's individual associative system (S. Freud, A.R. Luria, A.A. Brudny), and the difference in the understanding of the world is to a great extent determined by the specificity of the person's "individual language", or, in the terminology of Yu. Karaulov (1987), "linguistic personality".

According W. Humboldt (1984), the fore-runner of "linguistic relativity" theory, "different languages are not only different designations of one and the same thing, but different ways of seeing it". This principle, formulated in application to national cultures as linguistic subjects, could be extended in application to different "linguistic personalities". Each man as a "linguistic personality" is immersed in his own unique world,

be it the world of politics, economy, human relations, etc. The lack of coincidence of world categorization forms induces the problem of “lacunas in meaning” as principal incompleteness of translation from one language into another, from one consciousness to another (Markaryan 1969; Sorokin, Markova 1985).

A psycho-semantic approach to the study of personality implements a “subjective” paradigm in the understanding of the other. A meaningful interpretation of the elicited structures (factor) inevitably demands that we perceive the world through the eyes of the subject, to feel his/her ways of understanding the world. An individual system of meaning reconstructed from the framework of subjective semantic space provides a specially oriented basis for an empathetical process and gives it new semantic grounds.

A psycho-semantic approach also allows us to outline new principles of personality typology, where the personality of a subject is viewed not as a set of objective characteristics in the space of diagnostic indicators, but as a bearer of a certain image of the world, as a microcosm of individual meaning and senses.

The uniqueness of human consciousness does not exclude common invariant categorical structures inherent in different social, professional or ethnic communities in relation to certain aspects of social life. The psycho-semantic approach allows to investigate the social representations of these population groups and is very powerful method when dealing with political and socio-cultural issues, and aims to construct and describe so-called individual systems of meanings through which individuals perceives the physical and social external world and inner world of him or herself because allows to explicate implicit stereotypes which typically are very deep and difficult for diagnostic. The reasons of these problems might be because of poor mental reflexion of political topics, vague representation in the consciousness and social desirability. In the world of politics, for example, individuals may use political terminology and express attitudes toward various political topics without adequate reflection on and understanding of the subject. In such situations dealing with individual subjects researchers could use projective methods. But when we should analyse mental representation of relatively large group of people as whole we need more standardized and easy quantified methods. Psycho-semantics, using various methods of gathering and interpreting information, examines these individual meanings at the level of symbols, communications, rituals, and — very often — word constructs. Different statistical methods are then used to compare the individual political meanings and put them together into a more comprehensive picture, which may reflect various cognitive trends at the group or societal level.

For example, it is possible to produce a group data matrix on the basis of individual survey lists to investigate the “figures” of public consciousness for a certain empirical sample of respondents, or, applying multidimensional statistic techniques, to perform a theoretical classification of respondents according to their answers to the questionnaire.

Different ideologies raise a task of the unification of man’s personal meanings, his “implicit theories”, etc., and claim to construct the universal system of the perception of the world: “Is it not clear that the task of “a new language” is to narrow the horizons of thought? Finally we’ll make “thought-crime” absolutely impossible, there will remain no words for it. Each necessary concept will be expressed by a single word, the meaning of the word will be strictly expressed, and its secondary meanings will be abandoned and forgotten... The atmosphere of thinking will become different. There will be no

thinking in our contemporary meaning of the word at all. An orthodox does not think - he doesn't need thinking. An orthodoxy is an unconscious state." (Orwell 1949)

On the other hand, the investigation of implicit theories of public consciousness, its categorical structures, allows the society to reflect itself and, consequently, to expand the degrees of freedom in the choice of the ways of its own development.

That is why Psycho-semantics is very useful in ethnopsychology, psychology of public communication, psychology of art, political psychology. (Petrenko, Mitina, Berdnikov 2003; Petrenko, Mitina 2001; Petrenko 2005).

Measurements people's attitudes about political parties

These attitudes can be described through opinion polls and analyses of opinion leaders' beliefs. But very often psycho-semantic approach gives more reliable and more valid results in this field. Political parties, as unions of politically active individuals who pursue comparable political goals and maintain relatively similar political attitudes, play a role as collective carriers of particular ideologies. Psychologically, political parties may be seen as the groups that convert various interests of different social groups into the language of political demands and programs available for rational comprehension and contemplation. Furthermore, through the struggle of ideas, political parties could stimulate creation of new cognitive constructs, new systems of meanings in individuals. Analyses of both individual and collective meanings (in other words, the semantic space) of political parties could provide a specialist with an opportunity to predict the dynamics of attitudes and their formation, and forecast some of the society's political developments.

Several models could be used for the construction and investigation of the semantic space of political parties.

Inside model. The first model is the direct interpretation or explanation of the parties' positions. The group matrix is formed from "within" — based on the answers of the party members to specially designed questions related to political and economic problems of the society. The factor and cluster analyses of the party matrix allows the positioning of the parties within a multidimensional space, helps visualize the society's "political map," describes political groups and political interests, and predicts some political developments.

Two surveys took place in the early 1990s. The first was conducted in August of 1991, prior to the coup and the collapse of the Soviet Union. The second took place in the fall of 1993, before the dismantling of the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation and the armed confrontation between the government and the opposition (the method and procedures are described in Petrenko, Mitina 1997; Petrenko, Mitina 1996; Petrenko, Mitina, Braun 1995).

The respondents, national leaders of various political parties, were given questionnaires that contained statements and assertions regarding different aspects of the social and political developments taking place in the country. The statements were direct quotes from speeches and interviews of Russian political leaders of different political orientations. Among them were democrats and fascists, nationalists and communists, monarchists and greens. There were some additional statements in the questionnaire taken from the Declaration of Human Rights and other international documents. The list

of statements was selected so that it reflected the most frequently discussed problems of the Russian society. The representatives of different political parties, without knowledge about the source of the assertions, were supposed to express their agreement (+1), disagreement (-1), or absence of opinion (0). The final matrix displays general views of the surveyed members of each party participating in the study. In (Petrenko, Mitina 1997; Mitina, Petrenko 1999) you can find some data (average scores for each party) gathered in 1991 and 1993 studies.




Figure 1. The Boxplots of factors of semantic space of political consciousness of Russian society (in comparison between 1991 and 1993 years).

Examining the answers of the representatives of each party, the investigator is able to form a generalized impression about the political positions of the parties and the proximities one to another and consensus among its members measured as average variance among answers all members of the party all questions of the questionnaire. One of the forms of the data display could be an attempt to construct the “cluster dendrogram” of the analyzed parties (Tabachnick, Fidel 2002). The structure of attitudes, while being a cognitive reality, could reflect political realities, such as positions of various political groups and coalitions of political parties. The results reflected many close similarities among the parties’ political platforms. If cluster analysis allows to get one integral rule of positioning parties as more or less close to each other, factor analysis of the data allows to reconstruct several dimensions determining parties’ positions in the multidimensional space. The procedure has been described in our works mentioned above shows that among the most significant factors splitting political parties in 1991 were the “de-centralization of the state” (for the democrats), the “unified socialist state” (for the communists), and “undivided Orthodox monarchy” (for the nationalists). The

weight of the factor “denial or acceptance of the Communist ideology” was unexpectedly less significant compared to these other factors. In order to compare the results of the 1991 and 1993 surveys, only those political parties that participated in both surveys were selected. As a result of a factor analysis and rotation, six major factors (which identify the dynamics of the semantic space of the examined political parties) have been identified. In Figure 1 boxplots of factor scores on each of six factors got by the parties participated in both studies are presented. For each factor two boxplots are given together to visualize differences between opinions. And because not only parties’ positions had changed but semantics of the factors themselves, each boxplot is accompanied by the factor names on each poles.

A comparison of the results of the 1991 and 1993 surveys shows that within factor 1, the struggle against totalitarianism has been reoriented. The data reflect diminished societal interests in this problem partly because of its relative resolution, and partly because of the decline of people’s interest in politics. On the other hand, totalitarianism has been replaced on the attitudinal level with militant nationalism. Another finding that proves the trend of the decline of people’s interest in politics could be a change in factor 3 over the observed period. The absence of a leading ideological doctrine of the transitional society and the diminishing interest in religion may cause further de-ideologization of the society. Analyses of factors 2, 4, 5, and 6 indicate an increased diversity of the answers in 1993 compared with the earlier survey. Problems such as support for the incumbent government, self-governance, and ecological concerns were not as divisive as they became by 1993. The growth of the general diversity in the answers may also suggest the increased importance of these problems for the surveyed individuals. The results also showed that the changes in public consciousness take place in time but also may depend on the location of the surveyed subjects.

The 1993 survey was conducted both in Moscow and in Samara, a relatively large and “typical” Russian city. The comparison showed a significantly low differentiation and lower cognitive complexity of attitudes on the local level compared to the Moscow sample (Petrenko, Mitina, & Brown 1995).

External model. Another model of measurement is based on analyses of the parties’ images—the evaluations given to the parties by average voters acting as “experts”. The experts, in these cases, use particular scales for the evaluation of the parties’ political and economic activities. For example, such study was conducted during parliamentary elections in December 1995 in Russia (Perenko, Mitina 1997). The respondents were city dwellers with college educations and students who were interested in politics and paid attention to the media. The individuals surveyed were asked to evaluate each party eligible to participate in the elections, on a seven-point scale. The respondents were also asked to predict each party’s success in the forthcoming elections. The results, in general, proved that nonexperts could evaluate various political developments quite adequately, even better than political scientists and public opinion experts. The external evaluation of political parties requires that participating subjects have particular abilities to reflect and explain and also have a certain knowledge of politics. Based on the factor analysis of the answers, it is possible to create the semantic space and identify the respondents’ political mentalities. The objects of study here could be categorical structures of individuals, larger samples, and the entire society. This method reliably predicts

electoral results and allows us to build a multidimensional ranking of the political parties among the electorate. This model could be also effectively used when the respondents are professional policy experts, or highly educated and politically knowledgeable individuals. However, political consciousness of the vast majority of Russians, even if they have their opinions about the economy, culture, religion, and other issues, is not conceptualized and structured.

Certainly, the “internal” and “external” models yield very different results. Predictably, declarations made by politicians about their actions and their parties do not generally match their real actions, and this is reflected in public consciousness.

Diagnostic of political attitudes. There is a third model, however, which juxtaposes political parties’ positions (based on the party members’ answers) with attitudes of voters about the parties. Within the frame of reference of this method, one cannot create an individual semantic space. However, it is possible to compare the respondents’ attitudes within already-created political parties’ spaces. In other words, one can determine how close an individual’s positions are to positions of a particular party. This method of projection of individual political attitudes upon political position of major parties, used on a larger representative sample, allows researchers to identify potential electoral support of particular political parties. The results could also allow political parties and leaders to either adjust or keep their political opinions, based on the desire to widen their electoral support.

This method of prognosis of electoral results has a lot in common with various methods of indirect questioning in psycho-diagnostic procedures. In personality inventories, the subject is never asked directly about the presence in him or her of a particular trait: The subject may not be aware of its existence. Moreover, the individual could be unfamiliar with professional terminology. In addition, some traits may be seen as negative, not socially desirable, and therefore they could be consciously or unconsciously rejected or denied. However, sociologists and political psychologists, while making their forecasts, often rely on respondents’ answers to direct questions, like “What party are you going to vote for in the forthcoming elections?” In a state with a century-old party structure, and with political preferences passed on from one generation to another, the answers regarding two, three, or even four political parties could be effectively analyzed. However, in Russia, where the age of political parties does not exceed twenty years (the multiparty system was legally established in 1989) and voting bulletins contain more than ten party names, the pollsters quite commonly get the “I don’t know” answer. Indeed, people cast their votes and make other judgments, but often these decisions seem not to be based on a logical analysis.

Very often the names of the parties are confusing and do not represent real goals of this or that party. For example, the Liberal-Democratic Party of Russia is very far from the namesake in Japan or Great Britain, or name Yabloko (*trans.* Apple) does not have anything common with political orientation at all. Very often, the average voter, often makes a decision based on chance. Secondly, political attitudes of most Russians are clearly contradictory and unbalanced. For example, a person could often vote for two political foes at the same time, sharing the same political values with one of them and saying about the other one as about “nice guy” (Petrenko, Mitina 1997). Therefore, asking direct questions may not always be productive in attitude measurement. The above limits may give psycho-semantic methods particular advantages.

Measurements people's attitudes about political leaders.

Another way to study political attitudes is based on *reconstruction the multidimensional rating of political leaders* through their evaluations by respondents "from street". This is significant advantage of psycho-semantic comparing with traditional ones conducted by sociologists which can reveal only integral images of political leaders.

In the summer of 1997, the respondents, who represented 18 Russian regions, described their opinions about top Russian leaders on a seven-point scale (the study was carried out by a center of political studies, Image-Contact). The sample of respondents represented a wide variety of social attitudes and personal political affiliations. Therefore, the average scores yielded by the survey require additional interpretation because of the diversity (disperse rates) of the answers. As expected, the most contradictory and dispersed evaluations have been received by the most popular political leaders. The less-known leaders received more neutral evaluations, and the answers about them were less dispersed. The factor analysis of the data identified four basic factors, which could be used to interpret how the respondents form their perceptions of political leaders. These factors were: (1) positive ↔ negative evaluation of the politician, (2) liberal values and orientation toward a market economy ↔ socialist values and a state-regulated economy, (3) populist behavior ↔ absence of such, and (4) "iron arm" values ↔ absence of such. Based on the analysis, a cluster structure of the most prominent leaders of 1997 was created. It shows the relative "proximity" and "distance" of political leaders to one other based on people's evaluations.

Choosing these or those scales (descriptors) is very important and determines the results in very large degree. These scales should be relevant to the field of research from one side and also should be cleaned and easy for understanding for respondents. Using traditional scales used by Osgood (list of antonymic pair of adjectives) researcher can get only traditional Osgood factors. There could be different way to think about personal characteristics and evaluate political leaders using these characteristic according scales of personal semantic differential or political semantic differential. In the first case respondents should be sufficiently good experts in personal psychology in the second case have a good knowledge in politics. But if we would like to have more representative sample we should think about scales which could be easy for answers for mostly people. A good example is using idiomatic expressions, which are very popular among people and being asked about political leaders do not make difficulties been asked.

The next study demonstrates results of evaluation some political leaders using idiomatic expressions (folk metaphors, proverbs). Subjects were Moscow university students. The first evaluation was conducted in 2000 (104 subjects) just before the president election. The second evaluation was conducted one year later in 2001 (100 subjects).

The factor analysis extracted 4 factors:

The first factor (34,1% variance) included in the left pole next variables:

Wall stone	-0,91
Workhorse	-0,90
Serve faithfully	-0,87
Great ship	-0,85
Being in the ascendant	-0,79
Lucid mind	-0,75
Struggles for a just cause	-0,73
Jack of all trades	-0,68
Is a Solomon	-0,63
Rises from rags to riches	-0,62

And the right pole of the first factor were items:

Included	0,91
Tom fool	0,90
Shove in wolves having dog's tail	0,88
The snow of yester-year	0,88
Buggers about	0,87
Do not knows oneself does	0,87
Nobody home	0,81
Does not see an inch before one's nose	0,75
King for a day	0,74
Fishes in troubled waters	0,70

This is the factor of evaluation. Business characteristics have positive connotation here. In the same moment low moral level and absence of purposeful activity related with negative image.

In Figure 2 you can see positions which evaluated leaders got in semantic space in projection Factor 1 and Factor 2. The leaders who were evaluated twice marked as name1 and name2 for 2000 and 2001 years respectively.

V. Putin had the most positive results and it became better during the year between to studies. Positive evaluations got Kasianov, Luzhkov, Yavlinsky, Berezovsky (probably because of very strong namely business characteristics). Negative evaluations got Zhirinovsky, Barkashov and Zuganov.




Figure 2. Positions of political leaders in semantics space (factors 1 and 2).

The second factor (27,1% variance) included:

Hell of a fellow	-0,92
Dutch courage	-0,85
Has balls	-0, 85
Is a cagey old bird	-0, 83
Breathes fire and fury	-0,81
A deep file	-0, 81
Takes the bull by the horns	-0,79
Cambers	-0,78
Stubborn as a mule	-0,74

Opposite pole includes:

Neither fish nor fowl	0,85
Is no conjurer	0,65
As an angel	0,64

This factor can be interpreted as metaphoric for of “Strength Ego” of a person, decision abilities, experience. Zhirinovsky was the leader in this factor, but also Luzkov, Putin, Berezovsky. The losers in this category were Panfilova, Gaydar, Podberezkin, Kasianov.

The third factor (8,1% variance) included items:

A wolf in sheep's clothing	-0,85
Harbours a grudge	-0,67
A snake in the grass	-0,65
Has been at the cookie jar	-0,64

In opposition:

Popular patron	0,7
Unlocked hearts	0,7

This is a factor of morality characteristics (comparing with the first one of business treats). As “patrons” for people subjects see Yavlinsky, Govorukhin, Zuganov (whose image increased during the year in this direction) (see Figure 3). As negative leaders are evaluated Berezovsky, Dzhabrailov, Skuratov, Putin moved from negative pole to neutral.

The forth factor (7,2 % dispersion) included ideoms:

thick skull	0,60
kvass patriot	0,60

In opposition:

Scapegoat	0,70
Solomon	0,60

The content of this weak factor forms a specific construct which opposites jingos in different degrees to “Scapegoats – Westerners”. In the role of last ones subjects see Gaydar, Berezovsky and with less factor score Yavlinsky. In this dimension Putin is close to Zuganov. However his second position after the second survey moved to the center significantly. Also we would like to stress that the survey was conducted shortly after the 11th of September 2001 and the following after this terrorist events course on closer relations with the US had not realized in public opinion yet.

Concluding this part say that because idiomatic expressions have equivalents in different languages it is possible to use the same list of descriptors for cross-cultural research to reconstruction and comparing categorical system of perception political leaders. From the other side we would like to stress that this example should be considered basically as methodological example and does not reflect representatively public opinion in Russia in a whole or in Moscow partly. We use university students as subjects to demonstrated the advantages of evaluation using idiomatic expression even in the sample which is sufficiently apolitical. But to get representative results researchers should be more careful about samples because it is well know that students opinion differ from population opinion from one side and people living in Moscow differ from people living in other regions of Russia.




Figure 3. Positions of political leaders in semantics space (factors 3 and 4).

4. Psycho-semantic Analysis of the Categorical Structure of the Social Representation of Economic and Political Reform in Russia

In another study conducted before the parliamentary elections of 1995 (Petrenko, Mitina 1997), several semantic models were constructed to describe the *respondents' evaluations of both economic and political reforms*. More than one thousand respondents from eight different regions were asked to evaluate various parties, their leaders, and different social events in terms of their impact on the major economic and political changes in Russia. As a result of the analysis, a typology of Russian people's attitudes toward the transformation and the reform process was created. There have been six major factors underlying people's attitudes about political transformations identified: (1) morality versus lack of morality, (2) totalitarianism versus democratization, (3) economic benefits versus lack of such, (4) dependency on developed countries versus independence from them, (5) criminalization of the economy versus absence of such, and (6) defense capability versus absence of such. In general, the study revealed an interesting phenomenon of mismatch among several of the expressed attitudes. Realizing the importance and usefulness of the economic reform (privatization, transition to a market economy, and private property), the respondents also evaluated these changes negatively, primarily in the categories of ruined morality and lack of social justice.

This discrepancy, a split in attitudes about the reforms, could be explained by at least two arguments. First of all, people's understanding of moral issues has been formed during the period of socialism, with its Marxist views on exploitation and private property, free health care and education, and social protection in general. These perceptions also have deep roots in Russian history and are based on the communal way of thinking, and a mentality of abstinence from the time of the Orthodox reformation. Secondly, "nomenclature privatization," corruption among many government officials, and active participation of criminal structures in the process of the redistribution of property, cause negative evaluations from most Russian people.

The semantic space described above is so called average space. But of course the society is not homogenous concerning political attitudes. That is why there was an attempt made to use the factor analysis method to identify particular types of political attitudes and describe social and demographic characteristics of the following discovered types. These six types of attitudes represented Russian ideological pluralism, with the first type conveying ideas of the state regulations over the economy, and the other five diverse types representing market-based relationships.

The semantic space of the respondent of the first type was characterized by the lowest cognitive complexity. They supported a planned economy and were convinced that only the old (communistic) party nomenclature would be able to revive the economy and took care of politics. The most significant attribute of this group was its age. Most people in that cluster in the moment of research (1995) were over 40, and most of them evaluated their material situation as poor. Among them were engineers, retirees, housewives, blue-collar workers with few qualifications, and those who voted for the Communist Party of the Russian Federation. The respondents of the second type were characterized by their market-oriented attitudes. These were people of an average income, politically active scientists, artists, and those who voted for democratically oriented politicians. The third type resembles the previous one; however, this type had a higher cognitive complexity, and the individuals within that group were also less categorical in their judgments. There was a relative prevalence of men in that category who assessed their income as very high, and Muscovites who had their own business. Generally, that group was apolitical. Those who voted in this group preferred to support Gaidar or Yavlinsky. The attitudes of the fourth group were both market-oriented and negative toward the contemporary political reforms in the country. The ideal reform path was seen by them as going from “the bottom to the top.” They believed that democracy copied after the Western models was wrong for Russia. Their ideal was the Orthodox collectiveness (*sobornost*). The church was regarded very highly. The most typical representatives of this group could be such renowned Russian movie directors as Stanislav Govorukhin and Nikita Mikhalkov, with their nostalgic desire to restore the “lost” Russia. This type was comprised of people between the ages of 25 and 40, primarily men; most of them had high incomes. They negatively evaluated all political parties, but consider themselves supporters of the democrats. Individuals of the fifth type showed attitudes, which in part resemble the market-oriented attitudes of the second type. But contrary to the second type, these attitudes were less influenced by a particular ideology. In general, the attitudes conveyed support of greater regional independence. People who express these attitudes were mostly women, students, and recent college graduates. The sixth type also represented market-oriented attitudes. Most people in that group were over 55, mostly women with college educations, who evaluated their income as low, and who worked primarily in academia, education, and health-care fields.

Cross-Confessional Investigation of Religious Visions of the World in the Context of the Fight against Terrorism

Goals of this study: cross-confessional investigation of value systems in religions spread in Russia and establishing to what extent they are spiritually acceptable to Russians. Procedure: 160 fragments of religious canonical texts containing moral judgments (Russian Orthodoxy, Catholicism, Protestantism, Judaism, Buddhism, Islam

and Hinduism presented by Krishna Consciousness) and representative texts of communist and fascist ideologies, which claimed in the 20th century quasi-religious status. Respondents were asked to express their agreement/disagreement how the texts or statements match to representative of this or that religions using a 7-point scale (from +3 'agree completely' to — 3 'absolutely disagree'). Subjects were not informed about the sources of these statements though some of them were easily recognized. Also they should evaluate oneself and typical person according these scales.

Individual matrices with 10 role positions on 160 statements were brought together and formed one group average matrix which was subsequently analyzed by means of factor analysis. As a result, four factors were selected that explained 42%, 27%, 8% and 6% of total variance.

Factor 1 had on one axis statements like:

Do not murder (*Exodus*)

Love your enemies, and pray for those who persecute you (*The Gospel according to Matthew*)

Hate shall never stop hate in the world but it stops in the absence of hate (*The Dhammapada*)

Do not resist him who is evil; but whoever slaps you on your rights cheek, turn to him the other also (*The Gospel according to Matthew*)

Wars cannot be conducted for the sake of gaining territory (*Hadith*).

The other axis contained the following statements:

He is unworthy who is unable to revenge (*Nietzsche*)

Those who want to live have to fight and those who keep away from fight do not deserve to live (*Hitler*)

The stronger shall rule the weaker (*Hitler*)

One shall be punished by death for the crime committed (*The Book of Deuteronomy*)

A soul for a soul, an eye for an eye, an ear for an ear, a tooth for a tooth and wounds shall be avenged (*Koran*)

If a man does evil but for the sake of loyal faithfulness, he shall be as righteous as he is in the right way (*Bhagavat Gita*).

Thus, on one axis we have here the judgments that forbid violence even with best intentions. Many of these statements contain a negation. In its strongest expression, it demands love toward one's own enemies.

On the opposite axis we have the statements that belong mainly to Nietzsche and Hitler that emphasize the right of the strength. There are also statements from the Old Testament and the Koran about the right to retribution.

We can see the locations of representations of religions in semantic space (Figure 4). From the point of view of our respondents, Christianity, Buddhism, Krishna Consciousness preach forgiving, tolerance and no evil deeds even for the sake of good purpose.

On the opposite axis, we find representations concerning fascism. It is known that fascists strove to prove their racial superiority in every possible way including genocide. Representations on communism are close to those on fascism though communism

practiced genocide not for racial reasons but for ‘class reasons’, with certain exceptions. So far, this opposition between religions and ideologies looks rather logical. There is but one exclusion. That is Islam. In axiological space, it opposes other religions. It could be explained by its rigid norms and by associations with fundamentalism and negative experiences with the war in Chechnya. Neutral happen to be representations on Judaism. Perhaps, the respondents are not well informed about this religion. Rather neutral are ‘common persons’ representations while representation of ‘myself’ are shifted in direction of tolerance.

Thus, the first factor has been interpreted in the following way: “Violence forbidden ↔ Violence for the sake of a good purpose (or ‘The end justifies the means’)”.




Figure 4. Semantic space of religions. (Factors 1 and 2).

Factor 2 included statements like:

Do not take gifts (*The Book of Exodus*)

Whoever exalts himself shall be humbled, and whoever humbles himself shall be exalted (*The Gospel according to Matthew*)

No piece for those who strive to satisfy their wishes (*Bhavad Gita*)

The love of money is a root of all sort of evil (*First Timothy*)

Wealth gives rise to immoderate desires (*Islam Nadjul Balagha*)

Wine and gambling are great sins (*Koran*)

If you want to live quietly, learn to do without things which are unnecessary (*L. Tolstoy*)

Pride precedes death and arrogance precedes fall (*The Book of Proverbs*).

On the opposite axis we have the following statements:

Follow your passions, good or evil (*Nietzsche*)

Evil instincts serve their purpose as they preserve the species (*Nietzsche*).

The contents of factor 2 can be expressed as “Control of passions and desires ↔ Self-indulgence”. Almost all religions demand self-restriction and humility (see Figure 4). On the opposite axis we find the representations of “myself” and “typical person’s”. Religion establishes a certain ideal towards which one should strive. However normal people are disposed to passions, pride, bodily desires and attractions.

Communist ideology also imposes some limitations (‘communal is more important than individual’). As for fascism, according to our respondents, it is neutral on this

issue.

Factor 3 had to do with the pair “Rigid norms of behavior ↔ Possibility to choose”.

On the one hand, we found strictly normative statements like:

The thief’s hand shall be cut off as retribution for his gain (*Koran*)

Man is responsible for all sins of the woman (*Nietzsche*)

People must not eat the meat of animals (*Bhagavad Gita*) etc.

On the other hand offered the choice for person:

As your soul wants it, you can get and eat meat (*The Book of Deuteronomy*)

Church belief is slavery (*Tolstoy*), etc.

On factor 3, Judaism and Islam, being strictly normative religions, oppose Christianity (Russian Orthodoxy and Catholicism) that allow more freedom of choice, as well as communism with its conscious choice (Figure 5).

Weak Factor 4 included the statements being interpreted as illusion and those on primacy of individualism (a kind of moral solipsism) like the following:

Ruler of death does not see those who see the world as mirage (*The Dhammapada*)

Living means permanently pushing away things that have to die (*Nietzsche*).

The other axis presented the statements that emphasize involvement in the world of people:

Man finds happiness only in serving others (*Tolstoy*), etc.

On factor 4, role representations of Buddhists and the followers of the Krishna Consciousness (both being individualistic religions), are away from Christianity, Islam and Judaism while representations referring to ‘myself, a ‘typical person’ and a ‘communist’ are neutral (Figure 5).

Factor 4 can be interpreted as “Illusive nature of being ↔ Inclusion in the world of people”.




Figure 5. Semantic space of religions. (Factors 3 and 4).

We would like to stress that these results are not based on profound religious analysis but reflect our respondents’ representations concerning religions. However, we plan to work with those who are professionally involved in religious activities, i.e.

priests, pastors, mullahs, rabbis, lamas etc. and with proponents of the two mentioned ideologies (fascism and communism). Semantic space based on their judgments, together with representations of the population will provide a picture of religious views and show typical people's attitudes to specific religious confessions or ideologies. Psycho-semantic analysis exposes the deepest religious and moral feelings of persons while sociological surveys reflect only conscious reactions of respondents and are not free from 'social desirability', ethnic influences and social conformity with religious rituals. Such an investigation will make it possible to determine an approximate percentage of true believers and those who claim to be believers, as well as the percentage of people oriented at specific religious values.

In conclusion we would like to stress that results (questions' distributions on factors, factor scores which scaled concepts (roles, parties, political leaders) got on each factors can not be considered as exact numbers. Researchers should use these or those results as tendencies or illustrations for theoretical speculations and conclusions, as fruitful way for producing new hypotheses. The working with and understanding of results getting from analysis psycho-semantic data could be compared with so called flexible modeling versus restrict modeling (which oriented on improving and developing methods from mathematical point of view, search formal ways of verification and testifying of hypothesis about models and structures). Flexible modeling postulates existing models with limited accuracy, does not assume the model a priori, but reconstructs it as method of research of empirical reality. Comparing with science humanitarian field is not so advanced to pretend on great success in predictions about behavior of so complex systems as personality or society of peoples. But including new methods in arsenal of humanitarian researcher expands his or her cognition abilities and skills dealing with studied field.

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Role of agency in social representations of history

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Abstract

The paper discusses the relevance of social representations of history from the perspective of collective identity. It argues for content analyzing verbal accounts by computer programs which are sensitive to linguistic forms of psychological features. It presents a program mapping two features of agency, i.e., activity and intentionality. The authors used this program in a study with two text corpora: Hungarian history school books and folk narratives about the salient positive and negative Hungarian historical events. The stories about the Hungarian history, both the professional ones, which are parts of history textbooks, and the stories of the naïve historians, present identification patterns in which Hungarians – apart from events in the distant past – appear with reduced capacity of action as compared to other nations. Low level of agency may weaken their responsibility for their fate and the realistic appraisal of their current situation. Contemporary history text books seem to alleviate this identity construction, but their impact on the common forms of collective memory is still in question.

Keywords: *history, narrative, social representations, agency, Hungarian national identity*

Social representations theory (Moscovici, 1961, 1973, 1984) embraces the processes by which phenomena in the physical and social environment become objects of social thought. History is a particular set of social representations and representing history deserves particular attention. As Moscovici (1984, p. 10) writes “Social and intellectual activity is, after all, a rehearsal or recital, yet most socio-psychologists mistakenly treats it as if it were amnesic. Our past experiences and ideas are not dead experiences or dead ideas, but continue to be active, to change, and to infiltrate our present experience and ideas.” Or as Liu and Hilton (2005) convincingly show, “the past weighs on the present”. Historical representations function as social theories in frame of which inter-group attitudes, evaluations, prejudices and social judgments are shaped (Hilton, Erb, Dermot, Molian, 199,;Liu, Wilson, MacClure, Higgins,1999, Sibley and Liu. in press).

Historical representations have two highly neglected features. 1. They are intimately bound to group identity. 2. They are narratively organized.

The relationship between representation of national history and national identity has been neglected for two reasons. On the one hand, the two most competent areas in which the phenomenon has been studied intensively, social representations theory (Moscovici, 1984) and social identity theory (Tajfel, 1981) have developed independently of each other; and on the other, narrative meta-theories (Bruner, 1986; Sarbin, 1986), have previously had relatively little influence on theorizing in social psychology. At present, however, there are several theoretical endeavors to integrate social representations theory and social identity theory. The general idea that representations existing in groups by necessity fulfill some sort of an identity function is increasingly gaining ground (Breakwell, 1993; de Rosa, 1996; Elajabarieta, 1994; Vala, 1992). Starting out from omnipresent narrative discourse (Halbwachs, 1925; Barthes, 1966; Bahtyin, 1981) and the idea that human thinking takes place in a narrative mode (Bruner, 1986), there emerges a narrative view of social representations (Flick, 1995; Jovchelovitch, 1996; 2006; László, 1997; 2003, 2008). This integrated approach argues that stories about history are suitable for the study of national identity in social psychology (Liu and László, 2007).

Although there is consensus in very different ethnic groups as to what can and should be told of the history of a group, which events and persons are important from the point of view of a nation's history (Liu, Wilson, McClure and Higgins, 1999; László, Ehmann and Imre, 2002) and the same can be observed in world history too (Liu, Goldstein-Hawes, Hilton, Huang, Gastardo-Conaco, Dresler-Hawke, Pittolo, Hong, Ward, Abraham, Kashima, Kashima, Ohashi, Yuki, and Hidaka, 2005; Pennebaker, Rimé and Paez, 2001), the meaning of each event, their relevance for the present and the future may be viewed differently by various social groups, and the construction of national identity often takes place in the crossfire of debates. The social representation of events is largely determined by group interests and knowledge about a particular event. Accordingly, we can distinguish *polemic* (competing social representations of different social groups), *emancipated* (social representations that fit on the basis of a few criteria) and *hegemonic representations* (unified social representations widely accepted in a society, see Moscovici, 1988).

The social representations maintained in the present time of a society are not static but dynamic entities that change in accordance with the changing demands of the present. This is especially true of representations concerning negative historical events that are characterized by a special kind of dynamism. Approximately 80-90 years are needed for a generation to get sufficiently far from a traumatic event emotionally and temporally so that it can deal with such an event properly. The results of research on the Spanish civil war show that groups with different political views have different (polemic) representations concerning the civil war. However, these representations tend to converge by the third generation; polemic representations turn into hegemonic representations (Paez, Valencia, Marques, Vincze, 2004).

Historical narrative and identity

The "affordances" of historical events, that is, the symbolic contents and emotive

qualities of identification potentially expressed by them, identity policy and the real identity needs of society collectively determine the present representations of history.

The classic example of narrative restructuring is the revival of the history of the Masada fortress at the time of the foundation of the Israeli state. In 72-73 BC the Romans stormed the Masada fortress defended by the Jews. The Jews defended their fortress heroically for several months, and when they saw that they had no chance left against the superior power of the enemy, they committed group suicide in order to avoid being captured. This event had been dormant in the historical memory of Jews for a long time, but when the State of Israel was founded in 1948, the founding fathers made it the cornerstone of Jewish history. This conscious step of identity policy was also motivated by a social psychological need to restore the self-esteem of the Jewish nation that had become a victim of the holocaust, in other words, to ensure that Jews could identify with the idea of active resistance and heroism. This interpretation is confirmed by simple facts like the erection of the monument commemorating the Masada incident took place much earlier than the erection of the first Israeli holocaust monument (Zerubavel, 1994; Klar, 2004).

Not only selection of the historical events, but also shaping them by various means of narration, i.e. how the story is told, serves identity needs of a nation. Just as life narrative reveals individual identity, its stability, continuity, strength, complexity, integration, emotion-regulation, etc, historical narratives are informative about the same aspects of national identity. And similar to the automated content analysis applied to narrative categories of individual life stories, which helped to enlighten important aspects of individual identities (László, 2008), narrative psychological content analysis of stories of the national past seems to be able to explore all the social representations – symbolic constructions – that mark the place and role of a group in the world, and may also be able to give an outline of the emotive structure of group identity in a clear way.

Agency

Agency is a major category in narrative construction. In the same time, it is one of the basic dimensions underlying judgments of self, persons and groups. It refers to task functioning and goal achievement, and involves qualities like efficient, competent, active, persistent, and energetic (Wojciszke and Abele, 2008). Agency has a wide range of psychological forms, e.g. capacity, expansion, power, dominancy, separation and independence. Harter (1978) defines the desire to control our environment or have effect on it as effectance motivation. Deci (1975) attributes inner control of actions to intrinsic motivation. Definition of DeCharms (1968) holds personal causation to be human disposition, which means intentional action for the sake of change. The above-mentioned psychological phenomena, all refer to the intention and desire to shape our physical and social environment. Bandura's (1989, 1994) definition of self-efficacy, or personal efficacy means the belief or idea that individuals are able to achieve the proposed aims and can keep their control on the actions happening in their life. In fact, it means belief in ourselves. The expectations of individuals about their own efficacy have a relationship with their coping: our belief in our own efficacy inspires us to invest more effort to achieve our aims and in a stress situation we feel less pressure or discomfort. Yamaguchi (2003) correlates control, personal efficacy and the psychological construct of autonomy: successful direct personal control leads to self-efficacy, which is the base

of the feeling of autonomy.

Not only individuals but also groups are seen as agents- as they are capable to perform goal-directed behavior and have an effect on their environment. Hamilton (2007) distinguishes between two approaches to agency in group-perception research: one of them conceives agency as the capacity of efficient action (Abelson, Dasgupta, Park & Banaji 1998; Brewer, Hong & Li, 2004), the other one emphasizes the function of the mental states (Morris, Menon & Ames, 2001). The perception of a group's agency was measured by Spencer-Rogers, Hamilton and Sherman (2007) with four items: the group is 'able to influence others'; is 'able to achieve its goals', is 'able to act collectively' and is 'able to make things happen (produce outcomes)'. Kashima (2005) assessed perceptions of agency with nine items mapping mental states (beliefs, desires and intentions) which, according to him, are the base of the group-agency.

Agency and identity

At least in Western cultures, agency is an important component of personal and social identity. In order to arrive at a well organized and adaptive adult identity, people have to acquire autonomy, which is reflected in their agency in life events (McAdams, 2001). Current narrative models of identity reconstruct personal identity from life stories (Bamberg and Andrews, 2004; Brockmeier and Carbaugh, 2001; Freeman, 1993; McAdams, 1985) Similar to individual identity, group identity can also be reconstructed from narratives about the group's past. Representations of history reflect psychological characteristics of national identity such as stability or vulnerability, strength or weakness, autonomy or dependency, etc. (László, 2008; Liu and László, 2007). Distribution of agency between in-group and out-group seems to be a sensitive indicator for the above identity states.

Linguistic markers of agency

Narrative language has the capacity to present characters' agency in narratives in different forms. Agency can be best expressed by voice. Active voice e.g. "Hungarians occupied their land" carries higher level agency than passive voice: "The land was occupied by Hungarians". In languages, where passive voice is seldom or not at all used, general subjects instead of nouns or personal pronouns may express passivity.

Another mean of communicating agency is thematization. It shows who is the focal character in the event presented by the text. The theme is presented first in sentences, it has the grammatical role of surface subject and therefore it frequently associated with passive verbs. In "John greeted Mary" the theme is John, however in "Mary was greeted by John" the theme is Mary. Although languages may differ in how thematization is performed, thematic information universally occupies the initial position in sentences (Semin, 2000). Turnbull (1994) showed that the thematic character carried higher responsibility for moral events, therefore her agency is also perceived higher.

There is, however a third mean, which is less connected to grammatical structures than to implicit semantics of verbs (see e.g. Brown and Fish, 1983). Similar to implicit causality, verbs have an implicit activity versus passivity meaning. Build, construct or fight involve high level of activity whereas suffer, lay or listen arise associations of passivity.

Finally, in accord with Kashima (2005), certain transformations of verbs which

express intentions and desires also carry agency. Those actors (or group of actors), to whom during the narration of a story we assign numerous intentions, are perceived as capable of acting in order to reach given goals, contrary to those who are attributed few intentions but plenty of constraints. While examining intention, constraint and possibility, the context of action becomes comprehensible, possibly playing role in the evaluation and attribution of such dimensions as control, responsibility and efficiency, which are in turn significant in the evaluation of the acts and story of an individual or a group. Similarly, high intention level and low constraint level in self-narratives or group narratives indicate stable, well-organized and autonomous identity.

The analytic device

In accord with Abelson, Dasgupta, Park and Banaji (1998); and Brewer, Hong, and Li, (2004), who derive agency from effective actions, a computer algorithm was constructed, which maps active and passive verbs in texts. The program has been developed in NooJ, an integrated linguistic development environment (Silberstein, 2008). This software enables morpho-syntactic, that is textual level analysis. Beyond the elaboration of the content relevant dictionaries for the examination, also the identification of grammatical structures is enabled with the help of local grammars, both for general (e.g. verb + infinitive) and for concrete cases (e.g. any form of the verb to go + infinitive). Consequently, not only concrete words can be searched for, but also word forms and various text environments, which are important for meaning. For isolating languages, such as English, it suffices to compile a dictionary. However, In agglutinative languages, such as Hungarian, different word forms cannot be handled by lexicons. Morphological complexity prevents using simple dictionaries. For this reason, not only words but also grammatical relations between them should be analyzed. NooJ has the capacity for building local grammars around words. Local grammars are able to find and equip the different cases and inflections of the verbs with appropriate output.

The core of the program is an active-passive dictionary. Five judges classified the dictionary of the ten thousand most often-used verbs into different verb categories. A verb was considered active, when it referred to an intentional act, the action had an agent, and the action had an effect on the environment.

*"The Hungarian troops **occupied** Bácska, the Baranya triangle and Muraköz."*

*"Rákóczi **turned to** the French king for help."*

*"Hungary **took a hand** in redeeming the debts of the empire."*

*"He **chose** suicide 3 April in 1941."*

Verbs indicating change in state or action were classified as passive verbs. These actions refer to change outside individual's control, e.g., changes in physical circumstances, or transcendental changes. For instance:

*"Later, the centres of immigration **grew up** in Paris and London."*

*"By 1917 revolts and escapes **occurred** in the military."*

*"On account of these, our country **got** under totally new life conditions."*

*"Thirty percentages of the Hungarian habitants, so 3.3 million Hungarian people, **became** under control of other states."*

In the next step, local grammars were constructed for contextual disambiguation of verbs whenever it was necessary. The graph of activity-passivity consists of local

grammars of 941 active and 230 passive verbs.

The algorithm is able to detect linguistic structures of activity-passivity in text, and thereby enables quantitative analysis of each character's activity. The higher is the activity-passivity ratio, or in other word, the more active idioms are used at the expense of the passive ones, the higher extent is the character presented as efficient actor in the narrated events and the more is she having effect on her environment. Moreover, the more passive expressions the narrative uses at the expense of the passive ones for a character, the more it emphasizes her passivity, and her incapacity in action.

Intentionality-constraint algorithm. Intentionality can be expressed not only by intentional auxiliary verbs such as want, will, wish, etc., but also by intentional nouns, adverbs, adjectives and postpositions, as well as by some cases of conditional mood and subordinate sentences. Similarly, constraint also has a wide range of lexical and grammatical expressions. Similar to the activity-passivity algorithm, local grammars have been constructed to map all linguistic features of intention and constraint.

Assumptions

When perceiving linguistically presented activity-passivity, intention, and constraint, the context of action becomes comprehensible. Therefore these features play a role in the evaluation and attribution of such dimensions as control, responsibility and efficiency, which are in turn significant in the evaluation of the acts in the story of an individual or a group. Those actors (or group of actors), to whom are assigned high level of activity and numerous intentions in a story, are perceived as capable of acting in order to reach given goals, contrary to those who are attributed few intentions but much constraints. In the way around, high activity and intention level and low constraint level in self-narratives or group narratives indicate stable, well-organized and autonomous identity. In the narration of traumatic events, higher level of activity and intention attributed to in-group can be seen as indicator of elaboration.

Method

The present research focuses on the narration of the ten most important historical events of Hungary (Table 1). The study was carried out on two text corpora. One contains the current primary and secondary school history books' contents related to these events – composed of approximately 150 thousand words altogether. The other is a folk-historical narrative corpus, gathered from a stratified sample (considering gender, age, level of education, ethnical background). It has been taken from 500 people. It includes two thousand stories, about the same ten historical events (approximately 64 thousand words).

Texts in both corpora were analyzed by the activity-passivity and intentionality-constraint algorithms. Frequencies of hits were subsumed so as to get agency indices for both Hungarian in-group and various out-groups in each event. Frequencies of activity was divided by passivity as well as intentions were divided by constraint. The overall agency index was calculated by averaging the two ratios.

Results

Overall results are shown in Figure 1 and Figure 2. Without any statistical analysis it is seen that agency of the Hungarian in-group is much lower than the agency attrib-

uted to out-groups. The pattern of results is very similar in the history school textbooks and folk-narratives. Apart from some positive events (but not all!) such as conquest of land, establishing the state, victorious phases of freedom fights, and system's change, Hungarian characters and Hungarians as a group are depicted as less active, less intentional, and having more constraints than their out-groups. Folk-narratives express this pattern more markedly than school books do. Whereas textbooks assign the most agency to out-groups who conquered Hungary in the distant past (Mongolians, Turks), folk-narratives see those out-groups most agentic, who took part in the Hungarian history in the past century, i.e. in WW 1, WW 2, Holocaust and '56 revolution. Similarly, these are the historical events, where folk-narratives depict Hungarians as having minimal or no agency.




Figure 1. In-group and out-group agency in history text-books




Figure 2. In-group and out-group agency in folk-narratives

Figure 3 and Figure 4 show these discrepancies in bar graph form. Folk-narratives tend to depict both in-group and our-groups as having more agency than textbooks do, except the Hungarian in-group in the negative events, where the agency level is

extremely low.




Figure 3. In-group and out-group agency in positive versus negative historical events as presented by history text-books




Figure 4. In-group and out-group agency in positive versus negative historical events as presented by folk-narratives

Discussion

What inferences can be made regarding Hungarian national identity on the basis of these results? Although it is a well-known self serving bias in attribution research that success or victory is attributed to internal, whereas failure or defeat to external causes (see e.g., Forgas, 1985), the degree of this bias as it appears particularly in folk-narratives is remarkable. In negative historical events Hungarians are depicted as not playing active roles, not having intentions, and facing only constraints. In these events out-groups are seen as highly intentional and active. This pattern of results is the most salient with the Paris peace treaty subsequent to WW1. Several historical accounts argue that the Paris peace treaty (Trianon treaty) has been a traumatic experience for the Hungarian national identity after the WW 1 and this trauma persists even today (Romsics 2001, Ormos 1983). The fact that both history text books and folk-narratives depict Hungarians in this event as helpless and defenseless underpins this interpretation. Extremely low level of agency in negative events suggest that both history textbooks and folk-narratives pass on vulnerability and instability of the Hungarian national identity. In the same way, the

low level of in-group activity and intentions as opposed to the extremely high level of out-group agency in the most traumatic event of the 20th century suggest that elaboration of this trauma has not progressed too far. There are, however, two positive features for the Hungarian national identity in our results. First, the above tendencies are less expressed in school books than in folk-narratives. Whereas in communicative forms of collective memory (Assmann, 1992), i.e. in folk-narratives Hungarians turn out to be at the mercy of the invasions of greater empires, history text books, when transposing these events into the cultural memory, endow Hungarians with relatively more agency. It suggests that elaboration of the national traumas has still began, at least on the level of historiography. Second, in-group agency relative to out-group agency increases in the events of the recent past whether negative ('56 revolution) or positive (system's change). This results suggests again a stabilization of national identity. Nevertheless, this process is very slow. Historians claim that several generations of Hungarians have grown up with the feeling that they cannot have effect on their fate and they are not responsible for their life. They have not got used to the independence and the frames of democracy (Ormos, 2005). Our results concerning the system's change support this observation. Although out-group agency in these texts is relatively low, the in-group is the lowest among the positive events both in the folk-narratives as well as in the stories of the textbooks. This result shows that this important event, which could have represented as an achievement and thereby serving a reintegration of Hungarian national identity, is represented by Hungarian people as an event out of their efficacy or control.

Summing up, we can say that the stories about the Hungarian history, both the professional ones, which are parts of history textbooks, and the stories of the naïve historians, present identification patterns in which Hungarians –apart from events in the distant past-- appear with reduced capacity of action as compared to other nations. Low level of agency may weaken their responsibility for their fate and the realistic appraisal of their current situation. Contemporary history text books seem to alleviate this identity construction, but their impact on the common forms of collective memory is still in question.

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Knowledge production and transfer: A case of soviet influence on chinese psychology

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Abstract

Knowledge is created and transferred in social sciences and humanities in general, and in psychology in particular. This paper presents an overview of how Chinese psychology was influenced by Soviet psychology, and the social processes leading to such knowledge production and transfer. From the 1920s through the 1940s, Chinese psychology was oriented mainly towards Western psychology. After the establishment of the People's Republic of China in 1949, Marxism-Leninism became a dominating ideology in China. In the process of reconstruction, the new psychology took Marxism-Leninism and Maoism as its underlying philosophical principles, and Soviet psychology became the model of Chinese psychology. With China's open-door to the outside world and a market economic reform from the late 1970s, and particularly, with the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, the Soviet influence has faded away, and both American and European traditions of psychology have become the dominated paradigm of Chinese psychology. Psychology in China is rehabilitating as a scientific discipline. From the perspective of social representations, the rise and decline of Soviet influence on Chinese psychology well illustrate how political-economic-ideological forces affect the production and transformation of scientific knowledge, and such knowledge is always produced through interaction and communication, between the particular groups of people and their contexts.

Key words: *Knowledge production and transfer; Soviet psychology; Chinese psychology*

1. Introduction

Knowledge is created and transferred in social sciences and humanities in general, and in psychology in particular. China has experienced/accumulated/observed a wealth of psychological thought. As U.S. psychologist G. Murphy notes, "China is the native place of psychology in the world" (Wang, 1996). The study and discussion of psychological issues had a long history in ancient China. Early psychological thinking

in China not only was contained in diverse philosophical, political, military, and other literature but was also expressed through various practices in education, medicine, and human resource management. The influence of Chinese culture on world psychology has been widely recognized in current literature in the field and is attracting more and more attention (Jing, 1994; Murphy & Kovach, 1972; Wang, 1993).

At the beginning of the 20th century, some Chinese psychologists had adopted the Western ideas of behaviorism, psychoanalysis, and Gestalt psychology, and the works of I. B. Pavlov, V. M. Bekhterev, and Komilov were translated from Russian into Chinese. As early as in the 1930s, some Chinese psychologists tried to take dialectical materialism as the guiding principle in their work. From the earliest days, Soviet influences on psychology were strong. After the establishment of the People's Republic of China in 1949, Marxism-Leninism became a dominating ideology in China. In the process of such reconstruction, the new psychology took Marxism-Leninism and Maoism as its underlying philosophical principles and Soviet psychology became a model of Chinese psychology. With China's open-door to the outside world and market economic reform from the late 1970s and particularly, with the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, the Soviet influence has faded away, and both American and European traditions of psychology have become the dominating paradigm of Chinese psychology. Psychology in China is rehabilitating as a scientific discipline. Today, psychology in the People's Republic of China is experiencing rapid growth and a redefinition in response to dramatic changes in economic, cultural, and political conditions.

In a word, knowledge is created and transferred in social sciences and humanities in general, and in psychology in particular. This paper presents an overview of how Chinese psychology was influenced by Soviet psychology, and the social processes leading to such knowledge production and transfer. It also provides a historical and contemporary context of the development of Chinese psychology. From the perspective of social representations, the rise and decline of Soviet influence on Chinese psychology well illustrate how political-economic-ideological forces affect the production and transformation of scientific knowledge, and such knowledge is always produced through interaction and communication, between the particular groups of people and their contexts.

2. Soviet psychology: The historical context

It is well known of the differences between Soviet psychology and Western psychology, but the cause of such differences is still unclear. We think that the situation of the time in Russia can only be understood by tracing the historical foundations of Soviet psychology. Russia has had quite a different political, cultural, religious and social history from Western Europe, even long before the Revolution. Since the latter, its psychology has been even further removed from others. It is based on political action and social changes, as is also revealed by a study of its history and its radical philosophical background.

2.1. Prior to the 1917 Revolution: Kaleidoscopic Period

More space is allotted to the history of Soviet psychology, even to its pre-history. Since the Middle Ages, this is seen as a struggle of Tsarist and Christian Orthodox obscurantism against liberating Western influences which reached Russia from Peter the Great onwards (Koutaissoff, 1976). Soviet psychology was a product of a long

development and had varied historical antecedents. These antecedents include the work of Russian educators and educational theorists (beginning with the early part of the 18th Century), literary critics of the 19th Century, psychiatrists, physiologists, and writers of books on psychology proper. In 1796, the first Russian book with a near-equivalent of “psychology” in its title appeared. In 1885, seven years before the formation of the American Psychological Association in 1892, the Moscow Psychological Society was formatted. In 1886, the first psychological laboratories in Russia were established by the psychiatrists Bekhterev and Korsakov. Russia’s first psychology laboratories were created by Bekhterev in 1886, first in Kazan and then in St. Petersburg. It was not until 1911 that an institute of psychology was founded by G. I. Chelpanov, a mentalism philosopher and logician who had taught psychology as well.

Prior to the 1917 revolution, this was seen as a struggle of mentalism and materialism in the field of psychology. Chelpanov and Gelot were representative mentalist theorists. For example, Chelpanov had published a psychology textbook for secondary schools which went through almost twenty printings prior to the Revolution. This large volume, entitled *Brain and Mind*, was devoted to a discussion of the relationships between subjective experience and the material world. Chelpanov adopted the position that a materialist approach to the study of mind was useless. And, Sechenov, Pavlov and N.N. Langer were representative materialism theorists. Later, the Russian Revolution created a receptive atmosphere for the theories of Sechenov, Pavlov, Bekhterev and others. These psychologists had founded a natural-scientific approach, which turned out to be the most acceptable materialistic view of man and his behavior. Their approach, which became widely popular, was called reflexology. During the mid-1920s, reactology, reflexology and Pavlov’s theory were called “Russian psychological schools” by Western scholars.

The reflexological period is the one in which Bekhterev’s reflexology, coupled with American behaviorism, came pretty close to becoming the official Soviet psychology. Bekhterev set out, right after the revolution, to unweave his reflexology into the Soviet system. He published a monograph on Psychology, Reflexology, and Marxism and an article on “Reflexology and dialectical materialism,” trying to show that reflexology is the proper Marxian and dialectical psychology. The reflexologists were very active in research and, in their own way, very fruitful in hypotheses. Had they continued unhampered, they no doubt would have made significant contributions and probably would have developed a psychology not very different from what some of our behaviorists would like to have. But the school was declared too mechanistic for Communist philosophy and slowly passed out of existence.

Meanwhile, Kornilov’s reactology was a school of psychology that let the physiologists study the reflex while keeping to itself the study of voluntary reactions or voluntary behavior. Its methodology was primarily objective, but it did not completely disdain introspections. The school also contained a principle of wholeness that total behavior dominates individual reaction behavior and social behavior dominates individual behavior and a principle of socioeconomic prepotency, while the form of reactions may be determined biologically, their content is social, specifically economic, and man in general is a variant or a function of a particular economic class. The school was certainly wider in scope than reflexology and no less experimental and, if permitted to exist, would no doubt have been of considerable significance.

Pavlov and Bekhterev shared essentially the same opinion. They accept the existence of two parallel sciences – psychology and reflexology – which study the same object, but from different sides. Pavlov’s research on the physiology of digestion led to the development of the first experimental model of learning, Classical Conditioning. He was awarded the Nobel Prize in Physiology or Medicine in 1904 for research pertaining to the digestive system. As his work progressed, Pavlov established the basis for conditioned reflexes and the field of classical conditioning.

Under such world-class researchers as Bekhterev and Pavlov, Russians were at the forefront of world science. The purpose of this kaleidoscopic and largely irrelevant hash is to show the spread of materialist philosophies, and the emergence, prior to the 1917 Revolution, of a Russian school of psychology based on the experimental work of Sechenov and Pavlov. It is here that Soviet psychology should begin. Yet this was an uneven mix of neurology, physiology, psychology, and philosophy, with never a clearly distinguishable psychology during these early days.

2.2. After Revolution: Dialectical Materialism and Marxist Psychology Period

Marxist philosophy, one of the world’s most complex systems of thought, was assimilated slowly by Soviet scholars. The period following the revolution of 1917, in which the Communist Party seized power in Russia. The once-large Psychoanalytic Institute in Moscow closed its doors when Freudian mentalism was prohibited. After the revolution until the late 1920s, Marxism was the only correct doctrine not only in economics and politics but also gaining ground in science. During the communist era, psychologists were expected to produce a “Marxist psychology” in sync with Marxism-Leninism’s materialist, environmentalist, and egalitarian ideology. The search for ways to introduce the spirit of dialectical materialism into psychology was intensifying, not only because Communist ideology dictated subordinating scientific thought unto itself, but also because psychology was experiencing an inner crisis.

Many Russian intellectuals, anticipating troubled times, felt helpless in the context of the dramatic events that were unleashing new social forces. In the early 1920s, Vygotsky reacted enthusiastically to the appeal to recast psychology on the basis of dialectical materialism. Kornilov studied a number of complex, esoteric Marxist postulates on the level of what was then called “primary political course.” Even Chelpanov, who favored the viewpoints of Wundt and Titchener, argued that his psychology was compatible with Marxism. Kornilov claimed that his psychology was the true expression of Marxist dialectical materialism. More profound theoretical research psychologists were eager to bring Marxism into the field. It was characterized by extensive theoretical discussions about the status of psychology among sciences and about the consequences of Marxist philosophy for psychological theory. A considerable range of viewpoints was represented in the discussions.

Between 1930 and 1936, it began with the Communist cell of the Moscow Psychological Institute initiating a series of discussions of the basic premises for a Marxian psychology, primarily a criticism of the then-established Kornilov reactology. Dialectical materialism in psychology is close to reflexology because it tends to base its system on the principles of dialectical materialism. In the Soviet Union, the pluralism of Western methods was confronted in Soviet psychology by integrated Marxist-Leninist ideology, which has made it possible to understand the real nature of the mind.

2.3. Political Pressure Period

The context of Soviet psychology underwent several changes in the 1930s as a result of political influences. In 1929-30, Lenin Philosophical Notebooks appeared in print. According to Teplov (1947), Lenin's theory of psychic life as the reflection of reality created considerable interest and was much discussed by psychologists. General acceptance of the Lenin reflection theory resulted in greatly increased interest in problems of sensation and perception. In 1936, mental testing largely disappeared. Educational processes and procedures research had been the most prominent feature of Soviet psychology since the late 1930s. During the Stalin era, 1924 till 1953, government control became oppressive of psychologists, to an extent rare in other nations. Psychologists lost their positions and, on occasion, their lives. Bekhterev himself--the day after he made an offhand comment during his physical examination of Josef Stalin--was fatally poisoned at the Bolshoi Theatre buffet. Like Armenia's top psychologist, Gurgen Edilian, many leading psychologists found themselves exiled or worse during those dark years, putting scientific psychology on a shaky footing (Joravsky, 1989).

Further changes in Soviet psychology followed World War II. In 1946, the Central Committee of the Communist Party passed a decree objecting to the supposedly exaggerated reliance of Soviet scientists on foreign sources, and the failure to credit Russian scientists sufficiently. A tendency developed among psychologists to cite exclusively Soviet sources, or only the "classics of Marxism Leninism," and it became difficult to trace the influence of foreign sources in Soviet psychology. There is a conspicuous omission among the principal historical sources consulted in writing these "historical remarks on Soviet psychology."

2.4. Restructuring in Psychology in Russia

In 1989, the Soviet Psychologists' Society held an All-Union Conference in Moscow (Gindis, 1992). Prior to this meeting, a round table discussion, "Restructuring in Psychology: Problems and Means of Resolutions," was published in the leading professional journal *Problems of Psychology*. Participants in both events bitterly acknowledged a state of crisis in the theoretical domain, in the area of professional training, in the field of practical functioning, and in the sphere of scientific communication. As a result, Soviet psychology found itself ill-equipped to participate in the socio-economic reconstruction of the Soviet society. The blame for this crisis is laid at the door of rigid ideological control which has adversely affected the development of all the social sciences in the former U.S.S.R., with psychology being no exception. Fear of critical revisions of basic theoretical assumptions, lack of freedom in discussion, extreme ideologization of scientific criticism, and isolation from and confrontation with the world psychological community on the basis of ideological differences have been named as the leading causes of the current stagnation in the domain of Soviet psychology. Another openly acknowledged problem of Soviet psychology was the lack of reliable and valid methods of research and psychological evaluation. Despite the hardships it has endured, Soviet psychology has indeed achieved significant results in certain areas. The accomplishments of Soviet psychology in psychophysics, psychophysiology, neuropsychology, and developmental psychology have earned international recognition and respect in the world's psychological community.

Since 1991, the changes in Russia and the other 14 republics have been so transforming that the world is unsure even what to call these republics, which are now separate, yet interdependent. In less than 20 years, psychology has seen changes. The oppression of the Stalin gulags is apparently long past, and psychology is relatively free from political pressure. The Marxist influence on psychology still exists, but on a voluntary basis, while the science of psychology grows more diverse. Now, post-Soviet psychology continues to grow into a more vibrant and diverse force in order to address the also-growing social problems which await it.

3. Psychology in China: evolution and transform

3.1 The Birth of Psychology in China: Prior to 1949

There is a rich body of psychological thought present in the writings of ancient Chinese philosophers. However, psychology in China did not develop into a systematic discipline, despite the fact that the concepts of psychology have deep roots in Chinese civilization dating back to almost 2,500 years. Some researchers thought that Chinese psychology has lacked a scientific basis because of the belief that Chinese scholars should only concern themselves with “book learning, literature, history and poetry, but not with science” (Higgins & Zheng, 2002).

In the early 1900s, Chinese intellectuals began the Reform Movement. They promoted an uncompromising rejection of Chinese traditions (especially those with Confucian roots) and advocated total or whole-hearted Westernization, in terms of science. At the beginning of the 20th century, China's emphasis turned to modernism and technological development after the devastating invasions by Western countries and the fall of the imperial system. It led to the development of a number of areas of study and research, including psychology (Hsu, 1983; Yang, 1998). Chinese students who had studied in the West brought back ideas fundamental to modern psychology and translated Western books. In 1889, for example, Yan Yongjing translated a Japanese version of Joseph Haven's *Mental Philosophy* (1875), which was regarded as the first Western psychology book to be published in China (Kodama, 1991). Later, the Chinese educational reformer, Cai Yuanpei, who studied psychology at Wundt's Laboratory in Leipzig and who later became president of Peking University, set up the first psychology laboratory at Peking University in 1917 (Jing, 1994). Meanwhile, some Chinese scholars finished their studies in Western universities and returned to China to teach and do research in psychology. They played important roles in laying the foundation for the development of modern Chinese psychology. This included renowned scientists like Z. Y. Kuo (1898-1970), who did research on instinct and heredity in animals. He went to the University of California at Berkeley in 1918 and returned to China in 1929. Wei Ai (1890-1970), wrote about educational and experimental psychology, and C. W. Luh (1894-1970) researched on memory. Li Chen (1902-2004), known as the founder of Chinese industrial psychology, carried out field studies in Chinese factories after studying under C. Spearman of University College London. S. K. Chou (1903-1996) researched on the recognition of Chinese characters. S. Pan, who obtained his Ph.D. in Chicago in 1927, worked with Carr on the influence of context on learning and memory. He later became president of the Chinese Psychological Society when it was reestablished in 1955 after the People's Republic of China was founded.

In short, from the 1920s through the 1940s, Chinese psychology was oriented

mainly toward Western psychology. Psychology was basically an imported product whose general development was slow because of the unstable social environment in China during this period.

3.2 Psychological Research in Communist China, 1949-1966

After the founding of the People's Republic in 1949, psychology was reestablished under the auspices of the Communist Party. The new psychology took Marxism-Leninism and Mao's thought as the basic philosophy underlying its psychological theory. In the 1950's, some psychology periodicals were published. The publication of three important Chinese textbooks in the early 1960s reflected a significant development of teaching and research during that period: General Psychology (Cao, 1963), Educational Psychology (Pan, 1964), and Child Psychology (Zhu, 1962). Psychology had a preliminary development in the 1950s and early 1960s and carried out a great deal of theoretical and applied research related to China's social, economic and cultural development. In 1958, the Institute of Psychology was set up as a part of the Chinese Academy of Science, and about half of the 3,000 Chinese psychologists then worked in normal universities or pedagogical institutes in the fields of developmental and educational psychology (Jing, 1994). Some basic psychological studies were also carried out on perception, conceptual development, memory, and physiological psychology.

For a brief period, Pavlovian dimensions of Soviet psychology were imported into China. Throughout the 1950s there was a strong emphasis on Soviet psychology and, consequently, waves of students went to the Soviet Union to study psychology.

3.3 Cultural Revolution, 1966-1976

Similarly to Soviet psychology fate, the development of psychology in China was not smooth because of the ebb and flow of political movements. In the case of the sciences this is not as difficult as in psychology, because within the history of the People's Republic the academic discipline of psychology has been attacked twice: once within the Maoist "Great Leap Forward" in 1958 and again in the so-called "Cultural Revolution." Within the latter movement a ban was enforced against all social sciences, including psychology. This ban was disastrous because no psychological research of teaching was allowed for the long period between 1966 and 1976. All organizations of psychology were completely abolished. Teachers and researchers were dismissed and investigative work was stopped completely. Some psychologists were sent to other workplaces or work camps (Petzold, 1994). The only social psychology articles then published were criticisms of the bourgeois and idealist values of Western psychology. However, some psychologists insisted on and worked hard to facilitate psychological studies in China. Among them were R. C. Cao, S. Pan, and others.

In the politically charged climate of the time, research and psychology suffered severely. Cultural Revolution turned the entire society upside down. Western theories were viewed as a tool for exploiting the working class and a false bourgeois science, which contradicted with the Marxist framework of historical materialism.

3.4 Multiple Rebirths of Psychology: 1976-Present

In 1976, the study of psychology in China entered a period of rapid development. Chinese economic reform launched an open-door policy to the outside world in the late

1970s, and psychology was rehabilitated as a scientific discipline. In 1977, the Chinese Psychological Society was reinaugurated. And next year, the Institute of Psychology, Chinese Academy of Sciences, and many university sections and departments of psychology were reinstated, including those at Peking University, Beijing Normal University, East China Normal University, and Hangzhou University. Meanwhile, many Chinese psychologists visited other countries, and psychologists from abroad visited China and lectured in China's universities. Since 1979, large numbers of scholars and students from mainland China were sent to the West for study or research. China's psychological research team has been growing rapidly over the last thirty years and is beginning to take its place in international psychology. With the development of China's economy, the study of psychology is becoming increasingly important.

4. Soviet psychology and the Chinese response

4.1 Oriented Toward Exotic Ideas

The advent of the May Fourth Movement in 1919 brought forth a challenge to the Confucian political structure, as a strong student movement sought to overthrow the feudal system with which China had been saddled for centuries and to re-evaluate traditional thinking. The attention paid to Western science in the 1920s spread the seeds for China's receptiveness to many Western subjects and led to their becoming disciplines taught in institutions of higher education: psychology was one such discipline. By the end of the 1920s and 1930s, not only universities but also many teacher colleges were instructing their pupils in the ideas of Freud, Watson, McDougall, Piaget, Lewin, and Kohler using translated texts and essays.

At the beginning of the 20th century, some early Chinese psychologists had adopted the Western ideas of behaviorism, psychoanalysis, and Gestalt psychology, and the works of Pavlov, Bekhterev, and Komilov were translated from Russian. Pavlov and the conditioned response have predominated in basic theory. Sechenov's research into the physiology of the nervous system and cortical reflexes, and the early experiments of Pavlov on conditioned reflexes led a new road in Chinese psychology. Lenin's theory of reflexion, combined with Pavlov's conception of higher nervous activity, became the cornerstone of Chinese psychology.

Later, Marxism became more important than Pavlovianism. As early as the 1930s, some Chinese psychologists tried to take dialectical materialism as the guiding principle in their work. Pan was dissatisfied with the various schools of Western psychology when he studied psychology in the USA in the 1920s. After returning to China, he read *Lenin's Materialism and Empirico-criticism* in Shanghai in 1933, and he found that many standpoints argued for in the book provided meaningful solutions for basic theoretical problems in psychology which had not been solved until that time (Pan, 1987). Pan gave a series of lectures about theoretical psychology. In them, he consciously applied dialectical materialism to the basic theoretical problems of psychology. Meanwhile, Pan (1984, 1987) pointed out psychology should be pursued under the guidance of dialectical materialism because only dialectical materialism can help psychologists overcome the defects of traditional psychology and explore scientifically the nature of human beings and human psychological activities (Yue, 1994). Gao (1979) had advanced some principles that can be used to build psychology on the basis of Marxist philosophical theory, and Ching (1980) held that dialectical materialism must

guide psychological science. In this period, Shu Pan, Juefu Gao, Zeru Lu and Yicen Guo wrote articles or books introducing Soviet psychology to the Chinese. Guo's *Outlines of Modern Psychology*, published in 1937, was the first book written under the guise of dialectical materialism in China (Yue, 1994).

It was a main theme of both Soviet and Chinese psychology, that theory or the evolution of a Marxist psychology was consonant with dialectical materialism. The Marxist-Leninist view, based on dialectical materialism, had been tenacious, with only a slightly added Chinese flavor. In fact, from the 1920s through the 1940s, Chinese psychology was oriented mainly toward Western psychology. Experimental approaches were emphasized, and Chinese psychologists were strongly influenced by the schools of functionalism, behaviorism, and the Freudians. Psychology was basically an imported product whose general development was slow because of the unstable social environment in China during this period.

4.2 Oriented Towards Political Pressure

China was heavily influenced by the former Soviet Union. The Soviet Communist Party (which helped with the founding of the Chinese Communist Party in 1921) was considered by the Chinese to be a successful model of the socialist system. Therefore, it was a natural choice for the Chinese Communist Party to adopt socialism when it founded the new China. After 1949, Marxism-Leninism became a dominating ideology in China, and Marxist dialectical materialism had been considered foundational to Chinese psychology (Gao, 1985). In the process of reconstruction, the new psychology took Marxism-Leninism and Maoism as its underlying philosophical principles, and Soviet psychology became a model of Chinese psychology. Chinese psychology was guided by the slogan "Learn from the Soviet Psychology" (Barabanshchikova & Koltsova, 1989). Contacts with Western psychology were curtailed, and Soviet psychology became a model for Chinese psychologists for it was considered to be the science best conforming to the ideology of the victorious class of the working people. Meanwhile, books by Soviet psychologists (Pavlov, Luria, Sechenov, etc.) were translated into Chinese; Chinese students and postgraduates were sent to study in Russia rather than in the United States. Pavlovian dimensions of Soviet psychology were imported into China, and his theory of conditioned reflex was the main theoretical approach of Chinese psychology. The belief that Marxism was the only correct doctrine not only in economics and politics but in science as well (psychology no exception) was gaining ground.

To understand the Soviet influence on Chinese psychology one must consider the rigid Chinese adherence to the two-camp thesis. For the Chinese, the post-war international system was structurally bipolar. To be certain, this dichotomous view of international politics had its genesis in the worldview of the Yan'an leadership. The two camps were socialist and imperialist. They were headed by the Soviet Union and the United States respectively. At this time it was widely held that psychology, based as it was upon Western ideas would need to be revised to fit better into the new social and political situation. Like other intellectuals, psychologists had to study Marxist philosophy and their discipline had to be practiced. Freud's psychoanalysis theory was denounced as pansexualism. All the psychologists learned and used Pavlov's theory and followed the model of the former Soviet Union.

In the latter years of the 1950's and with the more recent Great Proletarian Cul-

tural Revolution beginning in 1965, the impact has been unprecedentedly great. During the 1950s, the Soviet bureaucracy served as advisor to Mao Tse Tung and others in the political power structure (Jenni, 1999). Given the particular interpretation of communist ideology and practice of the times, psychology was seen as subversive, capitalist, and imperialist. The system remained intact even after the relationship between China and the former Soviet Union broke up for political reasons. The prolonged existence of the system could be attributed to the fact that, having adopted a closed-door system, the Chinese government did not keep in touch with world issues and changes. The Systemic problems peaked during the devastating Cultural Revolution, which turned the entire society upside down. In the politically charged climate of the time, research on psychology suffered severely. Indeed, running through the history of psychology in Communist China was a conflict between two underlying philosophies. One of these sees the subject matter of psychology to be processes universal in man, as in Soviet psychology, while the other sees psychology in the light of the conflict of economic classes, as in recent Chinese development.

In China, confounding political matters with academic ones led to the suppression of certain subfields in psychology. For example, social psychology and psychological testing were abolished “on the grounds that the former ignored the class nature of social groups, and the latter stressed too heavily individual differences rather than social differences” (Jing, 1994). The only social psychology articles then published were criticisms of the bourgeois and idealist values of Western psychology. As Brown (1983) noted, Western theories were viewed as a tool for exploiting the working class and a false bourgeois science, which contradicted the Marxist framework of historical materialism.

As we know, the influence of politics on psychology has at times been strong. Leung and Zhang (1995) note, “even though it is a science, psychology could be construed as an ideology and hence a threat to the doctrine promulgated by the ruling regime or by influential segments of society.” During the period of the Cultural Revolution, psychology was attacked by the extreme leftist revolutionaries as a “bourgeois pseudo-science,” and was uprooted completely as a scientific discipline. Chinese psychology, or in other words, psychology in China, thereby, stands as an acute example of a discipline peculiarly sensitive to ideological influence. Its development was buffeted by enormous political upheavals, and these interruptions had a very strong and very mixed influence.

4.3 Oriented Towards Social Need and Practical Applications

Since it was introduced into China at the turn of the century, psychology has followed a difficult path to arrive at its current standing. However, with China’s open-door to the outside world and market economic reform from the late 1970s, and particularly, with the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, the Soviet influence has faded away, and both American and European traditions of psychology have become the dominated paradigm of Chinese psychology. Psychology in China is rehabilitating as a scientific discipline. Psychologists have reached a consensus on building psychology with Chinese characteristics (Chen, 1993; Shi, 1989). Yue (1994) reflected on the need for Chinese psychologists to strengthen their theoretical roots and bind their work closely to life in China. Wang (1993) concluded that much recent Chinese psychological research has

been closely linked with economic and social reform, technological developments, and applications of psychology (e.g., the design of Chinese language computers, the effects of the single-child policy). Most research projects are therefore oriented toward society's need and practical applications. As we have seen, the development of Chinese psychology is closely linked with the social environment and with government policy. This link will continue and will orient most psychological research toward practical applications

5. Discuss: knowledge production and transfer

For a variety of reasons, psychology was seen from the beginning of its importation to be a foreign discipline, initially American-European, and later Marxist and Soviet. In the second decade of the People's Republic of China it became progressively Maoist in outlook, only to be outlawed subsequently as a bourgeois discipline. It then re-emerged with a broadened scope and aims, as China once again became receptive to ideas from inside and outside the culture. It is a process of knowledge production and transfer. Knowledge is created and transferred in social sciences and humanities in general, and in psychology in particular. As we know, social knowledge is knowledge in communication and knowledge in action. Communication by definition involves movements of thoughts, transformation of meanings and contents of knowledge. There can be no social knowledge unless formed, maintained, diffused and transformed within society, either between individuals or between individuals and groups, subgroups and cultures. Social knowledge is about the dynamics of stability and change.

The emergence of a new, more social perspective in the psychology of groups involved the gradual reconstruction of a social representations system through the processes of assimilation and accommodation. Social representations processes are transformed in the organism-environment-culture system. Within the realm of the social sciences the organism-environment-culture system embraces the individual, both as a scientist and as a member of society; it embraces the object of study in the research setting as well as in society and everyday life; and it embraces the community of scientists as well as the broader culture. Moscovici developed social representations theory in order to describe and explain the transformation of common-sense knowledge as the innovations and discoveries of science diffuse within society. Science is conceived as a human endeavor in which individuals, who have internalized the language and beliefs of their community, contribute to and evaluate knowledge. Scientifically, research, like any other activity, is a culturally and historically situated activity which is ongoing and open-ended, always open to revision and change. This does not imply an extreme relativism or extreme social constructionism. Such a position could not explain the phenomenal success of the sciences, nor could it explain the transformation of science. Rather, it expresses a reality which is founded in the organism-environment-culture system. Social representations theory, as an expression of the social constructionist paradigm, constitutes a framework in which to develop a social psychology of science in China.

This paper presents an overview of how Chinese psychology was influenced by Soviet psychology, and the social processes leading to such knowledge production and transfer. More generally, it indicates a form of social thought. Social representations are practical and communicable ways of thinking that are oriented towards understanding and mastery of the environment. As Jodelet (1988) states, the concept of social repre-

sentation indicated a specific form of knowledge, i.e. common-sense knowledge, the contents of which reveal the operation of processes that are generative and that (serve) distinct social purpose. From the perspective of social representations, the rise and decline of Soviet influence on Chinese psychology well illustrate how political-economic-ideological forces affect the production and transformation of scientific knowledge, and such knowledge is always produced through interaction and communication, between the particular groups of people and their contexts.

The field of psychology has long been dominated by Western theories, data, practitioners, and subjects. Within the past some decades, however, a growing body of psychological research on Chinese people has added rich new data and insights to our understanding of both culture-specific and universal learning, thinking, and behavior. We have seen that throughout China's developm. Early, Chinese psychology became a graft product of Western and Soviet psychology. Chinese psychologists had adopted the Western ideas of behaviorism, psychoanalysis, and Gestalt psychology, and the works of Pavlov, Bekhterev, and Komilov were translated from Russian. Chinese psychology will certainly benefit from learning from Western advanced psychology and Soviet psychology.

However, to interpret the mental phenomena and behavior of the Chinese people, attention must also be focused on the theoretical construction of China's indigenous psychological heritage traced through traditional Chinese culture. Indigenous psychology strives toward developing a 'system of psychological knowledge based on scientific research that is sufficiently compatible with the studied phenomena and their ecological, economic, social, cultural, and historical contexts. The adherence to the indigenous culture in modern Chinese psychology will place world psychology in a broader framework and expand psychology to a more complete body of knowledge. Nowadays, however, more and more scholars taking the cross-cultural view of psychology (Matsumoto, 2000) have realized that it is not appropriate simply to apply Western theories to explain the behavior of the Chinese or any other cultural group.

Today, it is seen as a valuable and necessary source of information and practice as China meets the demanding challenges of economic and cultural transformation. It may be expected that psychology will play an important role in the attainment of China's present goal to modernize industry, agriculture, science, and technology. The goal is to contribute to economic development and national modernization. It began a more favorable environment for the present development of Chinese psychology. Most research projects are therefore oriented toward society's needs and practical applications.

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Technology, Psychology, and Man-Made Crises: On the evolution of non-violence in human history

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Abstract

Rough calculations demonstrate that while demographic densities and technical capacity for mutual destruction have increased throughout the millennia, violent death rate – the average number of deliberate killings per capita per time unit – has been decreasing. The resulting downward trend appears highly non-linear and mediated by man-made crises and catastrophes, but still, in the long term, consecutive. Meanwhile, there is no direct evidence of falling aggressiveness of the humans in the course of history – natural aggressive impulses were rather growing up with population concentration. Obviously, some perfecting cultural and psychological mechanisms of aggression-retention have compensated for technological and demographic growth. This issue is explored using the pattern of techno-humanitarian balance.

Key words: *Aggression, violence, non-violence, self-organization, technological might, mental regulation, Bloodshed Ratio, techno-humanitarian balance, internal sustainability, external sustainability, anthropogenic crisis, Homo prae-crisimos syndrome, psychological fitting, phylogenesis, historical development, cultural revolutions.*

J. Piaget [1997] and his followers [Volovikova, Rebeko 1990] have demonstrated a positive link between individual intellectual and moral development. The ethnographers' observations have empirically verified the "conflict-enculturation hypothesis": the downward course of children's violence with increasing age was revealed both in Western and other cultures [Munroe et al 2000; Chick 1998]. The American psychologist L. Kohlberg [1984] tried to apply the notion of moral development to human history as a single progressive process, but his optimistic conclusions are still subject to criticism, even by social evolutionists.

In this article, we expound some cross-disciplinary results carried out lately by the Russian scientists. Insights from archeology, comparative history, social psychology, cultural anthropology, ecology and biology have been synthesized. A synergetic (i.e. chaos-theory) view on society as a sustainable non-equilibrium system and on culture

as a complex anti-entropy mechanism served for data integration.

Trying to discover common mechanisms and causal links, certain regularities are noted that may throw new light on two points thoroughly discussed in historical sociology and psychology. One is whether or not “panhuman history” may be reasonably construed; the other is whether or not there may be observed any kind of evolution in human mentality.

In chaos-theory terms, human history and prehistory is the story of one “self-similar” system, which exists on a scale of 2.5 million or so years and has been successively transforming itself to maintain sustainability. Retrospective analytical procedures have shown at least five mainstreams of consecutive global transformations: *increases in world population, in technological power, in organizational complexity, and in mental information capacity, and perfection of cultural regulation mechanisms.*

The first three mainstreams are inferred as “empirical generalizations” that are easily illustrated with figures. The fourth and the fifth require particular arguments [Nazaretyan 2004]. It is argued that the perfection of cultural regulation mechanisms in conformity with developing instrumental intelligence has been a basic condition for all the other mainstreams.

The pattern of techno-humanitarian balance

Zoologists have gathered substantial evidence concerning *ethological balance*: that is, the more powerful species’ natural killing power, the stronger the inhibition of intra-species aggression. Summing up remarkable observations in his brilliant book about aggression, K. Lorenz [1981] noted that we ought to regret not having the ‘nature of the predator’. For had humans descended from lions instead of biologically harmless *Australopithecus*, he explained, we would have a much stronger aggression-retention instinct preventing warfare.

Meanwhile, comparative calculations have demonstrated that lions (and other strong predators), relative to their population, kill each other *more frequently* than humans do [Wilson 1978].

This result looked sensational. First, it is true that lions, unlike humans, have a strong instinctive ban on killing conspecifics. Second, lions’ natural population density differs tremendously from that of human communities, whereas concentration usually increases aggression among both animals and humans. Third, ‘killing facilities’ are incomparable: the assaulting lion’s sharp teeth meet the enemy’s strong pelt, while mutual killing among humans who are armed if only with stones, is technically very easy, and since the Stone Age, weapons’ ‘progress’ has been enormous.

The Australian ethnographers received another interesting result having compared wars among the aboriginals with World War II. Out of all participants, only the USSR lost more human lives in relation to population numbers than primitive tribes usually did [Blainey 1975].

According to our calculations, from 100 to 120 million people perished in all the international and civil wars of the 20th century^a. The numbers, which also involve indirect warfare tolls, are monstrous. Still, they represent about 1% of the century’s planet population (no less than 10.1 billions in the three generations). Approximately a similar ratio occurred in the 19th century (about 35 million war victims to 3 billion population), and probably, in the 18th century, while in the period from the 14th to the 17th centuries

the ratio had been higher.

Contradictory data and lack of co-ordinate calculation procedures [Wright 1942; Uralnis 1994] make comparative inquiry rather difficult. Nonetheless, general estimates reveal a paradoxical fact. While weapons' killing power and people's concentration have been successively growing for millennia, the number of war victims as a percentage of the overall population has not.

Besides wars, a total amount of victims includes people perished during 'peaceful' political repressions, and everyday violence; so in the 20th century, up to 4-5% of the world population seems to have died in the acts of *deliberate* violence [Nazaretyan 2008]. The decreasing trend is more manifest when non-war violence victims are compared. To calculate them retrospectively is even more difficult, but as far as the orders of magnitude are concerned, we may resort to the indirect evidence.

Wars, repressions, and everyday violence led to approximately similar numbers of human deaths in the 20th century. Meanwhile, the proportion of non-war victims of violence compared to the warfare ones was different in the past. We may observe this difference distinctly by comparing remote epochs of cultural history.

For instance, J. Diamond [1999, p.277] summarized his own field observations and critically revised his colleagues' information: "Much more extensive long-term information about band and tribal societies reveals that murder is a leading cause of death". This conclusion apparently considers the total sum of infanticide, geronticide, inter-tribe, inner conflicts, hunting for heads, etc. M. Cohen, a most competent specialist in historical demography, who is also known as an admirer of the Paleolithic, still had to recognize: "Even in groups without patterns of formal warfare... homicide may be surprisingly common when measured on a per capita basis" [Cohen 1989, p.131].

For a comparative historical research, we used a distinctive cross-cultural index of practical violence – *Bloodshed Ratio (BR)*, a ratio of the average number of killings per unit of time $k(\Delta t)$ to the population size during that period $p(\Delta t)$:

$$BR = \frac{k(\Delta t)}{p(\Delta t)} \quad (I)$$

For the purpose of global and long-term historical retrospection, we accept $\Delta t = 100$ years, as we compare *Bloodshed Ratio* by centuries. The total number of violence victims is considered as the sum of *war victims* – wv , *repression victims* – rv , and *everyday victims* – ev . The integral population number of Earth during a century is the total sum of demographic data in the beginning (01st year), the middle (50th year), and the end (100th year) of the century.

So, the equation for *Bloodshed Ratio of the century* looks like:

$$BR_{(c)} = \frac{\sum_{i=1}^3 k_i}{\sum_{i=1}^3 p_i} = \frac{k_1 + k_2 + k_3}{p_1 + p_2 + p_3} = \frac{wv + rv + ev}{p_1 + p_2 + p_3} \quad (II)$$

Special calculations demonstrate that the violent death rate decreases irregularly

in the context of a successively increasing potential for mutual destruction and population densities in the course of millennia [Nazaretyan 2008] (see also [Social violence... 2005; Korotaev 2008]). This contrasting combination of the long-term trends implies an additional assumption: there should have been a certain cultural factor, which compensated for the growth of instrumental might. The factor's dynamics are better shown as we supplement global comparisons with regional ones (see below). As to its essence, it explains a hypothesis that arises from quite different empirical data; in fact, our calculations are conducted to check a corollary of the hypothesis.

Summing up diverse information from cultural anthropology, history and historical psychology concerning anthropogenic crises, we suggest that there was a regular relation between three variables: technological potential, cultural regulation quality, and social sustainability. The pattern called *the law of techno-humanitarian balance* states that *the higher the power of production and war technologies, the more advanced behavior-regulation means is required to enable self-preservation of the society*.

The circumstances of early hominids' existence were of the kind that only a dramatic development of instrumental intelligence gave them a chance to survive [History... 1983]. Meantime, having begun tool making, they dramatically interfered with the ethological balance. The power of artificial weapons rapidly exceeded the power of instinctive aggression-inhibition, and the proportion of mortal conflicts within the population grew incompatible with its further existence. This could have been the main reason for the fact demonstrated in archeology [Klix 1985]: many groups seem to be on the margin between animals and proto-humans, but very few could cross it; those few groups managed to cope with the endogenous danger.

Indeed, individuals with normal animal motivation were doomed to mutual destruction in the new unnatural conditions, and the groups in which certain psychostenic and hysterical individuals prevailed, got selective privileges. Their survival required artificial (beyond biological instincts) collective regulation, which was paradoxically provided by pathological changes of the psycho-nervous system, abnormal mental lability, suggestibility, and phobias. Thus, irrational fear of the dead and posthumous revenge is supposed to strongly restrain in-group aggression. It also stimulated care for the handicapped: archeology gives us evidence of such biologically senseless facts in the early Paleolithic.

The assumption of a "herd of crazies" who seem to be our remote ancestors has been thoroughly argued by the neurologists, cultural anthropologists and psychologists [Davydenkov 1947; Pfeiffer 1982; Grimak 2001; Nazaretyan 2005-a]. Here, the relevant point is that the initial forms of proto-culture and proto-morals emerged as an outcome of the first *existential crisis* in human prehistory: neurosis compensated for the insufficient instinct as aggression-inhibitor and served ferment for the development of spiritual reality.

From *Homo habilis* on, hominids' unnatural intra-species killing facility seems to have been a key problem of pre-human and human history: the ways of solving this existential problem influenced essentially the forms of social organization, cultural and spiritual processes. Since the further life of the *hominidae* family (including *Homo sapiens*) has not had a natural background any longer, it was to a great extent enabled by the adequacy of cultural regulation with technological power. The law of techno-humanitarian balance has controlled socio-historical selection, discarding social organisms that

could not adapt to their tools' power. We shall demonstrate that the pattern helps explain causally both sudden collapses of flourishing societies and breakthroughs of humanity into new historical epochs (which often look still more mysterious).

Although the pattern is based on voluminous empirical evidence, its universal character remains hypothetical. Besides comparative calculations of the victims of violence, there are some additional non-trivial corollaries under verification. Furthermore, a special apparatus is being constructed, which will allow estimating sustainability of social organisms as much as it depends on technological potential and cultural regulation.

For an initial and rough guide, *internal* and *external sustainability* are distinguished. The former, Si , expresses capability of the social system to keep away from endogenous catastrophes, and is estimated as the ratio of catastrophes per population number. The latter, Se , is capability to withstand natural and/or geopolitical habitat fluctuations.

If we refer to the quality of cultural regulation as R , and technological potential as T , a simple equation represents the techno-humanitarian balance pattern:

$$Si = \frac{f_1(R)}{f_2(T)} \quad (III)$$

It goes without saying that $T > 0$, for in case of no technology at all we are dealing with a *herd* (not a society) where biological causalities are effective. When technological potential is very low, primitive cultural regulation means is sufficient to prevent anthropogenic crises, as in the case of the Paleolithic tribes. A system is highly sustainable, up to stagnation, as cultural regulation quality considerably exceeds technological might (middle-age China is a textbook example). Finally, the denominator growth increases the probability of anthropogenic crises, if it is not compensated by growth of the numerator.

Actually, the indices' structure, the methods of quantitative estimation and the definition of functions $f1$ and $f2$ are under consideration. Thus, the magnitude of R is composed of at least three parameters: the social organization's complexity, the culture's information complexity (anthropologists work over calculation procedures for these indices [Chick 1997]), and the average individual's cognitive complexity (the parameter is investigated by experimental psycho-semantics [Petrenko 2005]). The last component is the most dynamic one, and we will show that the decline of cognitive complexity under emotional impulse is the leading reason for crisis-causing behavior. In contrast to internal sustainability, the external one is a positive function of technological potential^b:

$$Se = g(T...) \quad (IV)$$

Thus, *growing technological potential makes a social system less vulnerable to external fluctuations, and more vulnerable to the internal ones, i.e. mass mental states, inadequate decisions of influential leaders, etc. (less "fool-proof")*.

One more conclusion is that the specific weight of anthropogenic crises *versus* the ones caused by outside factors (spontaneous climate fluctuations, geological and cosmic cataclysms, incoming aggressive nomads, and so on) has been historically increasing.

The consequences of techno-humanitarian imbalance

Ethnographic papers are full of tragic stories about the aboriginals of Africa, Asia,

and America, after they first mastered European technologies, like the following. During the Vietnam War, a Paleolithic *Mountain Khmer* tribe obtained American carbines. The hunters mastered the new weapon, and soon after that, they exterminated the fauna, shot each other down, and those who survived, left the mountains and disappeared [Pegov & Puzachenko 1994].

Such cases look like “artifacts”, as far as the technologies came from outside, the society skipped over several historical phases, and left a deep gap between firearm and Stone Age psychology; therefore, the processes were accelerated, and causes and effects were apparent. Similar leaps do not usually occur in the authentic history, and thus, the disparity between ‘instrumental’ and ‘humanitarian’ intelligence (the ‘force’ and the ‘wisdom’) is not that manifest. So, causal links are complex, delayed for centuries or, in early history, for millennia. To be revealed, the same causalities require a thorough analysis supplied with an appropriate working pattern.

To explain the pattern, we may first resort to a classic experiment in a Petrie dish. Several bacteria impetuously propagate themselves in a closed vessel with a nutrient medium, and soon, the population suffocates in its own wastes. This is a graphic image of living matter’s behavior: as long as the capacity of extensive growth prevails over habitat resistance, the population keeps on capturing available vital space, and repressing as much as it can any counteraction or competition. For this reason, a natural ecosystem is full of ecological micro-crises.

In natural conditions, the aggravations are usually regulated via dynamic equilibrium mechanisms, which have been developed for billions of years. Strategically, the processes of breaking and restoring an inner balance lead to increasing variety of ecosystems and their joint sustainability, which go together with the highly irregular conditions of each population’s existence (oscillations in ‘predator – prey’ circuit, etc.).

Culture, in both its material and regulative hypostases, has always been aimed at emancipation from spontaneous environmental fluctuations. Social communities, unlike animal populations, do not behave so rectilinearly as the bacteria colony in a Petrie dish does, until cultural restraints substitute for the habitat resistance^c. Meanwhile, a broken balance between grown technological opportunities and former regulation mechanisms can change the situation radically. According to formula (III), it reduces internal social sustainability, but the approaching menace is not noticed right away.

On the contrary, superiority of instrumental intelligence entails the rise of ecological and/or geopolitical aggression. Insufficiency of cultural restraints makes the society’s behavior essentially similar to that of a biological population, especially as natural expansion impulses are supplemented with a specifically human factor: needs go higher as soon as they are satisfied.

The psychological aspect is given more detailed analysis in the following section. We must just note here that sooner or later, extensive growth runs against real limits, which leads to the anthropogenic crisis. Most frequently, it is followed by the catastrophic phase: the society falls a victim to its own non-compensated power.

Special investigations show that most tribes, states, or civilizations in the past were destroyed not so much by external factors (such cases also took place, but they are less interesting for our subject), but because they had subverted the natural and organizational bases of their own existence. As to military interventions, epidemics, ecological cataclysms, riots, and so on, events of that kind usually accomplished the society’s self-

destroying activity, like a virus or cancer cells do a similar job in a weakened biological organism.

Numerous facts gathered in relevant papers [Grigoriev 1991; Global... 2002] testify to the distressing destiny of societies that could not anticipate the delayed consequences of their economic activities. In spite of all peculiarities, a common script was simple: increasing intervention into the ecosystem → landscape destruction → social catastrophe.

As many researchers have indicated, an empire's destruction frequently followed its flourishing, if increasing inner diversity did not accompany extensive growth. A. Toynbee cited various examples to illustrate the inverse relationship between "military and social progress" and was puzzled by the fact that this was surprisingly true about production tools as well as weapons. Modern historians have also repeatedly indicated that new technical achievements usually preceded social decline: "It certainly seems as though... every heightening of efficiency in production were matched by a new vulnerability to breakdown" [McNeill 1992, p.148].

The facts of social systems' fracture conditioned by technological growth are so numerous that they serve as a pretext, on the one hand, for total technological pessimism and, on the other, for denial of a common human history. The patterns of closed civilization cycles deprived of continuity started to supplant the ones of single historical process in the late 19th, early 20th centuries. The discussion of those problems has resurfaced lately in relevant literature. To a considerable extent, it centers on the psychological aspect: if human consciousness has been transforming historically, whether or not those transformations were 'progressive'?

Nowadays, the idea gets new empirical and conceptual support. The techno-humanitarian balance pattern highlights both the facts of a social system's self-destruction and the opposite ones, concerning the constructive solution to anthropogenic crises. The latter have been less frequent in the past; however, they were the turning points of world history.

Namely, as a certain crisis involved a vast region highly saturated with diverse cultures, its inhabitants managed to find a key way out of the deadlock. Each time it was conditioned by a set of irreversible social, political, and psychological transformations (see below), which have been lined up as the consecutive evolution mainstreams. As special analysis shows, society's ability for the appropriate transformation of its economy, policy and mentality essentially depended on marginal groups, which had been formerly neglected and despised; this we refer to as *the redundant variety rule*.

No less than seven crucial breakthroughs in all of human history and prehistory have been revealed and described. Still, most researchers have so far either confined themselves to phenomenology or left for the future the problem of causes and premises of the revolutionary transformation. Thus, Jaspers [1955] has adduced "the simultaneity puzzle": how could the Axial Revolt occur simultaneously on the immense geographical area from Judea, Persia and Greece to India and China?

The techno-humanitarian balance pattern proves helpful for *causal* scrutiny of great historical turning points, each of which had been preceded by a wide-scale anthropogenic crisis. Human consciousness has progressively evolved, restoring step-by-step the disturbed cultural balance. So more curious is the fact we find out as we make a close study of social activities foregoing crises aggravation: pre-crisis extensive growth

phases are attended by psychological states, processes, and mechanisms, which have astonishingly reproduced themselves regardless of the population's cultural and historical peculiarities. That is why a coming crisis may be diagnosed by psychological symptoms while economic, political, and other signs still indicate growing social prosperity.

Mental conditions on the threshold of a crisis

To begin this section, we consider selected historical episodes that belong to a kind of 'optimistic tragedies'. This will help us observe some specific psychological features of both the pre-crisis state of culture and minds and the one that is present after having coped with the most dangerous aggravations. Here, only the inner logic of the processes is considered; this approach abstracts from the influence of outside factors, up to cosmic ones, on social events.

Apparently, in order to describe those episodes as single separate stories we have to single them out of the continual historical process; for this reason, the conventional beginning and end of each are distinct by means of dots.

The Upper Paleolithic millennia were marked with an unprecedented development of "hunting automation" and distant projectiles. Hunters learned to dig trap-holes, and invented the lance, lance-thrower, darts, and bow with arrows [History... 1983; Semionov 1964]. This created good conditions for demographic growth and human expansion all over the planet. World population reached 5 – 7 million people [McEvedy & Jones 1978; Snooks 1996]. As one hunter-gatherer's nourishment required an average territory of 10 – 20 square km., the planet's resources could not provide for many more people.

However, not only demographic growth created the problem (growth by itself is usually a function of a disturbed technology-psychology balance): archeologists reveal the Upper Paleolithic hunting bacchanalia. While natural predators first get sick and weakened individuals, a well-armed hunter had the opportunity (and desire) to kill the strongest and the nicest ones, and besides, the amount of preys far exceeded the hunters' biological needs. Some kind of wild animals' "anthropogenic graveyards" were discovered by the archeologists, and a great part of the meat had not been used by humans. The dwellings made of mammoth's bones exceeded construction needs. In Siberia, 30-40 adult mammoths' bones were spent on each dwelling, plus newly-born mammoths' skulls, which were used as props and, perhaps, for ritual aims. In the basins of Don and Dnepr, pit-stores of mammoths' bones (their predestination is not quite clear) have been found near some dwellings. Enclosure hunting led to annual extermination of herds [Budyko 1984; Burovsky 1998; Anikovich 1999].

Since the fact was discovered that the last mammoths lived on Wrangell Island about 4000 years ago, until the first humans appeared there [Vartanian et al. 1995], the "overkill" theory of mammoths' and many other big mammals' extinction hardly has an alternative. The first symptoms of mega-fauna elimination are registered near 50000 years ago in Africa, and the process peaked near 20000 years ago in Eurasia, and near 11000 years ago in America [Karlen 2001]. Skillful hunters penetrated into America, quickly spread from Alaska to Tierra del Fuego, and eradicated all big animals, including elephants and camels, which had never before met hominids. Similar effects of mega-fauna extinction followed the first humans' appearance in Oceania and Australia [Budyko 1984; Diamond 1999]. In total, up to 90% big animals disappeared for ever,

although those species had endured twenty Pleistocene climatic cycles.

The trend of merciless extermination was intensified on the threshold of the coming Holocene, the post-glacial epoch, which could have helped foraging economies flourish; instead, it led to a deadlock. Nature could not bear endless pressure on the part of such an unrestrained aggressor as the Upper Paleolithic hunter. Uncontrolled resource exploitation led to the ecosystems' exhaustion and destruction, and it aggravated inter-tribe competition. Population on the Middle latitudes decreased several times.

The Neolithic revolution was society's creative response to the Upper Paleolithic crisis: some tribes made the transition to settled agriculture and cattle breeding, and the new economic idea rapidly spread from several centers (in Eurasia, and later in America). Humans first started "partnership with the nature" [Childe 1936]; their ecological niche essentially deepened. Thanks to developing agriculture, the territories' carrying capacity increased one, and then two, and then three orders of magnitude [Korotaev 1991], and the population rapidly grew.

Complex transformations in social relations and psychology attended the transition from foraging economy to food production. One needs a relevant mental horizon of delayed causalities to throw into earth eatable grains, or to feed and protect animals instead of killing and eating them. The mind's grown information volume was embodied in all vital activities. Social links and role repertory essentially broadened. Production and combat tools were first differentiated, and a new kind of relationship between agricultural and "warrior" tribes was established. The warriors could guess that it was more profitable to protect the producers, and regularly appropriate production "surplus", than to kill or to drive them away, and the farmers understood it was better to payoff the warriors for protection than to leave the land or to perish in hopeless battles.

Such forms of inter-tribe symbiosis and "collective exploitation" supplanted genocide and cannibalism of the Paleolithic. As Telhard de Chardin [1987] notes, since the Neolithic, physical extermination has been an exclusive or, anyhow, secondary factor: the cruelest warfare still included some form of assimilation. Modern anthropologists have also indicated more than once that only in the Neolithic tribe integration (the chiefdoms), people learned "for the first time in history, how to encounter strangers regularly without attempting to kill them" [Diamond 1999, p.273].

Population geneticists have recently added a bright trait to the Neolithic portrayal [Sykes 2001]. Unlike previously prevalent scenario, they showed, the substitution of foraging economy by agriculture had not occurred via displacing or eliminating the hunters-gatherers by an incoming tide of farmers (for instance, from the South Caucasus to the East and to the North-West) but via displacement of the retrograde technologies and organization. At least, so it was in Europe: most of modern Europeans proved to be genetic offspring of the Cro-Magnon hunters. To all appearance, the European story was not an exception.

This is a sensational discovery. It means that first in human history a progressive idea won through change of mental matrix, instead of physical removal of the old idea bearers, what had been common for the Paleolithic. So, the competition of social models was not merely a struggle of races any more: it shifted partly to the "virtual" sphere, which imparted a new long-term mechanism to the historical development...

In the 12-11th centuries BC iron production appeared in the Middle East, Transcaucasia, and East Mediterranean and soon spread to India and China. This produced a

steep rise in extensive (including demographic) growth opportunities.

Bronze weapons had been expensive, fragile, and heavy. Small professional armies composed of physically very strong men had waged wars. It had been extremely expensive to prepare and to arm such troops, as well as to replace a killed fighter. Therefore, each commander had tried to spare his own warriors, and exterminate as many enemies as possible. War-captives had been usually killed, and a subjugated population had been terrorized into obedience, by demonstratively destroying or “taking prisoners” the local gods’ statues, etc. [History... 1989; Berzin 2009].

Steel weapons were considerably cheaper, more durable, and lighter than the ones of bronze. This allowed arming the whole male population; something like a “people’s volunteer corps” replaced the professional armies, and competition for productive soils aggravated. Meantime, the combination of new technology with former social, political, and military values made early Iron Age leaders extraordinarily bloodthirsty [Vigasin 1994; Berzin 2009].

Emperors and generals carved on stones boastful “accounts” to their gods about the numbers of enemies killed, and towns destroyed and burned, which presented sadistic details of their “deeds” (a relevant texts collection from ‘Reader on Ancient East History’ see in [Nazaretyan 2008]). Battles became so bloody and diminution of male population so fast that further life of technologically advanced states was threatened.

Culture responded to the challenge with the Axial Spiritual Revolution, the causes of which, as indicated before, has remained a puzzle so far. On vast geographical area, great prophets, philosophers, statesmen and generals set the tone for society’s intensive job on the whole value system’s revision. Cultures transformed unrecognizably in several centuries. The cognitive complexity of social and individual minds, humans’ capacity for abstract thinking and reflection, and the scale of generic identity radically increased. Universal ideas of good and evil, personal choice and responsibility appeared. Authoritarian mythological thinking first in history partly made room for criticism, and the new private self-control instance – the conscience – made an alternative to traditional gods-fear. Enemies learned to see each other as human beings, understand, and sympathize. Aeschylus’s tragedy “The Persians” was the first work of art in history that described warfare as seen from the enemies’ side [Jaspers 1955; Yarkho 1972; Nazaretyan 2008].

These mental processes were distinctly reflected in political relations. Objective aim achievement, instead of the number of victims, became a matter of virtue and a combat success criterion. The role of military reconnaissance and propaganda among enemy troops and population grew. A new tradition of the conqueror’s patronage over local gods and priests appeared. “Political demagogy” as a means of persuasion and pacification contrasted with the usual terror methods: in 539 BC, the Persian king Cyrus the Great having captured Babel, proclaimed a Manifesto, which said that his army was just going to defend Babylonians and their gods and priests from their own bad king Nabonid. This brilliant trick soon spread far outside Middle East, to South Europe, India and China...

All symptoms of the evolution’s next deadlock were manifest in the II Millennium AD Europe. Development of agricultural technologies stimulated demographic growth; besides, the Christian Church, which had primarily called to refuse marriages and child-bearing, in the 9th century changed its attitude for the opposite one [Arutiunian 2000]. The woods area was decreasing, swamps were being formed, and their water

steamed down to rivers, together with all the wastes of growing cities.

The ecological crisis provoked social tension, disorders, and epidemics. Wars were becoming more and more murderous. Even the disaster of Black Death in the 14th century that took away more than 1/3 of Europe's population, only temporarily interrupted the demographic tendency [Le Goff 1977]. Development of agricultural and military technologies had produced a new strategic evolutionary deadlock, as hunting technologies had done long before. In the 17th century, the Thirty-Year War with developed artillery and other firearms took lives of about 80-90% of adult male population in Central Europe.

The crisis of agricultural civilization was partly softened by mass emigration, and besides, introduction of the overseas plants (potato, maize), and carbon utilization [Le Goff 1977; Bondarev 1996]. The 'Pre-Industrial Dash' that turned Europe from a Eurasian outsider to the world leader, was forestalled and attended by impetuous development of the ideas of humanism, individualism, enlightenment, and progress. The values of individual success, qualification and education increased unprecedentedly. According to the calculations of the Russian economic historian V. Meliantsev [1996, 2004], on the turn of the II Millennium, West European countries fell behind the leading Asian states in literacy of adult population twice and more, while on the threshold of the Industrial Revolt, exceeded them 3 – 3.5 times.

The Thirty-Year War completed with The Westfall Peace Treaty, and relevant political system saved Europe from most sanguinary religious (or quasi-religious) wars for the next 2.5 centuries. A new legal, economic and moral mentality was being formed, which implied equal natural rights, free market interchange and panhuman ethics in place of the foregoing estate domination and clan mentality. The humanitarian achievements enabled a new historical breakthrough, and it left behind the agricultural crisis (which may be therefore qualified as regional by geographic extension and global by the evolutionary consequences). It also implied superiority of the active Spirit over the passive Matter and the Future over the Past^d.

European nations spread with fire and sword the light of reason, and their power soon enveloped the whole planet, resources of which fell under parent states' control. European citizens' faith in moral progress and future everlasting peace was based on the indisputable superiority of the Western mind, and was growing together with social and economic prosperity, needs, and ambitions. While the soldiers fought in the exotic lands, mother countries' inhabitants believed wars and their cruelty were a thing of the past. No wonder: in all the colonial wars of the 19th century, Europeans' losses were 106000 soldiers, in contrast with millions of natives who perished in the same warfare [Urlanis 1994].

In the early 20th century, reserves of extensive growth were exhausted, while it was yet far from sobering the public. By the following events, by various official and memory documents, and by indirect testimonies, we can see that the inertia of extensive development and corresponding state of minds still dominated. A thirst for new successes and achievements produced joyful expectancies of either a "small victorious war" or a "revolutionary tempest" among politicians, intellectuals, and masses. The photos of August 1914, which show us happy crowds in Petrograd, Berlin, Vienna, and Paris streets after the war had been declared, are a brightest illustration [Man 1997].

Now, we may observe a result of those social and psychological processes.

Whereas European countries' summary warfare losses during the 19th century were about 5.5 million people (about 15% of all war victims in the world), in the 20th century they rose to 70 million – no less than 60%. Two World Wars, Hiroshima, and many years of nuclear “equilibrium of fear” were required for Europeans' psychological alteration. Was it for long?..

Having compared crisis episodes of the past and the present, we may sum up certain psychological observations. Once new instrumental facilities exceed former cultural restrictions, and extensive development begins, public attitudes and sentiments acquire peculiar features. A sense of omnipotence and permissiveness is intensified together with increasing needs and ambitions. Optimistic ideas of a world full of inexhaustible resources and the object of subjugation are formed. Success euphoria produces an impatient expectation of new successes and a drive to “small victorious wars” (a mass complex of catostrophophilia, in terms of the Dutch political philosopher P. Sloterdijk). The subjugation process and a search for new moderately resisting enemies are becoming self-valuable and irrational.

The proximity of desired aims intensifies motivational tension: the “aim-gradient phenomenon” in Gestalt psychology. According to another pattern, the Yerkes – Dodson law, the efficiency of a simple activity is proportional to the motivational force, while the efficiency of a complex activity is reduced by excessive motivation. This is one of the sources of danger.

As psycho-semantic experiments have shown, emotional tension decreases cognitive complexity [Petrenko 1982]. So, the world picture becomes lower-dimensional, thinking turns more primitive, and the problem situations look elementary, while objectively, the task of the social system's maintenance becomes more difficult as technological opportunities grow. In other words, the numerator index in equation (III), instead of increasing in proportion to the denominator's growth, is falling. Therefore, cultural imbalance lowers the society's internal sustainability.

Exploring the premises of revolutionary crises, J. Davis [1969] has shown that revolutions are usually preceded by an increase in the quality of living standards in terms of economic level, political freedoms, social mobility, etc. Simultaneously, needs and expectations grow as well. At a certain moment, increasing expectancies run against relatively reduced possibilities for their satisfaction. This occurs frequently because of demographic growth and/or unsuccessful warfare, which was expected to be “small and victorious”, whereas the expectancies go on increasing via their own momentum. The gap between increasing expectations and actualities produces frustrations, the situation looks unbearable and humiliating, people tend to seek those guilty, and aggression that cannot find release externally, gives vent inside the social system. Emotional resonance [Nazaretyan 2003] provokes mass disorders, which in many cases become the last act in pre-crisis development tragicomedy.

Having applied Davis's model to various countries and historical situations, we have found that it is applicable both to large communities, such as states or civilizations, and relatively small ones, such as political parties. Nowadays, the model may be used, with certain reservations, in global situation analysis as well.

Since some countries and regions, and planetary civilization as a whole are experiencing typical anthropogenic crises, which are fraught with great dangers in the 21st century, the question of the mechanisms of such crises' aggravation and overcoming

them is not a purely academic one. Certain facts show that during the second half of the 20th century great changes for the better took place. Politicians abstained from using the most destructive weapons; new kinds of inter-state coalitions were formed, which were not aimed against any outer force (a new fact in human history!), and effective international ecological measures became usual.

Fifty years ago, many people were not sure the 20th century would successfully move into the 21st, and this doubt had grounds. The most obvious one was a highly probable world nuclear war, still, not only this was the case. Modern ecologists demonstrate that had economic activities of humankind (including atomic weapon tests) remained so “ecologically dirty” as it was in the 1950-s, life on Earth in the 1990-s would have become unbearable: both human population and longevities would be falling down, etc. [Yefremov 2004].

Those encouraging facts gave rise to the hope that Western-type cultures had already developed a strong rational control reserve over intrinsic rectilinear expansion impulses.

Unfortunately, what followed one side’s unconditional victory in the Cold War demonstrated that maturity of political thought even in the most advanced modern cultures does not yet meet the requirements imposed by actual technological potential. Current *Homo prae-crisimos* psychological symptoms are described in [Nazaretyan 2004, 2008]: lowered political intelligence, decision-making quality and propaganda rhetoric level in the 1990-s compared to the preceding decades.

We may observe how simplified worldview and rectilinear extensive activities are provoking hostility. Meanwhile, emerging forms of sophisticated weapons and new methods of political terrorism make impossible the continuation of the previous half-century practices, which was canalization of the global conflict in the local wars. According to the pattern of techno-humanitarian balance, actual challenges, including political terrorism with its growing technical opportunities, will either destroy the planet’s civilization, or play *an educating role*, comparable to the ones of the atom bomb and other dramatic technical inventions in the past.

An outline of global anthropogenic crises and revolutionary breakthroughs

In conclusion, we briefly enumerate human history’s turning points: that is, historical periods when anthropogenic crises, which may be qualified as global ones by their evolutionary meaning, were solved via a breakthrough into a new epoch (see in detail [Nazaretyan 2008]). As some of them have been mentioned above, we cannot escape repeating certain details to give an overall portrayal of consecutive transformations in macro-social behavior as it is seen from the current perspective.

All appellations of the revolutions in the following list go with quote marks, for some of the terms have not been widely accepted, though all are present in relevant literature.

1. The “Paleolithic Revolution” (2.5-1.2 million years ago) was connected with the emergence of the first artificial tools (choppers), and hence, disturbance of the ethological balance, which is peculiar to animal populations: the existential crisis of anthropogenesis. Mystical fear of the dead (after-life revenge) was responsible for primary super-instinctive proto-cultural regulation: intra-group aggression was first artificially limited, and unnatural care for the handicapped appeared.

2. The "Upper Paleolithic Revolution", or the "*Cro-Magnons*' Cultural Revolution" (35-40 thousand years ago): transition from the Middle to the Upper Paleolithic and conclusive extermination of the *Neanderthals*. Stone material productivity grew, and the portion of tools made of bone and horn increased as well, which gave people relative independence from natural sources of flint. Sign communication systems, including articulate speech, were obviously perfected, and two-dimensional portrayal (the rock pictures) appeared. Why could not *Paleoanthropes*, who had developed complex Mustier culture and dominated their contemporaneous *Neoanthropes* (*Proto-Cro-Magnons*) during no less than 150000 years, resist more? We have to assume that Mustier culture was experiencing a deep crisis, though its essence is not quite clear.

There are two hypotheses to explain this; both well conform to the techno-humanitarian balance pattern. One accents the facts of culture's high material variability and very scanty signs of "spiritual production". Free choice of physical actions with insufficient spiritual regulation produced the *Neanderthal's* neurotic syndrome that was expressed in antisocial activity and splashes of uncontrolled aggressive energy [Lobok1997]. Another hypothesis [Reymers 1990] links the Late Mustier crisis to ecological effects: the *Neanderthals* had hit upon the idea to burn vegetation off, which caused landscapes' higher productivity, but this led to a fatal decrease of biological diversity.

3. The "Neolithic Revolution" (the X-VIII millennia BC): transition from a highly expensive foraging economy to food production, which went along with replacing the usual genocide and cannibalism with rudimentary collective exploitation forms, and was also accompanied by the original symbiosis of agricultural and "warrior" tribes.

Those deep complex transformations were a response to the Upper Paleolithic crisis, which had been aggravated because of the hunter technologies' development. This had led to the elimination of wild animals' populations and species, and to severe inter-tribe competition. During the Upper Paleolithic crisis, previous demographic growth had been replaced by a population decrease, and just after agricultural methods dominated, the population grew again.

4. The "Urban Revolution" (the V-III millennia BC): large human agglomerations were formed, irrigation channels were constructed, and written language and the first legal documents appeared, which regulated large communities' life, with a high human concentration and complex common activities.

This revolution followed the spread of bronze tools, the new demographic explosion, and the aggravation of competition for grasslands and fertile soil in some regions (see the theory of environmental circumscription in [Carneiro 1970]).

5. The "Axial Revolution" (the middle of the I millennium BC): new kinds of thinkers, politicians, and generals, such as Zarathustra, the Judaic prophets, Socrates, Buddha, Confucius, Cyrus the Great, Asoka, Sun-Tzu, and others, appeared during a short time interval in advanced societies, which were yet weakly linked among themselves, and deeply transformed the world culture. Criticism first supplanted authoritarian mythological thinking; universal ideas of good and evil, and of personality as a sovereign moral choice subject were formed. Aims and methods of warfare changed: victims' numbers ceased to serve as a combat masterpiece measure and a pretext for boasting; the value of communication considerably increased, and primitive violence and terror were partly replaced by intelligence data and 'political demagogy'.

The Axial Epoch followed displacement of bronze with iron weapons, which

were cheaper, lighter and more durable, and instead of professional armies, some kind of people's militia had appeared. As a result, battles became extraordinarily bloody, and former values and norms in new conditions could have destroyed the advanced societies. Therefore, the Axial Revolution was culture's response to a dangerous gap between new weapons' power and former aggression-retention mechanisms.

(The American cultures that developed separately passed through the same stages, though later in time. There are signs that the European conquerors found advanced societies of both Americas in a deep crisis caused by overpopulation, and on the threshold of a spiritual revolution, which could have been similar to the Old World's Axial Epoch [Semionov 2009]. Meanwhile, the aboriginals of the other isolated continent, Australia, conserved their Paleolithic life, culture and psychology without having reached the Upper-Paleolithic crisis, the Neolithic Revolution, etc.).

6. The "Industrial Revolution" (AD 18-19th centuries): introduction of relatively "spare" technologies, which had higher specific productivity than agricultural ones. It was prepared and attended by a complex spiritual framework, the 'indust-reality', in Al. Toffler's term.

The industrial revolution was preceded by a long crisis of agricultural civilization in Europe (the 12-18th centuries), when uncontrolled extensive growth, cutting down of forests, destruction of ecosystems and people's concentration in the cities had led to outbreaks of bloody warfare and mass mortal epidemics. The development of agricultural technologies had produced a new strategic evolutionary deadlock, as well as, long before, hunting technologies had done.

In its turn, the industrial production having increased power of human effort, gave a new impulse to extensive development, demographic growth, and ecological and geopolitical ambitions. So, like it had been before, the solution of one crisis opened a way towards the following ones.

7. The "Information Revolution"? In the middle of the 20th century, many people felt that planetary civilization was approaching a new crisis epoch. Its circumstances may also be well described in terms of the techno-humanitarian balance pattern. In the previous 100 years, weapons' power had grown 6 orders of magnitude. Human intelligence had achieved such high instrumental might that the aggression-retention means, which reflected previous historical experience, could not meet the new requirements any longer. The instrumental intelligence became dangerous for its own bearer's further existence again...

Discussion

Historically constraining physical violence does not mean that the humans have been turning "less aggressive" in the course of time; on the contrary, concentration as a bio-psychological factor had to stimulate natural aggressiveness, and developing technologies gave new opportunities for multiple killings. Still, developing social system, passing through the crucible of crises and catastrophes due to repeatedly renewing power/wisdom disparities, was impelled to progressively diversify, improve and select creative mechanisms of aggression-sublimation. Cultures have been developing more sophisticated languages of communication and replacing creative activities, and individuals had to perfect their motivation and self-control to sustain collective viability.

The pattern of techno-humanitarian balance gives an additional dimension to L.

White's conception, which was one of the most influential models of social evolution in the 20th century. In the words of his Canadian adherent V. Smil [1994]: "From the perspective of natural science, both prehistoric human evolution and the course of history may be seen as the quest for controlling greater energy stores and flows". Now as we find out that excessive power is self-destructive for a social system unless it is internally balanced with proportional cultural and psychological counterbalance, the model of development reduced to energy alone looks substantially insufficient even from the perspective of natural science.

Turning back to the historical experience of man-made crises, including the "optimistic tragedies", we may note that each new technology, both military and production, usually carried menace of growing destruction of geopolitical and/or natural habitat and after a period of euphoria, caused social catastrophes. This launched the process of dramatic selection of social and value systems, which could respond to the challenge. *As soon as the phase of cultural and psychological fitting was completed* (not before that moment!), even war technologies became *life-protecting factor*: calculations in [Nazaretyan 2008] show that after fitting, the more potentially destructive a weapon is the less murderous effect it really causes.

In case of constructive solution of such crises, it entailed a complex leap forward by all of the five long-term mainstreams mentioned above. More potential technologies provided higher specific productivity, i.e. the payload for a muscular effort and for a unit of nature's destruction. This implied higher variety of social structure, higher information volume of social and individual intelligence, and more advanced cultural regulation. As a result, humanity's ecological niche broadened and deepened, and population grew. Over time, the evolutionary success entailed increasing social needs and ambitions, and... the way to the next crisis.

This model keeps us oriented within the palliative space of the future, and helps us discriminate between constructive forecasts, scripts and projects, and utopian ones. At the same time, it involves definite conclusions about the past.

In the 19th century, the Russian sociologist N. Danilevsky [1991] argued that there had been no significant landmarks for all of human history, and therefore, no world history at all. In fact, he meant, separate civilizations' ascent, flourishing and decay had taken place, successive in time but devoid of causal continuity. This "civilization approach" was later caught up by many Western thinkers, for its pessimistic portrayal conformed to the 20th century mass disappointments. Within the paradigm, Spengler's [1980] notion that "*humankind* is merely a zoological concept" sounded reasonable.

Meanwhile, it was just in the 20th century that the historical discoveries disavowed the argument, and its far-reaching conclusions. As far as we take those discoveries into account, we may accept at least certain statements assertively.

To make sure of the substantially global character of human history, as well as life history, the congruent "unit" of consideration is to be singled out.

Thus, biological evolution is out of sight, concentrated on populations, species, or separate ecosystems: more than 99% of the species on Earth had become extinct before the first humans appeared. So nothing but life cycles is obvious until we look at the Geochronological Table, which represents the biosphere as a whole at successive geological epochs. Similarly, humankind, or, more precisely, the global society-nature system, is the only real subject of social evolution, while countries, nations, regional civilizations,

and even hominid species (in the Paleolithic) repeatedly replaced one another as the leaders; by themselves, all those smaller subjects cannot serve for an evolutionary portrayal.

Since hominids have once and for all turned to tool making, in spite of countless divergences, migrations and isolations, culture has been a single and common planetary phenomenon. This is proved by many observations and one of such observation is the surprising fact that the first standard tools on all inhabited continents (the stone handaxe) were surprisingly identical. As to the explosive growth of local diversities in the Middle and the Upper Paleolithic and later, it was a typical process of an evolving system's inner diversification.

What we may call "progress" is neither an aim nor a movement "from the worse to the better", but *a means of self-preservation*, with which the complex non-equilibrium system responds to the challenges of declining sustainability. A succession of *a posteriori* effects of restored sustainability is retrospectively construed as a step-by-step ascent from more "natural" (i.e. wild, and relatively equilibrium) states of the society-nature systems to less "natural" ones. So, having solved dramatic vital problems, progressive transformations produce more complicated ones, and at the same time, more developed means for their solution. After all, humans are still living on thanks to their virtue to adapt their self-regulation quality to their own increasing might...

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Endnotes

^a See also [Mironenko 2002]. The number 187 millions [Hobsbaum 1994] looks biased.

^b For example, the tables, which reflect the effects of natural hazards in various regions, demonstrate that the economic damage in technologically advanced countries is usually more considerable while human victims are less numerous than in technologically backward ones [Natural... 1974].

^c Those regulators may sometimes horrify an observer who belongs to another culture, but they enable the society's existence in the ecological niche. Many ethnographers reported that a typical method of demographic stability for primitive tribes was normative infanticide, regular extermination of the "unwanted" babies, especially female, and castration. In some tribes, a man may not marry without having killed or castrated another man from a neighboring tribe.

^d Some Sinologists [Lin Yufu 1995] have shown that all technological and economic premises were in place for an industrial revolution in the 14th century China. However, world model and value system did not favor this radical transformation, unlike the situation of the Europeans in the 18-19th centuries who had met the deep crisis and developed a new progress-oriented worldview, which was a psychological compensation for the Late Middle Ages mass alarms and phobias.

Relations between oral tradition and social representations studies¹

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Abstract

Narrators of Brazilian indigenous myths, while maintaining identity and social memory, allow the continuity of ways of living the relationships among men. The narrative of the Iamaricuma's myth allows us to see the impacts on contemporary life, and attests its reflexes among the Kamaiurá people and culture.

Introduction, objectives and method

From 2003 to 2005, our research group, which works in the centre west of Brazil, accomplished three expeditions to *Alto Xingu* region, in order to study an Indian people.

Where do the *Kamaiurá* society lives? In the geodesic centre of South America there's a Brazilian town called *Cuiabá*, capital of the state of *Mato-Grosso*. In the north-east of *Cuiabá* is situated the Indian Reservation of the *Xingu*, a region picked out and reserved for sheltering 14 Indian peoples.

The investigation allowed studying the ways of oral transmission of the mythical narrations, the social representations that they transport and their function in the management of the daily life, in a situation where cultural changes are increasing rapidly.

Based on systematic observation, interviews and sessions of informal conversations, the study describes what has been possible to notice from a daily coexistence with part of the residents of the *Ipavú* Village. The data analysis receives supports from both the Theory of Social Representations and the Cultural Anthropology.

There live in *Ipavú* a little more than three hundred persons, between adults and children. In the central yard, women may be planning the *Iamaricuma's* celebration. This leads us to our subject, because that party is related with an important myth of the Kamaiurá people, and is on myths that we shall discourse.

Our attention will be focused on narratives that speak to us about the knowledge

¹ This article is based on the communication of identical name, presented in a Symposium during the 9th International Conference on Social Representations (Bali, 2008), and partly drift of notes presented during the VII Lab Meeting, held on the European Doctorate on Social Representations and Communication (Rome, 2008).

of a people and of their explanatory argument on the relations with the world and among men.

We will lead with myths that come from a society without writing, called, in Greek language, Ἀγραφα. It is not possible to think the oral discourse by categories appropriate to the exam and understanding of the written and fixed production; instead, it is to walk among mutations. In fact, it is exactly because of the changes that we will speak about the possible relationships between myths and the social representations.

Life among the Kamaiurá

The great distance that separates the *Kamaiurá* village from Brazilian urban centres leads to the perception of the two ways of living. What makes life different among the *Kamaiurá*? What does living mean? Living means living together. Soft tone talking, affectionate manners, respect towards human acts, trust in reciprocity give colour to relationships. Intense exchange, intimacy are not only the base of the familiar nucleus, but of life itself, though nothing escapes to the tribal norms.

The *morerekwat*, the house's owner conducts the social and productive activities of the people who are around him: men brothers, parallel cousins, ascendants and descendants. Married men, who can be found there and are classified in the category of sons-in-law, will have already paid or will be paying their wives' cession to the father-in-law, in work or goods.

While children are allowed an exercise of freedom that does not find a counterpart among the so-called civilized people, pubescent young girls and boys are isolated and kept secluded for long periods of time. The *Kamaiurá* teen-agers, from both sexes, go through a reclusion period so much longer as their possibilities of assuming great responsibilities are, such as a *cacique*'s². Girls, who will never take up commanding functions, learn the feminine tasks during their reclusion time. And the centre of the whole education system, are renouncement and obedience. Thus, submission, consonance, generosity, must colour the behaviours, the attitudes, the habits, the beliefs of each bearer of representations so carefully maintained in the hard core of culture.

During the time that a young girl stays secluded, kept in her hut's depth, even her skin becomes whiter. And because of the roping to which she is subjected, there is some deformity in her shape in the pursuit of a beauty ideal. This beauty pattern is completed with corporal paintings.

Contention and solitude impose some sort of reflection to the future adult, preparing him for a daily living in which harmony in social relationships is praised.

Although this is not different in various cultures, marriage is done with the view to establish or strengthen economical, social and political alliances. For that very reason, in agreement with traditions, they are ideally negotiated by the parents, although even for married people sex practices are free. But a fantastic detail exists: no woman can be obliged to make sex. It is necessary that full assent exists. The man would be deeply ashamed if he came to force any sexual practice.

Transmission

The myth characters are, in the first place, the narrator himself and his necessary listeners. In the sequence, appear the hero who founded society, their civilizing heroes,

² Indian chief.

the stars and the planets and the savannah animals and vegetation.

Why did I invert the characters' habitual sequence? Which would be the reason to put the narrator - and his listeners - before, for instance, of the important personage of the founder hero? First of all because it is important to emphasize that the illiterate peoples immortalize their stories through the myth narrators' action.

The narrator doesn't just tell a history; therefore introducing changes, becomes its co-author. But he is not an independent and arbitrary author. Although the narration depends on his age and sex, for instance, he allows hearing the circumstances that are in the present time of all his people. The listeners, inside of the communication process, they also receive and understand the plot in agreement with their personal characteristics and the circumstances in which they live.

The narrators work preferentially in two places: in "the men's house", also named "the flutes house" which is in the centre of the village, or at the school, where the students, children and teenagers meet. Indeed, the young people and the children are the privileged listeners of the myths.

However, listening to myths is an event that may be spread all over the village, without a right day or hour to happen. For example, the father can make the recitation during lunchtime. Maybe they can be companions to the walks, to the fishing activities, to the work of weaving the hammocks, or of sitting down, without worries, when night falls, under the skies full of stars.

Usually the narratives are as rich in incidents as full of repetitions. The incidents serve to maintain the attention of the audience. The repetitions operate in the sense of internalizing the messages.

Charming in the plot and in the solutions, dealing with daily problems, explaining the everyday life, it claims for the presence of intuitive adhesion. However, the main point of the credibility is in the hands of its central character: the narrator. It is plain fact that he is knowledgeable, being a partner of the oldest members of society – those who own the tribe wisdom. Having accumulated knowledge, he is treated as an expert.

When we requested *Wary*, our companion, the indigenous researcher of our group, to tell his own version of a myth, he became embarrassed, and refused to do it. *Wary*, in fact, is one of the narrator Koka's grandsons, besides having a graduation degree in Education. He said, uneasy, that he could not assume a position that would never be accepted, maybe not even simply tolerated by the real knowledge holder. He would commit insolence without forgiveness, because the power of words would have been taken and not given, and even less conquered.

Magnificent in his art, the narrator insinuates, provokes, despises, gives away, and releases a repertory of representations, which go spreading through several places of life and of the tribal relationships. It is true that he represents himself as a transmitter of the cultural memory of the group designating with his work the small nets of the processes of behaviour formation and guidance of the communications that his people present and entertain.

How do the myths influence the Kamaiurá everyday life?

The myth comes from an extremely far away past. It crosses, through time, the changes brought by innumerable narrators and their circumstances. In addition, the myth arrives in the present; the changes do not matter, to answer some issues among

which I choose one that will point to some aspects of the feminine group's condition – the *Iamaricumá*'s myth. This story is not only a sort of counter-myth, since it is that in which the women leave their inferior positions and become the main protagonists. Besides, it has the virtue to fully show its contemporary face, in the festival and in the connected rituals that happen yearly in their village. Finally, the interest is linked to the fact that in its consequences in the present daily life, it clearly shows the power of the myth – its efficacy on social thinking and behaviour.

Surely, the actions are in their passing and consequences, a set of models and laws that support the social body, that codify the behaviour inside the culture and that serve the writing of the social rules, on the limit, giving parameters to the moral judgments. They are clearly the signs of the knowledge and the precepts that each one should carry to live with everyone.

Any myth is created through the report of the actions. In the case of the *Iamaricumá*, although there are thematic branches, the thickest part of the deeds follows closely the female reaction to the husbands' behaviours.

Therefore, what happens in this specific narrative?

After the passage of the ritual ceremony related to pierce boys' ears, the men of the village decided to go fishing. They were late to come back and the women were worried. They sent a messenger to the river to call them back. It was useless, although the men sent word saying that they would be going back soon. The women sent the messenger again but with no success. They sent the messenger again, who warned the fishermen, without success, about the anger of the women.

Afterwards the women stopped being worried, became angry and met in order to decide what they were going to do. They stopped doing their everyday chores and started to dance and sing. Finally, in yet another attempt, the messenger, on his arrival, said that the men were not fishing, but changing into wild animals. The women intensified their dances and songs, already using male ornaments and symbols.

They danced so much that with the beating of their feet a hollow appeared on the ground of the central yard. So, they asked for the help of one armadillo, whose long nails changed the hollow into a tunnel.

The woman kept on dancing...

Warned by the alarmed messenger, the husbands already changed into animals, returned, but were not received by their wives, and they called out begging for them to stay and take care of the children.

Spreading the odour of the *kuritsé*, their invention, which made everyone crazy; guarding the passages through which they went with wasps and bats, the women entered the hole taking only the girls and leaving the boys behind.

They started a long journey that stopped periodically, visiting other villages whose women joined the march until very, very far away they all decided to stop and build another village to live in.

By hearing the saga of the *Iamaricumá*, one can infer that the actions happen to deny resentment. As the gods do not come to change the painful situation of abandonment in which the women were put by men, the women became agents of their own fate, makers of their destiny. From the dependent situation in which they lived, and leaving the resentment for the action, they scorn the susceptibility, the disgust, the bitterness, and reform their identities. They cancel the uncertainty, the waiting and the possibilities

of reconciliation.

Early in the story – on its complete report - we find an interdependence relation while they work in their daily tasks. Next, there is dependence when the husbands are late in returning to the village. The women wait passively for the return, and when this does not happen, they ask a man to go and bring news. It is not one of them that go; they send a man, that is, an element that would not disturb - a choice that could confirm their inferior position. The lateness and later the return procrastination permit the independence of the female group, letting the *Iamaricumá* to take the decisions.

The revolt against the men, which happens next, is shown by the possession and use of their coat of arms, weapons and ornaments, of which the bow that is used frequently reduces their left breast – there come the Amazons!³ Thus, what seems to be just a detail would be sufficient to guarantee that the narrative flows about rebel, warrior, and unsubmitive women.

The changes of order and the customs follow rapidly through a flaming trail: the women stop their daily chores, dance and sing incessantly, day and night without tiring.

In the sequence, the women produced the *kuritsé*, which today they call feminine *urucum*⁴, about which they give explanations full of doubts and uncertainties - suggestions only insinuated, almost always linked to a powerful strength of sexual attraction.

Abandoning their sons, indifferent to their suffering, the women show, for the last time, the rupture with the masculine, and consequently with order and daily life.

According to one of the collected versions, told by a woman, the *Iamaricumá* seduced the old man, which acted as a messenger to their husbands. As well as the armadillo, he also worked digging the tunnel. As an instrument for excavation, because he did not have long nails, they give him the stick for flipping the manioc pancake – the *beijú*. Another instrument used by the women to dig the manioc out of the ground has been used to torture the old male: the man was *empalado*, that is, the stick was introduced in his anus. What for? Emasculate, divest of virility?

When these women submit an armadillo and the old man to work for them in the opening of a tunnel, the question that can be made is: where will the dug tunnel end up? For instance, the destination could be in a supernatural space. But, nothing of this, it is always in one or another Indian village that they'll arrive. They don't go out of the level of a possible concrete life, to enter dimensions of the supernatural and from there, obtaining or drawing out solutions for their restlessness.

Finally, the woman went through far lands; they cut off the men's access to them by putting as guardians fearful animals therefore not letting them pursue or follow their trail.

All the women entered on the tunnel, proceeding to a long trip periodically interrupted in order to visit other villages, of which the women adhered to the march, until, there, far away, in a very distant place, they all decided to stop and to construct a new village. Rights and obligations were subverted!

To tell about the *Iamaricumá* is not to create a cast of heroines but, maybe, it is to tell about the revolts and uneasiness of the women.

³ The detail of the shortening of the *Iamaricumá* women's breast connects them with similar myths, referring to the Amazons. *A-mazon*, in Greek, exactly means without breast.

⁴ A sort of *Bixa orellana*, used to prepare red corporal painting.

Up to the birth of the contemporary youth, women that become pregnant from relationships that are considered extra-matrimonial should sacrifice the newborns as soon as they were born, by their own hands! For sure it was not a *Kamaiurá*'s invention. The practice occurs inside several societies. The sacrifice of carrying physically handicapped children, the murder of one of the twins, for instance, has been object of many studies and reports, mainly of Lévi-Strauss⁵. However, there are reports that, in the beginning of this century, one or another child born in a socially not acceptable union survived this ancient practice.

Another revolution, which is on the way, comes from the possibility, already a reality for some young marriageable girls, of choosing their own husbands. This will cause, perhaps, the extinction of the traditional way in which the parents arranged the marriage. Concession or conquest? They seem to be consequences that happened through time, slowly, little by little, mainly because of the contact with the Brazilian society. Daily life suggests some questions whose solutions are shown, for example, on the TV programs, specially the soap operas, that they are nowadays watching.

One can see there that the content of what is transmitted by the myths finds different elaborations in the battles between the consensus and the disagreement of the ones who live in the new times.

Of course, the story of the *Iamaricumá* does not provoke trips in search of new horizons. But, to narrate the saga of the *Iamaricumá*, actually, is to revive a plot that celebrates, solitarily, the force and the power of the women.

The saga of the *Iamaricumá* is relived every year in the celebration that carries the same name. The celebration demands preparations, which include sending invitations to the women in neighbouring villages, to other peoples, which remembers the visiting of the first *Iamaricumá* to other villages. There is, also, an actual visitation, to the Indian huts, during the rehearsals. Without any ceremony, the singing dancers enter each of the *Kamaiurá* huts and go out followed by other women.

Real life dominates and enlarges the imagination field, breaking the barriers and revealing itself as of an unimaginable vastness.

During the celebration, the women simply reveal what cannot or should not be admitted. Many years ago, a white woman, a health worker, which was said to be sleeping with Indians, was almost killed under the fury of the *Iamaricumá*. Few years ago, the *Kamaiurá* women, possessed by the energy of the *Iamaricumá*, decreed the exile of a white teacher, declaring that she was more a foreigner than she had ever been.

In the *Iamaricumá* myth, there are no similarities for these actions. However, it is there that the strength of the women receives the power to determine fates. By reorganizing the range of their command, the women even banish those that they do not like. Here there is an important dimension of the myths - as a power that gives authority to the reversion of behaviours, which are structured according to the circumstances of the present time. But, also, it is like this that one can clearly notice the efficacy on social thinking and behaviour caused by the social representations - which are connected to the myth.

Young and older women, those that are interested in the providence, refuse to have sex with their men. However, it is mainly out of the hammocks, far from the sands

⁵ *Histoire de Lynx*. (1991). Paris: Plon; *Le cru et le cuit*. (1964). Paris: Plon.

of the lake, of the ground covered with leaves that the biggest avoidances and the most important confrontations happen.

Sadness, sufferings, resentments that are never shown, even through tears, appear as fair fights that are established under the inspiration and the protection of an authority that will not be questioned. Courage, ambiguity, cowardice or certainty, enter the plot and weave a continuity in which the old harmonizes with the new, and everything goes on following in the track of the ancestral stories.

Conclusions

Oral tradition can be referred to as an object of study or as a tool for investigation on different topics. In some contributions, oral tradition is taken as object, like in the case of mythical narrations. In others, it is a tool used to explore the reconstruction and interpretation of the past, as in the case of life-stories or collective memory accounts.

If we want to investigate the myth, taking it as object, we will have to deepen the study, for instance, on its significance. Important scholars have been studying in this way.⁶ If, however, our interest is on considering it as a tool, probably the men's relationships with the things and among themselves will be a vast exploration field. And, by treading through such road, we can arrive to the spheres of the identity of the group and of its cultural memory.

Thinking about the narrator's social and psychological functions, we shall conclude that he is a sort of founder and fundamental character in the maintenance both for the identity and for the tribal memory. And he knows that, very well. He is quite sure concerning the importance of the social role that he carries out. In fact, they know very well, because there are many and different narrators. Almost as a rule, the men emphasize aspects that concern the interests, fears, desires and difficulties to the members of the masculine group. The men don't hesitate in attributing to the feminine characters their own sexual fantasies and attitudes usually driven to the women. Neither is a little different the women's behaviour. They use the craft of narrator to display, to expose their gender point of view in relation to the masculine group. And the myths, while vehicle, they carry and transmit all of the versions, without censorship and either without allowing the censorship to install itself in the minds of the listeners. After all, somebody doesn't censure either question or the voice of the past, or the base of the identity and of the memory. Anyway, inside of the myth are introduced the solutions that come from the soap operas, the different knowledge of living styles that exist in the national society, from the new experiences and needs that the reinvented life introduces.

As the set of the myths is extensive, this is a good reason for the counteraction to find shelter in the arguments that point with respect to the existing contradictions in the culture. Certainly the different versions of a myth - the intertexts that can be read - illuminate the understanding of the existing contradictions in the culture.

It seems meaningless to question if determined plot, in its course along the time line, brings and carries what we usually call historical truth. Probably, this would be the most pointless of all the worries we could have. It is interesting in a more and better way, for example, to ask what shapes does it take and how do such forms meddle in

⁶ Lévi-Strauss, C. (1985). *Myth and meaning*. New York: Random House; Campbell, J. (1988). *The power of myth*. New York: Doubleday; Eliade, M. (1988). *Aspects du mythe*. Paris: Folio France, and (1989). *Le mythe de l'éternel retour*. Paris: Folio France, 1989.

everyday life.

The listeners of the myths can also be mature men, those who take pleasure in going over mythical stories, as a reaffirmation of their way of being in the world. It is well known that they are used to talk about the mythical plots, when sitting in front of the flutes' house at nightfall. In that meeting of community leaders, they would look like magistrates who leaf through the behaviour codes of their people.

Regarding to the myths' functions, we must perceive that they are the creators of how one sees the world, and we can affirm that they direct behaviours among the Kamaiura people.

Post Scriptum

Recently, in the Foreword of a book that has been just edited in Brazil, entitled *Mythical thought and social representations*⁷, Professor Serge Moscovici affirms: *C'est un fait que mythos et logos sont les deux themata souverains de notre culture.*

⁷ Paredes, E. C.; Jodelet, D. (orgs). *Pensamento mítico e representações sociais*. Cuiabá: Ed. UFMT/FA-PEMAT/Ed. IUNI, 2009.

Mondialisation, immigration et les nouvelles dynamiques identitaires

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Résumé

La migration implique le chevauchement d'une série de facteurs locaux et globaux, de même que des dimensions publiques ou intimes, libérales ou traditionnelles, hostiles ou favorables, qui se heurtent l'une à l'autre dans un processus souvent contradictoire et toujours émotionnel. À l'instar des théories postmodernes et postcoloniales, cet article examine quelques questions qui encadrent les dynamiques du Soi et de l'identité en connexion avec le phénomène des migrations féminines, dans le contexte de la mondialisation et de la mobilité récemment rehaussée des femmes. Il explore la construction de l'identité qui se définit ainsi en fonction de plusieurs temporalités et surtout en fonction des zones géopolitiques réelles ou imaginaires qui incorporent l'altérité. Il examine également les épiphénomènes de l'immigration et porte attention à plusieurs dynamiques identitaires, comme le métissage culturel et l'ambivalence, l'estime de soi et l'autonomisation (*empowering*) ou la fragilisation psychique.

Mots clé: mondialisation, immigration, identité, Soi, temporalité, métissage culturel

Summary

Migration brings together a series of local and global dimensions, as well as intimate and public spaces, liberal or traditional cultures and ideologies, and welcoming or hostile spaces. These factors are often in contradiction with one another, and transform migration into a highly charged emotional process. Inspired by theories of postcolonialism and postmodernity, this article examines several aspects of the dynamics of the self and of identity processes, especially as these involve the migration of women, whose social and cultural mobility has been dramatically affected by globalisation. In particular, I focus on the temporal dimensions involved in identity processes, as well as on changes to the real or imagined geopolitics of space that have redefined alterity. I also examine several epiphenomena attached to migration, such as cultural hybridity, identity ambivalence, self-realisation and individual empowerment, and psychological fragilisation.

Key words: globalisation, immigration, identity, Self, temporality, cultural hybridity

Introduction

À l'heure de la mondialisation et de la mise en place du nouvel ordre mondial néolibéral, où les systèmes de production et de finance sont rapidement et souvent inexplicablement démenagés d'une région à l'autre, de même que les mutations économiques et sociales qui les accompagnent, on note des ajustements profonds autant au niveau du mouvement des capitaux que de celui des ressources humaines et culturelles. On assiste ainsi à un phénomène d'internationalisation globale signalé par une porosité aigüe des frontières nationales, par un flux migratoire sans précédent, en Europe, en Amérique du Nord, et en Asie. On assiste aussi à une forme de «*compression of time and space*»¹, comme si la porosité des limites territoriales avait également brouillé la division entre «le passé» et «le présent» dont dépendent traditionnellement les identités nationales et même individuelles.

Ces dynamiques entraînent des mutations jadis impensables au niveau du métissage de l'espace de la culture, générant de nouvelles représentations spatiales et identités hybridées. L'ethnisation de certains quartiers au cœur des plus grandes métropoles occidentales, par exemple, en est un signe de même que les «nouvelles identités transnationales» et leurs pratiques de projection psychique ou d'identification nostalgique avec le passé ou avec le lointain, comme le nouveau cosmopolitisme de la classe moyenne occidentale. Cependant, ces signes d'ouverture vers l'Autre, vers le différent, et même vers l'exotique, ne sont pas uniquement dus à la présence des immigrants mais aussi aux essais de la classe moyenne professionnelle dont le cosmopolitisme², récemment adopté, semble suggérer qu'elle tente de récupérer et de renforcer du capital social et culturel affaibli par les flous de la mondialisation. De moins en moins capable de contrôler le local, elle érige un simulacre du global.

Ces développements peuvent être perçus comme une tentative de définir une alternative «cosmopolite» ou comme une réaction qui cherche à réinventer le «traditionnel» (dans le sens de Hobsbawm³) pour faire face à une invasion étrangère. Dans les deux cas, il s'agit de nouvelles formes d'hybridité qui ignorent les dynamiques traditionnelles et polarisées qui, jadis, traçaient les contours du contrat social en Occident : culture individualiste versus culture communautaire, culture nationaliste versus culture étrangère, société d'accueil versus société d'origine.

Face à ces changements dans les sociétés occidentales, il n'est pas surprenant que les immigrants soient inconfortables ou confus face aux valeurs ambivalentes de la société d'accueil, malaise qui ne fait qu'accroître les difficultés classiques entourant l'intégration (perte de statut social, obligation d'accepter un travail sous-qualifié, ghettoïsation culturelle, obligation de se frayer un chemin dans un social inconnu et hautement individualisé, etc.). Autrement dit, les problèmes «normaux» des immigrants sont aggravés par le contexte de la mondialisation et du néolibéralisme voués à affaiblir les cadres traditionnels et à déraciner les individus de leurs communautés de référence. Dans ce sens, la mondialisation a changé les enjeux de l'immigration, transformant la culture, soit celle de la société d'origine ou celle de la société d'accueil, en champs

¹ Harvey David. (2000). *Spaces of Hope*. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press.

² Par exemple, les communautés culturelles alternatives attachées à des cultes et religions étrangères; les pratiques «New-Age», les bistros et les boutiques d'alimentation exotique etc.

³ Hobsbawm Eric J. (1983). *Nations and Nationalism since 1780*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

minés, car ni les valeurs traditionnelles ni les valeurs «nouvelles» ne sont plus capables d'encadrer le processus d'accueil et d'intégration.

Cet article tente de s'adresser à quelques questions qui entourent les dynamiques du Soi et de l'identité en connexion avec le phénomène des migrations féminines dans le contexte de la mondialisation et des nouvelles mobilités des femmes. Il explore quelques corrélations qui s'établissent entre l'acte d'immigrer et les épiphénomènes qui en découlent et qui influencent les changements et les définitions identitaires, surtout les conditions de l'émergence des formes de métissage et d'ambivalence culturelle indicible. Je me concentre empiriquement surtout sur les femmes immigrantes car elles sont une catégorie plus apte à subir des pressions dans les situations d'inégalité sociale ou politique.

Survол théorique

Les nouvelles théorisations et courants critiques qui émergent dans les années 1980 sont directement influencés par les effets de la mondialisation, incluant l'immigration économique. Les critiques postmodernes, postcoloniales, féministes ou des Études culturelles proposent en fin de compte un dépassement de la vision occidentale eurocentrique du monde et une redéfinition du sujet humain et de son identité, autant sur le plan théorique que méthodologique et se concentrent sur des concepts tels que : la déterritorialisation de la souveraineté, la fragmentation du Soi, la fragilisation des catégories jadis standardisées, l'entre-deux et le métissage, l'agir dans les espaces étatiques interstitiels, et l'émergence des cultures transnationales. Le concept de l'altérité, utilisé dans les sciences sociales pour théoriser le processus d'exclusion ou de subordination des individus ou des groupes différents d'un modèle social normalisé dans le cadre d'une opposition cartésienne entre des « Nous » et des « Autres » bien définis, est présentement réactualisé et remis en analyse dans le contexte mondialisé où l'écart culturel censé les séparer n'est plus clair.

Il y a quelques décennies, Simone de Beauvoir introduisait la femme dans l'arène théorique de l'altérité à l'intérieur d'un «Nous» dominé par une culture masculine. C'est donc à cette époque qu'émerge l'étude des dynamiques identitaires des catégories minoritaires subalternes qui ne sont plus simplement des «Autres» tout court mais qui sont une partie intégrale de la communauté. Gayatri C. Spivak, par exemple, avec son texte «Les subalternes peuvent-elles parler?»⁴ présente une nouvelle approche. Empruntant de Gramsci le concept de «subalterne» et s'éloignant aussi de la vision de Beauvoir, centrée sur les inégalités du patriarcat, Spivak y ajoute la domination de l'eurocentrisme et souligne le double «statut subalterne» des femmes du Tiers-Monde, fragilisées autant par leur condition féminine que par la vision géopolitique qui transforme l'individuation en simple épiphénomène du nouveau régime financier.

Dans un contexte différent, Foucault mettra au point sa théorisation du pouvoir ambivalent,⁵ qui privilégie «le sujet opprimé» qui devient «l'absent non représenté» forcément obligé d'agir individuellement et de tenter de parler pour lui-même. La théorie de Foucault, centrée sur la normalisation des structures du pouvoir par rapport à la corporalité, va offrir de nouvelles clés pour analyser le pouvoir dans un contexte

⁴ Spivak C. Gayatri, Paris. (2009). *Les subalternes peuvent-elles parler?*. Éd. Amsterdam.

⁵ Foucault Michel (1983). "The subject and Power". Afterword to Hubert Dreyfus & Paul Rabinow, *Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics*, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.

contemporain où les lignes de force sont apparemment cachées par la rhétorique démocratique et par l'ouverture néolibérale.

D'autres concepts comme ceux d'«hybridité», d'«ambivalence»⁶ ou de «tiers espace» émergent dans les critiques de Homi Bhabha⁷ pour qui l'hybridité culturelle serait fluide et fragmentée. L'hybridité culturelle de Bhabha serait également une stratégie du pouvoir car, dans le contexte du postcolonialisme, les individus sont porteurs d'identités subalternes ; ils peuvent donc facilement assumer et manipuler de multiples identités. La construction de l'identité peut donc se définir en fonction de plusieurs temporalités «traditionnelles» ou «avant-gardistes» et surtout en fonction de plusieurs zones géopolitiques réelles ou imaginées, comme le propose Anderson,⁸ dont elles tracent les contours d'une intersubjectivité basée sur l'«altérité du Nous».

Ces perspectives novatrices, sensibles à la subjectivité autant qu'à l'«objectivité» du positivisme scientifique, répondent aux nouvelles réalités qui transforment le monde : la fin des empires, la fragilisation des États-Nations et de leurs «métarécits»⁹ et l'accélération d'une mondialisation qui amène dans son cortège de nouveaux acteurs comme le migrant économique, l'ethnique, le transnational, le cosmopolite et l'individu à identité hybridée. Ces réflexions sur l'individu et sa relation avec la corporalité locale et la communauté globale nous renvoient aux théories qui placent le sujet au centre de la construction de l'*habitus* mais aussi aux carrefours de la fragilisation du Soi social.

Le passé et le présent ; L'immigration comme conflit identitaire

Partant de la prémisse que l'identité se construit dans un mouvement double, autant par rapport au Soi intime que par rapport aux autres, nous nous sommes intéressés dans cet article à examiner succinctement quelques dynamiques identitaires dans le contexte de l'immigration féminine contemporaine en Europe et au Canada.

Dans mes recherches préliminaires réalisées sur l'immigration au Canada¹⁰, j'ai comparé les dynamiques identitaires de deux groupes de femmes migrantes afin d'établir les mécanismes psychiques et les indicateurs qui étaient à la base des stratégies de définition identitaire dans le contexte migratoire. Le premier groupe était constitué des femmes migrantes de l'Europe de l'Est qui travaillaient dans les pays occidentaux de l'Union européenne; le deuxième groupe était constitué de femmes immigrées au Canada avec leurs familles, dont la majorité provient des pays de l'Europe centrale et de l'Est. Dans cet article, nous allons nous référer uniquement à trois des indicateurs considérés dans notre recherche, soit, le rôle du paradigme temporel dans la définition identitaire, la performance autonome et l'altérité. Cette étude transversale a révélé, par exemple, que par rapport au paradigme temporel, les migrantes économiques qui tra-

⁶ Young J.C. Robert. (1995). *Colonial Desire: Hybridity in Theory, Culture and Race*. London and New York: Routledge. Selon Young, «l'ambivalence est un mot-clef pour Bhabha qu'il emprunte à la psychanalyse, où on l'utilise tout d'abord pour décrire une fluctuation continue entre vouloir une chose et son opposé (...). En faisant de l'ambivalence le centre de son analyse, Bhabha a eu fait effectuer un revirement politique à un niveau conceptuel, par lequel la périphérie, le cas limite, le marginal ou l'individu inclassable est devenu "l'ambivalence équivoque", incertaine et imprécise qui caractérise le centre».

⁷ Bhabha Homi. (1994). *The Location of Culture*. Paris: Éditions Payot.

⁸ Anderson Benedict. (1991). *Imagined Communities*. London: Verso.

⁹ Lyotard Jean-François. (1979). *La condition postmoderne: rapport sur le savoir*. Paris: Éditions de Minuit.

¹⁰ Recherche réalisée dans le cadre d'un projet postdoctoral à l'INRS-UCS (Institut national de la recherche scientifique, Centre — Urbanisation, Culture, Société), Université du Québec, Canada.

vaillent en Europe développent plus rapidement l'estime de soi que les immigrantes déménagées en Amérique du Nord car elles ont tendance à voir leur déplacement dans un monde étranger comme un séjour et non comme un changement permanent qui les obligerait à s'intégrer dans le pays d'accueil. L'étude a aussi révélé que les immigrantes de l'Amérique du Nord, à différence des migrantes d'Europe, sont plus aptes à incorporer des identités métissées et aussi qu'elles démontrent une performance autonome supérieure, tenant compte de leurs acquisitions basées non seulement sur leur capacité d'adaptation mais surtout sur leur capacité de transformation.

La migration temporaire est le plus souvent liée à un projet économique familial de courte durée qui se réalise dans un délai rapide. Les femmes restent attachées à leurs projets et motivations originelles pendant que leurs familles demeurent «chez elles». Bref, elles investissent dans un futur bien défini qui ne les obligerait pas à redéfinir leur identité sociale et intime et ne les forcerait point à formuler des stratégies pour affronter les questions de perte (de statut, de la parenté, des amis, des réseaux d'entraide, etc.).

Les migrantes temporaires travaillent pour des périodes fixes (une saison ou quelques années) et envisagent de retourner dans leur pays d'origine. Ceci est facilité par le fait que la majorité des pays de l'Union européenne ont des politiques plutôt flexibles face aux migrantes d'origine européenne et, les voyages touristiques se transforment souvent assez facilement en séjour de travail clandestin, les femmes occupant souvent des emplois domestiques ou sous-qualifiés. Approximativement deux tiers des femmes étudiées ont travaillé pour des périodes de plusieurs années (surtout en Italie et en Allemagne); elles retournaient plusieurs fois par année dans leur ville natale et conservaient un contact régulier avec la parenté et les amis restés au pays. Ceux-ci, à leur tour, effectuaient des visites le plus souvent à l'occasion des fêtes religieuses de Noël et de Pâques ou pendant les vacances. Ce système de visites réciproques était possible grâce aux coûts bas du transport (souvent il s'agissait de petites lignes de transport routier organisées spécifiquement pour faciliter tels voyages). Le fait de retourner au pays pour les Fêtes renforce la condition «temporaire» de leur séjour car les Fêtes font un appel sémiotique à un ensemble d'émotions incorporées (*embodied*) qui sont intégralement arrimées dans l'imaginaire de la société d'origine. Les Fêtes sont un symbole d'une temporalité figée dans un passé traditionnel partagée par la communauté entière, donc un point de référence stable de leur ancrage identitaire.

De plus, le fait que souvent les femmes se déplaçaient seules, transportant différents biens, marchandises ou cadeaux, a renforcé simultanément leur pouvoir d'agir et l'autonomisation. Cette circulation, sans nécessairement être commerciale, a néanmoins mené à une reconsidération du rôle des femmes par rapport aux lieux et aux espaces censés les définir. Si jadis leur culture patriarcale limitait traditionnellement les espaces publics de l'agir féminin, désormais elles font plus facilement le saut entre le privé et le public, le local et le lointain. Souvent, elles ont dû assumer des attitudes «masculines» et agressives pour affronter et déjouer toutes les formes de contrôle policier et douanier qui pourrait les intimider ou confisquer les biens et les documents de voyage. Ces femmes se sont aussi valorisées à travers une nouvelle présentation du soi, ritualisée dans le sens goffmanien¹¹, avec un accent mis sur la performance corporelle métropolitaine comme nouveau lieu d'identification formelle (de nouvelles attitudes, une nouvelle présentation

¹¹ Goffman Erving. (1959). *The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life*. New York, Doubleday-Anchor, Garden City.

vestimentaire, de nouveaux stéréotypes linguistiques attestant un passage superficiel d'une culture à une autre, de nouveaux goûts culinaires, etc.).

À différence de ce groupe, les femmes immigrées au Canada ont dû affronter un processus beaucoup plus complexe de reconfiguration identitaire, car l'immigration est une rupture à tous les niveaux et implique autant l'esprit, la mémoire et l'affect que la corporalité dans tout ce qu'elle a de plus biologique par ses rapports au climat, à la nourriture, aux typologies des soins de santé, aux pratiques corporelles, etc.

La question de l'intégration des immigrants est conçue généralement comme une étape positive qui se réalise, par exemple, au Québec par le biais des politiques d'accueil spécifiques mises en place à travers des programmes gouvernementaux qui visent à harmoniser l'écologie sociale. Au Canada, pays qui a investi dans le développement des politiques et d'infrastructures d'immigration, l'accueil des immigrants s'effectue à travers des ensembles législatifs visant : 1. l'intégration administrative, territoriale et surtout sociale (les structures d'accueil parrainées par le gouvernement); 2. l'intégration économique (insertion par le travail); et 3. l'intégration linguistique (en fait, les immigrants au Québec sont obligés de maîtriser deux nouvelles langues, le français et l'anglais).

L'intégration est aussi envisagée comme un «contrat moral» accepté par les immigrants pour leur insertion dans une société démocratique et pluraliste, dont les deux valeurs primordiales sont : 1. Le principe de laïcisation de l'État, censée représenter le respect d'autres religions et cultes et 2. L'individualisme, valeur sociale essentielle dans la société nord-américaine, car elle est le véhicule censé garantir la différence identitaire.¹²

Cependant, le mécanisme d'intégration est loin d'être spontané et mécanique, car les sociétés d'accueil occidentales se présentent de façon contradictoire : d'une part, elles incarnent l'ouverture, l'espoir et la liberté ; d'autre part, leur hypermodernité a éliminé la plupart de catégories temporelles qui servent à orienter le Soi intime. Dans ce sens, l'étape d'intégration serait liée avant tout à un processus complexe de décodage, d'incorporation et de maîtrise de systèmes de représentation à la lumière d'une dynamique temporelle postmoderne. L'extension spatiale, signalée par un système d'échange hyperactif, a éliminé le passé et le futur comme points de référence pour la construction du Soi. Comme Bhabha le note¹³:

The present can no longer be simply envisaged as a break or a bonding with the past and the future, no longer a synchronic presence: our proximate self-presence, our public image, comes to be revealed for its discontinuities, its inequalities, its minorities.

L'identité contemporaine se présente comme étant fluide, hybridée et réalisée dans le présent. Elle est aussi négociable, justement par l'entremise des mécanismes d'*empowering* individuel¹⁴ et par son rejet de l'identité historique inventée par l'État-nation, devenue la force des traditions nationales des peuples modernes. Elle se présente

¹² Laaroussi M., Montejo M.E., Lessard Dd., Viana M. (1995). Les pratiques sociales au Québec. *NPS*, Vol. 8 No 2, p. 125.

¹³ Bhabha H. *The Location of Culture*. p. 6.

¹⁴ Concept lié à l'autoestime dans le sens qu'il confère un orgueil personnel, une sensation de «pouvoir faire» (comme son nom l'indique, provenant de l'anglais *power*) ; il est par conséquent inévitablement lié au niveau d'autovalorisation d'un individu, mais également à l'agir (*agency*). Voir: Rappaport J. (1987). Terms of empowerment/exemplars of prevention: toward a theory for community psychology. *American Journal of Community Psychology*. 15: 121-148.

aussi comme une identité «libérée» ayant réfuté l'essentialisme des anciennes catégories organisationnelles :

To move away from the singularities of 'class' or 'gender' as primary conceptual and organizational categories, has resulted in an awareness of the subject position- of race, gender, generation, institutional location, geopolitical locale, sexual orientation- that inhabit any claim to identity in modern world.

What is theoretically innovative, and politically crucial, is the need to think beyond narratives of originary and initial subjectivities and to focus on those moments or processes that are produced in the articulation of cultural difference. These 'in-between' spaces provide the terrain for elaborating strategies of selfhood-singular or communal- that initiate new signs of identity.

The very concepts of homogenous national cultures, the consensual or contiguous transmission of historical traditions, or 'organic' ethnic communities - as the grounds of cultural comparatism - are in a profound process of redefinition. (ibid).

Face à cette fluidité, une bonne partie des migrantes se définissent justement par leur référence à leur identité antérieure encadrée par des structures nationales ou ethniques et par des traditions, éléments qui leur confèrent stabilité et un ancrage spatio-temporel. Une rupture avec le passé peut devenir une source d'angoisse car il est difficile de se situer quand on n'a plus de repères temporels. L'isolement temporel culturel de l'immigrante est alors vécu comme une mort symbolique, car il n'existe à ce moment de début que deux alternatives ; soit celle du repli, soit celle de l'ouverture et de l'*empowering*. En tant qu'immigrante, la femme laisse un milieu culturel qu'elle maîtrise et entre en confrontation avec un monde régi par un système de significations inconnues dont le sous-texte la pousse vers un anéantissement symbolique. Le nouvel environnement néolibéral a rejeté les bases patriarcales traditionnelles de la définition identitaire féminine: les femmes ne doivent plus ni dépendre, ni se définir vis-à-vis les hommes, un fait, qui fait partie de l'« ideascap » (cf. Appadurai) canadien. Dans ce sens, beaucoup de femmes provenant des cultures traditionnelles (patriarcales) éprouvent une baisse d'estime de soi car leur identité de «femme traditionnelle» n'est plus valorisée à l'heure de la libération de la femme, conçue comme une condition sine qua non du Soi individuel autonome. Cette période d'intégration¹⁵, dont la durée varie en fonction de la capacité de la femme de prendre le pouvoir et d'agir, est la période de la nostalgie et de la reproduction mécanique du mode de vie antérieure. Le malaise psychique devient une lutte temporelle et renforce le lien avec le passé imaginé, fait qui, évidemment, ralentit le processus d'insertion dans le présent.

Cependant l'intégration, n'est pas uniquement une étape de conciliation avec soi-même. Elle se développe au fur et à mesure que les immigrantes recomposent des liens sociaux et incorporent autant les nouvelles définitions de l'altérité que de nou-

¹⁵ Par exemple, selon Laaroussi et al... (1995) qui ont étudié le processus d'intégration des femmes immigrantes dans la région d'Estrie, il y a trois types de stratégies de reconstruction identitaire :

1. Les stratégies de repli, «dans lesquelles les femmes se retirent dans l'invisibilité, dans la nostalgie et dans le privé et utilisent l'informel comme moyen de protection identitaire».
2. Les stratégies de revendication, «qui permettent aux femmes d'user de leur visibilité nouvelle et du formel du pays d'accueil pour revendiquer leur différence tant par rapport au pays d'origine qu'au pays d'accueil».
3. Les stratégies de négociation, «qui articulent le formel et la visibilité dans des ajustements situationnels».

Ces stratégies correspondent à des étapes différenciées d'*empowering* et réorganisent autant les rôles familiaux et les représentations des femmes sur eux-mêmes que les attitudes envers l'extérieur (p.130).

veaux systèmes de signification. Le grand défi identitaire devient la lutte pour négocier les différences entre les deux temporalités des deux sociétés et de concilier le passé de la société d'origine avec le présent éternel de la société d'accueil.

Le mécanisme d'intégration est donc ambivalent, il est public et privé, social et intime et renvoie aux aspects invisibles et polysémiques de la définition identitaire dominée par des catégories comme la mémoire, la langue maternelle, la nostalgie, etc. Les dynamiques de valorisation ou de fragilisation et de perte peuvent agir de manière cumulative, renforçant ou affaiblissant le Soi, selon le contexte. L'ambivalence provient justement de la fusion qui se réalise entre l'incorporation de l'altérité dans les structures déjà naturalisées dans notre identité originelle. Comme le notait une de mes interlocutrices :

Pour les Fêtes de Pâques on a acheté l'agneau de Québec, ça vient des fermes locales, soit tu vas chez les Arabes de Jean Talon tu sais. Je n'aime pas l'agneau de la Nouvelle-Zélande!

Ensuite la teinture des œufs je l'ai pris du magasin des Russes (mieux que la teinture du magasin allemand et moins cher), j'ai acheté un «cozonac» chez les Polonais, et voilà, on a bu notre propre «tzuica» venu directement de Roumanie avec ma mère, et voilà, on s'est bien organisé... Ah, oui, oui, bien sûr qu'on est allé à l'église, nous allons à l'Église orthodoxe grecque de Jean Talon... Et en plus, ma mère elle a fait aussi des «cozonaci» et du «drob», mais bien sûr, on le fait chaque année, même si les gens ici ne fêtent pas les Pâques comme les orthodoxes...

Comme ça on se sent bien ! On respecte la tradition même si on est dans un autre coin du monde; on le fait pour nous, on le fait pour les enfants et pour les nouveaux amis d'ici qui ne connaissent pas nos traditions... mais ils les adorent. Ça fait du bien ! (CM. 46 ans, institutrice).

Conclusions

Dans cet article nous nous sommes proposé d'explorer quelques dynamiques du Soi et des technologies identitaires dans le contexte de la mondialisation en nous référant particulièrement aux migrantes non occidentales déplacées dans des cultures postmodernes.

Nous avons tenté de souligner qu'en dépit de tout paradigme économique, la définition identitaire des migrantes/ immigrantes est un phénomène complexe à la fois individuel (psychologique) et social collectif défini par des structures sociohistoriques et délimitées par des catégories culturellement construites, comme le temps et l'espace, le domaine public et privé, les rôles des genres, etc. Ces structures de la géopolitique du Soi influencent le développement transitoire des identités, leur hybridation ou leur refus de changer, mais aussi le renforcement du micro-individualisme ou la fragilisation sociale dans les zones de transition car les immigrantes sont prises entre deux systèmes de représentations et de valeurs. D'une part, l'hypermodernité – où les références au passé ne servent pas d'ancrage symbolique ; d'autre part, les valeurs incorporées dans la société originelle. En même temps, les immigrantes vont devenir plus aptes à incorporer une forme d'altérité qui désormais fait partie de la réalité quotidienne postmoderne. Cette dynamique nouvelle, d'une identité qui transgresse les frontières culturelles et incorpore la diversité, ne fait qu'augmenter son individualité.

Compte tenu des exemples présentés, nous pourrions donc conclure qu'en dépit de toutes les circonstances contradictoires et difficiles qui accompagnent l'immigration,

l'expérience transnationale et «trans-temporelle» influence la dimension identitaire féminine par l'imposition d'une nouvelle trajectoire d'autonomisation et surtout par la nécessité de maîtriser de nouvelles formes de valorisation et d'affirmation du Soi.

Moda și modernitatea – fenomene corelative

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Rezumat

Enunțarea acestei tematici în spațiul editorial al unei reviste de psihologiei politică poate părea surprinzătoare. Totuși, moda – înțeleasă ca transformare continuă și ciclică a preferințelor membrilor unei societăți – oferă o serie de aspecte sociale relevante pentru domeniul de studiu al psihologie politice: schimbarea sistemelor sociale (în special, modificările structurale) și modul cum sunt reglementate aceste schimbări (controlul social); emergența și difuzarea inovațiilor; moda ca resursă identitară a cercurilor sociale care dețin puterea; moda ca formă de comportament colectiv. Sunt teme de reflecție consacrate în primele decenii ale secolului trecut prin scrierile unor sociologi clasici precum Herbert Spencer, Gabriel Tarde, Émile Durkheim, Georg Simmel. Acest articol este o încercare de reconstituire a traseului științific al fenomenului modei în ansamblul de studiu al sociologie clasice.

Abstract

Enunciation of this subject in the editorial space of a psycho-political journal might seem surprising. However, fashion – as a continuous and cyclic transformation of the preferences of a society – offers a series of social aspects relevant for the study of the political psychology: the change of the social systems (especially structural changes); the way in which are settled these changes (the social control); the emergence and the spread of the innovations; fashion as identity resource of the social groups that have the power; fashion as a form of collective behavior. These are subjects that have been devoted to acknowledgement in the first decades of the last century through the writings of classical sociologists Herbert Spencer, Gabriel Tarde, Émil Durkheim, George Simmel. This article is an attempt to reconstruct the scientific tract of the fashion phenomenon in the study of the classical sociology on the whole.

Cuvinte cheie: modă, modernizare, habitus, consum.

Grabriel Tarde: teoria imitației

În abordarea sociologică a fenomenului modei se pot distinge două orientări: una relaționată evenimentelor social-politice și culturale ale începutului de secol XX, denumite

prin termenul generic de „modernitate”, și alta corespunzătoare comportamentului colectiv, dezvoltată cu precădere după anii ‘60. Alte tendințe recente de analiză a modei reflectă achizițiile teoretice și empirice aferente sociologiei consumului, sociologiei corpului și studiilor culturale.

În plan teoretic, concepțiile sociologice despre modă se revendică din interesul tematic al începutului de secol XX, corespondent dezbaterii asupra modernității. Ca fenomene, moda și modernitatea sunt corelative, în sensul că ambele ilustrează căutarea și instituirea noului (L. Vlăsceanu, 2007, 28), însă, în plan semantic, echivalarea acestor noțiuni ar fi o eroare, după cum ne avertizează un analist al conceptelor modernității, criticul literar Matei Călinescu (1934-2009). Etimologia cuvintelor „modă” (care derivă de la *modus*, manieră) și „modernitate” (*modo*, acum), indică diferența de sens dintre aceste două noțiuni (M. Călinescu, 1987/2005, 354).

Din punct de vedere istoric, emergența fenomenului modei a fost declanșată de urbanizarea progresivă începută în epoca industrială (M.-L. Rouquette, 1994/2002, 47). „Marea teamă a modernității – emanciparea” (P. Sloterdijk, 2000/2002, 11) – care a cuprins diferitele aspecte ale societății începutului de secol XX, a atras interesul unor sociologi clasici, precum Gustave Le Bon, Gabriel Tarde, Thorstein Bunde Veblen, Georg Simmel. Climatul modernității – semnalat deseori prin „forța” mulțimilor, prin comportamentul maselor, prin pierderea tradițiilor sau prin schimbările rapide ale modei – a fost explicat de autorii citați anterior prin noțiunile de „contagiune” și de „imitație”. În multiplele sale alegeri, individul nu face altceva decât să acționeze sub impulsul imitației și al contagiunii mintale, performând comportamente pe care le observă la semenii săi. Aceasta era concepția dominantă a discursului științific la cumpăna dintre veacul al XIX-lea și al XX-lea, sub influența unor lucrări celebre datate cam în aceeași perioadă: *Les lois de l'imitation* (1890) a lui Gabriel Tarde și *Psychologie des foules* (1895) a lui Gustave Le Bon.

Anterior lui Gabriel Tarde și Gustave Le Bon, unele observații și descoperiri din biologie furnizaseră deja argumente privind comportamentul imitativ al unor specii de animale. Charles Darwin (1809-1882) arăta că „uneori animalele își imită acțiunile între ele: lupii crescuți de câini au învățat să latre, puii de păsări imită cântul părinților și uneori pe cel al altor păsări, papagalii imită orice sunet pe care îl aud mai des” (*apud* S. Moscovici, 1981/2001, 85). De asemenea, este posibil ca similaritatea dintre starea psihică a individului în cadrul mulțimii și starea de hipnoză, pe care a propus-o Gustave Le Bon ca explicație a uniformității comportamentelor, să provină din rezultatele metodei hipnotice și a sugestiei în medicină, folosită pentru prima dată cam în aceeași perioadă de savantul Ambroise Liébeault (*cf.* S. Moscovici, 1981/2001, 85).

Imitația, căreia i se atribuie o mare influență în cadrul fenomenelor sociale, nu este în realitate decât un simplu efect al contagiunii [...]. Asemeni animalelor, omul este prin natura lui un imitator. Pentru el, imitația este o nevoie, cu condiția ca această imitație să-i fie la îndemână; în această nevoie își are obârșia moda. Fie că e vorba de opinii, de idei, de manifestări literare sau doar de simpla vestimentație, câți dintre oameni îndrăznesc să se sustragă de sub stăpânirea ei? Cu modele sunt călăuzite masele, nu cu argumente (G. Le Bon, 1895/2003, 65).

Moda apare ca un tip de imitație larg răspândită în viața cotidiană. Gabriel Tarde, căruia îi este atribuită paternitatea teoriei imitației, considera că moda nu face altceva decât să ilustreze principiul imitației, aceasta fiind caracteristică vieții sociale. Omul

este prin esență sa o ființă socială care imită idei, obiceiuri, norme, valori sociale, mode, conduite. Există două tipuri de imitație: *imitația-tradiție* (imitarea cutumă, imitarea strămoșilor), care asigură legătura dintre generații și *imitația-modă* (imitarea contemporanilor, a străinilor), care asigură coeziunea în cadrul aceleiași generații. Se pare că între cele două, prestigiul predecesorilor îl învinge pe cel al imitației recente, „căci imitația care există în curente de modă nu este decât un torent slab pe lângă puternicul fluviu al cutumei, și trebuie neapărat să fie așa” (G. Tarde, 1890/1895, 47). În acord cu legea imitației de la superior la inferior și cu legea imitației de la exterior spre interior (*ad interioribus ad exteriora*), formulate de psihosociologul francez, clasele inferioare ale societății copiază mai întâi ideile, dorințele, manierele și apoi comportamentele, stilurile de îmbrăcăminte, limba, obiceiurile claselor superioare. Cea de-a treia lege, cea a degradării modelului social al imitației este răspunzătoare de propagarea continuă a imitației și de menținerea stratificării sociale (*idem*, 235).

Georg Simmel: teoria *trickle down*

Eseul sociologului german Georg Simmel despre fenomenul modei, publicat pentru prima dată în anul 1904, în revista *International Quarterly* (vol. X) la New York, a marcat destinul teoretic al sociologiei modei timp de aproximativ șaizeci de ani. Receptarea acestui articol avea loc în contextul în care, doar cu patru ani înainte, în 1900, Georg Simmel publica volumul *Philosophie des Geldes*, iar în 1889 își finaliza teza de doctorat asupra filozofiei lui Immanuel Kant. Nu întâmplător, la o primă lectură, textul eseului despre modă ilustrează foarte bine influența kantiană asupra operei lui Georg Simmel, prin apelul la conceptul de „formă”. În lumina acestor considerente, desprindem înțelesul afirmației că moda reprezintă „o formă socială cu o finalitate demnă de admirat” (G. Simmel, 1911/1998, 50), prin intermediul căreia omul poate experimenta, simultan, legătura cu comunitatea, cu grupul din care face parte, dar și libertatea individuală, tendința de diferențiere.

Adoptarea modei de către individ reflectă particularitatea normei pe care aceasta o generează. „Femeile, bărbații, indivizii nehotărâți, demodații, sclavii modei” – pentru a recurge doar la tipologiile exemplificate de Georg Simmel – se conformează diferențiat normei care reglementează moda, dar cu aceleași finalități: de accentuare, concomitentă, a instinctului de individualizare, dar și de acceptare socială. Așadar, moda obiectivează în același timp curente contrare ale vieții: individualizare *versus* conformare (G. Simmel, 1911/1998, 51-57).

Un alt palier de lectură al eseului vizează tema predilectă a sociologiei, la confluența dintre secolele XIX și XX. După cum însuși Georg Simmel (1911/1998, 34) afirmă, fenomenele modernității au creat premise favorabile manifestării impulsurilor imitative, în societatea timpului său, moda resimțindu-se în cele mai diverse sectoare de activitate: politic, religios, științific, artistic, vestimentar etc. Chiar și socialismul și individualismul au fost chestiuni de modă, precizează autorul. Într-o astfel de ambianță, „moda a devenit mult mai amplă și mai agitată” (G. Simmel, 1911/1998, 53), tocmai pentru că modernitatea pune în scenă o tensiune între masele de jos, mai puțin mobile, cu o evoluție mai înceată și păturile de jos care se tem de orice formă de mișcare și schimbare apărută la cei dintâi. În această situație, clasa de sus recrează permanent semne distinctive, ca expresie a unității simbolice a statusului și a diferențierii de clasa de jos, iar aceasta din urmă, imită și adoptă moda clasei de sus, distrugând limitele fixate

de aceasta (*idem*, 34). De îndată ce masele încep să imite moda claselor de sus, acestea adoptă o nouă modă, care o diferențiază de mase și, prin urmare, procesul este continuu. „Moda este totdeauna moda claselor, și moda păturii mai înalte se deosebește de cea a păturii de jos fiind părăsită de prima dată în clipa în care aceasta din urmă o adoptă” (G. Simmel, 1911/1998, 31) – aceasta este explicația înscrisă în tradiția sociologică ca teoria *trickle-down*.

Întreaga istorie a modei ilustrează deopotrivă voința individului spre diferențiere și dorința de conformare la o normă socială. Tocmai în acest fapt constă caracteristica modei, subliniază Georg Simmel. Astfel, în termenii teoriei lui Georg Simmel (1911/1998, 52), putem distinge o modă personală, ca expresie a necesității individului de a se diferenția și o modă socială, ca modă a claselor. Moda înseamnă „imitarea unui model dat și satisface nevoia de sprijin social, ea dirijează fiecare persoană pe calea străbătută de toți, ea dă o notă generală, care face din comportamentul fiecărui individ un simplu exemplu. Ea satisface, nu în mică măsură, și nevoia de diversitate, tendința către diferențiere, variație, reliefare a sinelui” (*idem*, 31). Funcțiile esențiale ale modei asigură, pe de o parte, legătura între cei aflați pe același palier social, iar pe de altă parte, moda acționează ca un diferențiator între membrii claselor superioare și cei ai maselor: „A lega și a deosebi – acestea sunt cele două funcții esențiale, reunite aici indisolubil, din care una este premisa realizării celeilalte” (G. Simmel, 1911/1998, 32). Potrivit lui Georg Simmel, moda există când se îndeplinesc cele două condiții: necesitatea unității și necesitatea diversității. Așadar, moda oferă, în același timp, distincție individuală și coeziune de grup.

Desigur, ideea modei ca imitare a „mărcilor” sociale ale elitelor este potrivită pentru explicarea evoluției modei în secolele al XVIII-lea, al XIX-lea și în prima jumătate a secolului al XX-lea. Aproape toate muzeele și cărțile de istorie a vestimentației au ilustrat și au trasat în exclusivitate fluxul vertical al modei inițiate de aristocrație. Pornind de la aceste precedente istorice este ușor de concluzionat că moda a aparținut, într-un sens tradițional, clasei de sus, adică unui grup restrâns și faimos (*cf.* G. B. Sproles, 1981, 119). Personal, consider că cercetările ulterioare nu au făcut altceva decât să infirme sau să confirme această teorie. Expunerea teoretică din acest articol va argumenta că teoria *trickle-across*, formulată ca alternativă explicativă a mecanismului de propagare a modei, a susținut democratizarea consumului, dar nu a reușit să aibă un rol decisiv în sociologia modei.

Multiplele exegeze asupra scrierilor lui Georg Simmel îl caracterizează drept o personalitate marcantă în fundamentare științifică a disciplinei sociologice (D. Frisby, 1984/2004, xiv; R. Sassatelli, 2000, 42; S. Dungaciu, 2003, 18) și poate sociologul clasic cel mai important (D. Frisby, 1984/2004, 3). Nu întâmplător, concepția lui Georg Simmel despre fenomenul modei a fost valorificată deopotrivă în sociologia consumului, în analiza comportamentelor colective, în estetică și în filozofie. Însă textul eseului a fost interpretat divergent. În sociologia modei, argumentele lui Georg Simmel sunt relaționate cu cele ale contemporanului său, economistul și sociologul american Thorstein B. Veblen și reunite sub denumirea teoria *trickle-down*, cu toate că „nu există vreun indiciu al influenței intelectuale între cei doi sociologi” (*cf.* R. Tilman, 1999, 282). Deși am putea găsi un punct de reper pentru interpretarea unitară a celor două concepții, și anume – traseul modei descrie structura societății în care se manifestă – totuși, pe parcursul articolului, îi voi prezenta separat, asimilarea ideilor lui Thorstein

B. Veblen în sociologie producând o direcție distinctă, identificată prin temele societății de consum. O altă notă definitorie, care desparte cele două concepții, ar fi că la Georg Simmel mecanismul de propagare a modei este unul imitativ, în timp ideea principală pe care Thorstein B. Veblen o dezvoltă este consumul ostentativ, prin intermediul cărui clasa de sus își conservă identitatea și poziția socială.

Thorstein Bund Veblen: teoria consumului

Expresia “societatea de consum” – emblematică pentru caracterizarea ordinii economice și vieții cotidiene în societatea contemporană (G. Lipovetsky, 2006/2007, 17) – și-a făcut debutul în discursul sociologic la sfârșitul secolului al XIX-lea, prin lucrarea economistului și sociologului american Thorstein Bund Veblen (1857–1929), *The Theory of the Leisure Class* (1899). Reluarea temei *homo consumericus* de către generațiile ulterioare de sociologi a însemnat delimitarea unei arii de preocupări teoretice și empirice, denumită „sociologia comportamentului de consum” sau „sociologia consumului” (J. I. Nelson, 2007, 178).

Pornind de la premisa că timpul liber este o resursă diferențiată a oamenilor, Thorstein B. Veblen ajunge să descrie o societate bazată pe principii economice, în care plăcerea de consum ostentativ caracterizează clasa de sus, adică elita inactivă a celor care nu sunt implicați în procesul de muncă industrială și care domina ierarhia socială prin reputație (T. B. Veblen, 1899/2009, 81). Așadar, la nivelul societății pot fi distinse două mari clase: clasa de sus, cea a loisir-ului, „fără griji pecuniare” (T. B. Veblen, 1899/2009, 81), ai cărei membrii sunt angajați permanent în etalarea publică a propriului status și clasa de jos, care practică consumul „prin procură” (*ibidem*), imitând modul de viață al celor de sus.

Clasa fără griji se află în vârful structurii sociale, din punctul de vedere al respectabilității, iar felul în care trăiește și normele sale de valoare, stabilesc, așadar, etalonul de bună reputație pentru toată lumea. Respectarea acestor reguli, cu un oarecare grad de aproximației, le revine ca obligație tuturor claselor aflate mai jos pe scara socială. În comunitățile civilizate moderne, liniile de demarcație dintre clase au devenit vagi și trecătoare; oriunde se întâmplă acest lucru, norma de respectabilitate impusă de clasa superioară își extinde influența coercitivă aproape fără niciun obstacol prin structura socială, până la straturile cele mai de jos. Rezultatul este acela că membrii fiecărui strat acceptă drept ideal de decență modul de viață aflat în vogă printre membrii stratului imediat superior și își consacră energia aspirației de a trăi conform acestui ideal (T. B. Veblen, 1899/2009, 81-82).

Fenomenul modei vestimentare ar privi exclusiv pe membrii clasei de lux, al cărei consum ostentativ (*conspicuous consumption*) a devenit un simbol pentru bogăției și status social. Vestimentația elegantă este nu numai o emblemă a consumului, dar și o marcă a clasei înalte (T. B. Veblen, 1899/2009, 150), adică a celor care consumă fără să producă. În opinia autorului citat, moda se dezvoltă pe două nivele. Aceasta apare prin inovației în cadrul clasei loisir-ului, ai căror membrii creează în continuu noi articole de îmbrăcăminte, accesorii și ornamente pentru a-și reafirma poziția pe care o ocupă în cadrul ierarhiei sociale și pentru a se distinge prin „estetica pecuniară” (*idem*, 120).

Îndeosebi regula risipei ostentative de bunuri își găsește exprimarea în vestimentație, cu toate ca și celelalte principii înrudite ale reputației pecuniare se văd exemplificate în același gen de articole. [...] cheltuiala pe haine are acest avantaj dinaintea majorității celorlalte, că lucrurile cu care ne îmbrăcăm sunt

întotdeauna la vedere și le oferă o indicație a rangului nostru pecuniar tuturor celor care ne observă, de la prima ochire (T. B. Veblen, 1899/2009, 148).

[...] norma risipei ostentative exercită o supraveghere restrictivă asupra tuturor chestiunilor de vestimentație, așa încât orice schimbare în modă trebuie să se supună exigențelor risipei (T. B. Veblen, 1899/2009, 153).

La prima vedere, nu există o diferență sesizabilă între concepția lui Georg Simmel și cea a lui Thorstein B. Veblen, din moment ce moda se infiltrează spre bază (*trickle down*), în virtutea menținerii distanței sociale și a diferențierii. Tocmai această constatare a determinat gruparea acestor argumente sub denumirea de teoria *trickle-down*. După cum am mai afirmat, teza lui Thorstein B. Veblen se diferențiază clar de cea a lui Georg Simmel atât prin originea conceptelor vehiculate, cât și prin direcțiile de studiu pe care le-a impus ulterior. Pentru Georg Simmel (1908/2000, 9) imitarea modei claselor de sus reprezintă un efect al interacțiunii sociale, în timp ce în lucrarea lui Thorstein B. Veblen (1899/2009, 31), mecanismul de diferențiere între moda clasei de sus și moda clasei de jos este determinat de proprietatea sau controlul asupra mijloacelor de producție, și, implicit, de adoptarea unor comportamente de consum ostentativ.

Astăzi, se pare că dinamica consumului s-a schimbat (G. Lipovetsky, 2006/2007, 35). Funcția principală a acestuia nu mai este ilustrarea opoziției dintre clasa dominantă și clasa dominaților. Totuși, în societățile noastre, achiziționarea celor mai banale produse încă mai ilustrează inegalitățile sociale, chiar dacă acestea au devenit mai subtile. În Parisul anilor 1963-1968, moda vestimentară și datele privind achiziționarea articolelor de îmbrăcăminte încă mai indicau inegalitățile sociale, dacă luăm în discuție cercetarea condusă de Pierre Bourdieu (1979) pe un eșantion de 1271 de subiecți. Mai recent, interviurile realizate de Virag Molnar (2002, 94) cu persoane de culoare arătau faptul că aceștia reprezintă un procent semnificativ al consumatorilor din magazinele de pe celebra arteră comercială americană Fifth Avenue, respectiv 41 la sută comparativ cu 32 la sută americani albi. Pornind de aici, autorii formulează ipoteza potrivit căreia consumul a devenit o formă de comportament colectiv a cărei normă constă în „a conduce o mașină scumpă, a bea cel mai bun scotch și a fi îmbrăcat îngrijit și după ultima modă” (*ibidem*). Cercetarea a revelat faptul că pentru majoritatea subiecților consumul ostentativ reprezintă o formă de a câștiga aprecierea socială din partea populației albe și de a contracara stereotipurile legate de negrii din ghetouri.

Hainele „la modă”, ca și automobilele de lux sau vilele din zonele rezervate, petrecerea vacanțelor în locuri exotice sau frecventarea unor cluburi selecte fac parte din categoria „bunurilor poziționale”, care au funcția de a semnaliza poziția superioară a celor care le posedă, diferențiindu-i de restul populației. Pe măsură ce societățile devin mai bogate – susține Fred Hirsch (1977, *citată de* A.G. Johnson, 2000/2007, 52) – numărul bunurilor poziționale crește, fapt ce poate genera conflicte, dată fiind distribuția lor inegală.

Pamela N. Danziger (2005, 8) consideră că anii '80 ai secolului trecut au marcat trecerea de la consumul ostentativ la consumul de lux, nu atât pentru valențele distinctive, cât mai ales ca expresie a individualismului egalitar. Activitatea de cumpărare, ca mod de viață și sursă de fericire a fost pusă în evidență de o cercetare desfășurată pe teritoriul Statele Unite de Pamela N. Danziger (2005, 277) în anul 2002 (N=866) și respectiv 2003 (N=443). Profilul consumatorului american al bunurilor de lux ar fi următorul: acesta are un venit anual de peste 100.000 de dolari; este absolvent de studii superioare;

are în proprietate o casa de peste 250.000 de dolari; investește aproximativ 2500 de dolari pe an în activități de cumpărare, 380 de dolari pe produse de înfrumusețare, 46 la sută pe achiziționarea unor haine și accesorii precum bijuterii sau ceasuri; în medie consumul de modă se ridică la 2000 de dolari anual (*idem*, 123). Unul din patru americani cuprinși în eșantion declara că achiziționarea unor obiecte personale, precum hainele, ceasurile, accesoriile, bijuteriile și automobilele reprezintă sursa majoră de satisfacție. La întrebarea „Când vă gândiți la bunurile de lux achiziționate de dumneavoastră în ultimul an, care dintre acestea v-au adus cea mai mare satisfacție și fericire?” – 28 la sută dintre subiecți au optat pentru bunurile personale, și nu pentru cele experimentale (călătorii, vizionarea unor spectacole de teatru; tratamente de întreținere corporală; chirurgie estetică) sau obiectele de decorare a casei (tablouri de artă; aparate electrice de dotare a bucătăriei; aparate foto etc.). Nu întâmplător, tinerii consumatori, cu vârste între 28 și 34 de ani sunt cei mai bine reprezentați în grupul celor care se pronunță în favoarea bunurilor personale ca stimulent. De asemenea, persoanele celibatate își exprimă adevărată pasiune la cumpărarea obiectelor personale ca stil de viață și sursă a plăcerii (P. N. Danzinger, 2005, 117).

Norbert Elias: teoria procesului civilizării

Într-un sens, moda este sinonimă cu regulile de conduită considerate acceptate la un moment dat în societate, iar acest fapt este în mare măsură adevărat nu numai pentru perioada dinaintea secolului al XIX-lea, dar și astăzi, căci până și moda sânilor goi, care a dominat mai întâi plajele de la Saint-Tropez și apoi s-a răspândit în aproape toată lumea, „se integrează într-o evoluție care tinde către un control intim al emoțiilor” (J.-C. Kaufmann, 1995/2009, 24). Consemnările istoriei vestimentare întăresc și mai mult această afirmație: în normele sociale ale expunerii diferitelor părți ale corpului sau, dimpotrivă, ale acoperirii acestora regăsim în mare parte constrângerile exterioare transformate în autoconstrângeri (cf. N. Elias, 1939/2004, 211).

Teza dependenței dintre transformările care au avut loc în alcătuirea societății (sociogeneza) și transformările care au loc în alcătuirea conduitei și atitudinii psihice a oamenilor (psihogeneza) a fost enunțată pentru prima dată în sociologia anilor 1938-1939 de Norbert Elias (1897-1990). Numele acestui autor apare deseori citat mai ales pentru lucrarea sa clasică *Über den Prozeß der Zivilisation. Soziogenetische und psychogenetische Untersuchungen*, publicată inițial în Germania în anul 1939, dar puțin cunoscută în literatura anglofonă până la editarea primei ediții în limba engleză, la Londra, în 1978, cu titlul *The History of Manners* (R. Kilminster și S. Mennell, 2002/2003, 178).

Procesul civilizării, susține Norbert Elias (1939/2004, 211), reprezintă o modificare a conduitei și a simțirii umane într-o direcție absolut precisă: aceea a civilizării. Însă problema esențială nu rezidă în explicarea cauzelor schimbării conduitelor de-a lungul evoluției istorice, ci în stabilirea originii standardelor de comportament. În realitate, nimic din istorie nu indică că această modificare ar fi fost întreprinsă în mod rațional printr-o educație conștientă, inițiată de indivizi sau grupurile individuale, consideră autorul (*idem*, 212). Aceasta s-a realizat cu totul neplanificat, dar, cu toate acestea, nu s-a petrecut în afara unei ordini particulare. Totuși cum este posibilă? Cursul transformării istorice, fundamentarea procesului civilizării, este determinat de interrelaționarea socială.

Din cele mai vechi timpuri ale istoriei occidentale și până în prezent funcțiile sociale se diferențiază tot mai mult sub puternica presiune concurențială. Cu cât se diferențiază mai mult, cu atât mai mare devine numărul de funcții și în felul acesta și cel al oamenilor de care depinde în mod constant individul în toate acțiunile sale, de la cele mai simple și cotidiene la cele mai complexe și mai rare (N. Elias, 1939/2004, 213-214).

Diferențierea progresivă a funcțiilor sociale reprezintă prima și cea mai generală dintre trăsăturile sociale perceptibile când se pune problema cauzelor modificării atitudinilor psihice în sensul civilizării. Aceasta diviziune funcțională este însoțită de o reorganizare a structurii sociale (*idem*, 215-216).

Cu cât progresa în societate interrelaționarea și diviziunea muncii, cu atât mai dependente devin și straturile superioare de celelalte straturi și cu atât mai mare devine forța socială a acestor straturi, cel puțin potențial (*idem*, 25).

Demersul tezei – a argumentării conexiunii între schimbările de lungă durată care se produc la nivelul societății și modificările conduitelor oamenilor în sensul unei civilizări – este realizat de Norbert Elias într-un mod original, dacă ne raportăm la gândirea sociologică a timpului său, în care analiza macrosociologică era predominantă. Primul volum debutează cu o trecere în revistă a istoriei semantice a cuvintelor *Kultur* și *Zivilization*, susținută de exemple din codurile manierelor de la sfârșitul Evului Mediu până în secolul al XIX-lea.

Acest concept [civilizație - n.n] este o expresie a conștiinței de sine a lumii apusene. S-ar putea spune chiar: a conștiinței naționale. Conceptul sintetizează toate elementele prin care societatea apuseană a ultimelor două sau trei secole consideră că este superioară societăților anterioare sau celor contemporane mai „primitive”. Prin acest concept, societatea apuseană încearcă să caracterizeze elementele ce îi conferă specificitatea și cu care se mândrește: nivelul tehnicii *sale*, tipul manierelor *sale*, dezvoltarea cunoașterii *sale* științifice sau a concepției *sale* despre viață și multe altele (N. Elias, 1939/2002, 49).

Convenția cu privire la un anumit stil, regulile de comportament în societate, modelarea reacțiilor emoționale, aprecierea curtoaziei, importanța vorbirii îngrijite și a conversației, felul de articulare a vorbirii și multe altele, toate acestea se formează în Franța inițial în rândurile societății de curte, ca apoi să înregistreze, printr-o continuă mișcare de extindere, o transformare a caracterului social într-unul național (N. Elias, 1939/2002, 80).

Pornind de la aceste considerente, a doua parte a cărții, propune un model explicativ al procesului de formare al statelor în Europa, pe aceleași repere cronologice. După cum enunțăm și anterior, ideea de bază constă în existența unei conexiuni între dezvoltarea structurală de lungă durată și schimbările în structura personalității umane, a *habitus*-ului¹. Cu alte cuvinte, pe măsură ce structurile societății devin mai complexe, manierele, cultura și personalitatea se schimbă într-o direcție particulară și distinctă, mai întâi în straturile superioare ale societății, apoi gradual, către celelalte.

În fiecare val de răspândire a modalităților de conduită ale unui cerc către unul mai mare, aflat în ascensiune, deosebim în mod clar două faze: o fază de asimilare sau de colonizare, în care stratul mai amplu, inferior, aflat în ascensiune, este în mod evident subordonat celui superior, și care se orientează în mod evident după modelul celui superior și căruia stratul superior, fie că intenționează sau nu, îi inoculează modalitatea sa de conduită. Iar o a doua fază, de respingere, diferențiere sau emancipare, în care gruparea aflată în ascensiune câștigă în mod evident putere socială și conștiință de sine, în care, în mod corespunzător, gruparea superioară este constrânsă la o izolare mai puternică și în care se

¹ *Habitus* este de fapt cuvântul utilizat de Norbert Elias în limba germană, în prima ediție a cărții, traducerea în engleză dând sensul de *personality make-up*; conceptul de *habitus* va fi mai târziu popularizat de Pierre Bourdieu, care a fost un mare admirator al operei lui Norbert Elias (cf. R. Kilminster și S. Mennell, 2002/2003, 192).

accentuează contrastele și tensiunile din societate (N. Elias, 1939/2002, 283).

Moda a acompaniat cercurile sociale aflate în ascensiune la un moment dat în istorie. În următoarele paragrafe, voi susține precedenta afirmație, corelativă teoriei lui Norbert Elias, prin câteva exemple din istoria vestimentației.

După aproximativ trei secole de dominație a absolutismului în Europa, către sfârșitul secolului al XVIII-lea în saloanele și în stratificarea multiplă a societății franceze începe să se individualizeze tipul social al burghezului (Girolamo de Michele, 2004/2005, 239), care cunoaște principiile modei vestimentare tocmai pentru a se opune regimului lui Ludovic al XVI-lea. Și femeile își fac apariția pe scena publică: “Doamnele din Paris organizează saloane și participă, nu doar ca simple figurante, la dezbaterile care se desfășoară în cadrul acestora, prefigurând astfel cluburile Revoluției, dar urmând de fapt o modă care se instituise cu un veac în urmă, prin discuțiile de salon asupra naturii dragostei” (Girolamo de Michele, 2004/2005, 259). Aceasta ar fi faza de ascensiune a burgheziei care, în termenii lui Norbert Elias, constă în orientarea după stratul social dominant (nobilimea). Cetățeanul liber, acel *citoyen* al Revoluției Franceze, trebuia să fie o ființă a cărei “demnitate și ținută morală urmau să-i facă de rușine până și pe regi” (A.-W. Asserate, 2003/ 2005, 31). Partizanii revoluției – acei *inconcevables* și *incroyables* care puteau fi identificați prin culoarea roșie a redingotei, prin cravatele enorme care urcau până la bărbie, prin palaria mare biconică – lansau o nouă modă prin care accentuau tot mai mult contrastul față de cei care dețineau puterea, marcând o a doua fază de răspândire a modalităților de conduită. Nu întâmplător una din primele hotărâri ale Stării a Treia a fost de a abolii costumele impuse de Ludovic al XVI-lea deputaților din cele trei stări. Un decret datat din acea perioadă stipula faptul că “nici o persoană de un sex sau altul nu va mai putea constrânge pe un cetățean sau o cetățeană să se îmbrace într-un mod anume, sub pedeapsa de a fi considerată suspectă și urmărită pentru perturbarea liniștii publice; fiecare este liber să poarte haina sau veșmântul corespunzător sexului său, veșmântul care îi convine” (*apud* F.-M. Grau, 1999/2002, 66). Aceasta mișcare de emancipare ajunge să se manifeste și în artă: *merveilleuses* (echivalentul feminin pentru *incroyables*) își puneau în evidență sânii dezgoliți, uneori renunțau la corset și își despleteau părul; cel puțin așa reiese din tablourile epocii, în care doamnele baroce sunt înlocuite de femei mai puțin senzuale, dar mai libere ca moravuri (Girolamo de Michele, 2004/2005, 259).

Pierre Bourdieu: teoria gusturilor sociale

În sfârșit, omul se uită la Raskolnikov și-i spune cu glas tare, răspicat :

- Pot să-mi permit stimate domn, să intru în vorbă cu domnia voastră? Căci sub haina modestă, ochiul meu încercat citește în persoana dumneavoastră un om cult [...] (F. M. Dostoievski, 1999, 17).

Părerea generală este că intelectualilor nu le pasă de aparențe. Încă persistă în cultura populară imaginea romantică a intelectualului în turnul sau de fildeș, departe de trenduri efemere și de preocupări futele. Și sunt, într-adevar, există intelectuali care confirmă aceasta prejudecată, însă majoritatea se folosesc de haine pentru a-și sublinia apartenența la o cultură sau alta, la o anumită ideologie sau pur și simplu ca statement. Intelectualilor le place să se creadă despre ei ca sint intelectuali, și asta este adesea o sursă de motivație puternică atunci când își aleg hainele [...] (I. Calen, 3 aprilie 2008, *Cotidianul*).

Denumirea târgului de produse de lux: Bespoke, târg organizat în orașul modei cu obiectivul declarat de a promova toate formele particulare de bunăstare. [...].

A fost locul ideal de întâlnire a celor care fac colecții de obiecte deosebite, unice. Toate produsele expuse au fost atent studiate și personalizate pentru fiecare cumpărător pregătit să scoată din cont 190.000 de euro pe un parfum de la aceeași firmă care produce pentru regina Angliei, 75.000 de euro pentru o geacă din piele de crocodil sau 100.000 de euro pentru un ceas placat cu aur și diamante. [...]. Extravaganțele clientului sunt divizate în două categorii: stil și epatare. Publicul elitist își comandă toate produsele în funcție de gusturi, astfel aflăm că premierul italian Silvio Berlusconi își alege atent pantofii de la o singură casă de tradiție, Stivaleria Savoia, plătind pe ei de la 2.000 de euro în sus. Producătorul de parfumuri al reginei Angliei a expus la Bespoke fragranțe unice create în trecut special pentru personaje precum Andy Warhol și, în prezent, pentru Elton John, prețul de pornire fiind de 70.000 de euro (D. Vitelaru, 25 noiembrie 2008, *Cotidianul*).

Exemplele de mai sus ilustrează foarte bine diferențele de stil vestimentar între indivizii care dețin capital cultural și cei care dețin capital economic. Există vreo corespondență între formele de capital, poziția socială și, implicit, stilul vestimentar al acestora? Răspunsul la această întrebare ilustrează modul în care am gândit structura secțiunii dedicată contribuției lui Pierre Bourdieu (1930-2002) la fundamentarea teoretică a sociologiei modei.

Am enunțat în frazele precedente o tematică (*stratificare socială*) și un concept (*capital*) care au făcut carieră în sociologie, în special prin lucrările lui Karl Marx (1818-1883) și Max Weber (1864-1920). La mijlocul secolului trecut, printr-o cercetare teoretică și empirică, sociologul Pierre Bourdieu – caracterizat în cadrul unui compendiu al teoriilor sociale contemporane drept „cel mai original și influent sociolog francez de la Durkheim și până astăzi” (C. Calhoun, 2000/2003, 274) – semnală diferențele de gust din structura societății franceze a anilor 1963-1968, furnizând noi concepte explicative pentru delimitarea stratificării sociale: „capital cultural”, „gust”, „habitus”.

Teza sociologului francez Pierre Bourdieu despre gusturile culturale se aseamănă într-un fel cu cea a lui Georg Simmel prin originea kantiană a conceptelor pe care le vehiculează. Dar, spre deosebire de Georg Simmel care utiliza conceptul filozofic de „formă” pentru a defini moda, Pierre Bourdieu transpune în interogații sociologice și antropologice conceptul de „gust”. Modul în care consumăm (ne manifestăm gusturile, deci preferăm) unele produse culturale – de la cele elevate, precum cărțile, piesele de teatru, spectacolele de operă, expozițiile de picturi, până la cele care se înscriu în ordinea necesității – mâncare, vestimentație, decorarea interiorului – „sunt indicatori ai nivelului educațional, și apoi ai originii sociale” (P. Bourdieu, 1979/1984, 1). „Felul în care cultura a fost achiziționată, ilustrează maniera în care o folosim” (*idem*, 2), cu alte cuvinte, bunurile, adică consumul și utilizarea acestora, descriu modul în care cultura a fost dobândită. Capitalul cultural, nu numai cel economic, îl clasează pe individ în ierarhia socială. Aceasta teză, prezentată în lucrarea *La Distinction: Critique sociale du jugement* (1979), a fost pusă în evidență printr-o serie întreagă de anchete și studii etnografice de amploare, desfășurate de sociologul francez pe o perioadă de aproximativ cinci ani, respectiv din 1963 și până în 1969.

Cercetarea s-a derulat în două etape, inițial, în anul 1963, pe un eșantion de 692 de subiecți, de origine franceză, cu reședința în Paris și Lille, precum și în suburbiile învecinate. Mai întâi, studiul a confirmat structura eterogenă a gusturilor unor indivizi care compuneau diversele grupuri socio-profesionale, cuprinse în populația cercetării: profesori din învățământul liceal și universitar; manageri; mici întreprinzători; directori;

ingineri; profesii liberale; producătorii de artă (*clasa de mijloc*); angajați din sectorul medical și social, dealeri de artă, secretare și directori adjuncți (*mica burghezie, nouă clasa de mijloc*); funcționari; tehnicieni; comercianți; angajați ai atelierelor (*clasa muncitoare*). Ulterior, pentru a obține date statistice semnificative în raport cu numărul total al populației Franței în anii 1968 și 1969, eșantionul a fost extins la 1217 persoane (P. Bourdieu, 1979/1984, 504-505). Chestionarul², conceput în baza ipotezei uniformității gusturilor, includea 26 de întrebări, formulate pentru a colecta informații despre preferințele subiecților cu privire la decorațiuni interioare, vestimentație, muzică, filme, pictură, fotografie, gastronomie (P. Bourdieu, 1979/1984, 506). Rezultatele au relevat faptul că, în cadrul acestor sfere de manifestare a gusturilor, preferințele persoanelor cu capital economic difereau de cele ale persoanelor care dețineau capital cultural (*idem*, 261). Analiza indicatorilor pentru cultura clasei de mijloc (*classes moyennes*) a înregistrat diferențe între gusturile angajaților din domeniul comercial și industrial și cele ale profesorilor universitari. Deci, în interiorul fiecărei clase sociale, în funcție de capitalul economic și cultural pe care îl dețin membrii aceleiași clase sociale, se disting fracțiuni ale claselor, susține autorul.

Capitalul cultural, așa cum a fost conceptualizat de Pierre Bourdieu, îmbracă mai multe forme. Întâi, include calificările obținute prin intermediul educației, apoi cunoașterea și înțelegerea aspectelor artistice și creative ale unei culturi, cum ar fi muzica, dramaturgia, arta și cinematografia. În acest sens, sociologul francez distinge trei paliere ale gusturilor, corespondente nivelului educațional (P. Bourdieu, 1979/1984, 16):

- (1) gustul legitim, dominant, reprezentat, spre exemplu, de picturile lui Breughel sau Goya crește odată cu nivelul educațional și se manifestă în cadrul fracțiunilor claselor dominante cu un nivel înalt de educație.
- (2) gustul clasei de mijloc, care aduce în atenție operele minore, dar populare ale artiștilor importanți, cum ar fi *Rapsodia Albastră*; este comun claselor de mijloc (*classes moyennes*);
- (3) gustul popular – reprezentat aici de alegerile muncitorilor sau așa-numita „muzică ușoară” sau clasică mediatizată intens, cum ar fi *Dunărea albastră, La traviata* – este caracteristic claselor muncitoare și variază invers proporțional cu capitalul educațional.

A treia formă a capitalului cultural constă în practicile corporale, cum ar fi îmbrăcămintea, coafura, machiajul, menținerea siluetei. În ce mod gusturile vestimentare ale indivizilor sunt indicatori ai capitalului cultural și economic deținut de aceștia? În teoria lui Pierre Bourdieu, gustul reprezintă capacitatea de apropiere (material și simbolic) o anumită clasă socială, o formulă generică a stilului de viață, exprimată ca un set unitar de preferințe în domeniul vestimentar, mobilier, limbaj sau înfățișare, în cuvintele autorului, „aceeași intenție expresivă în logica specifică a fiecărui spațiu simbolic” (P. Bourdieu 1979/1984, 173). Aceste gusturi sunt ilustrate în retorica cotidiană prin „afirmații ale unei inevitabile diferențe, fiind formulate pur negativ, prin refuzul gusturilor altora” (*idem*, 56). Tocmai de aceea, alegerea unei ținute vestimentare este o oportunitate de experimenta sau de a afirma poziția socială a celui care o adoptă pentru a-și susține rangul, dar, în același timp pentru a menține distanța în ierarhia socială față de alte grupuri, susține Pierre Bourdieu (1979/1984, 57). Pornind de la aceste argumente,

² Chestionarului conceput de Pierre Bourdieu pentru determinarea gustului estetic al claselor sociale a fost adus în atenția publicului din domeniul științelor socio-umane din România de Septimiu Chelecea în lucrarea *Metodologia cercetării sociologice. Metode cantitative și calitative* (2001/2004).

am putea repera o distribuție a preferințelor vestimentare, în funcție de palierele de manifestare ale gusturilor sociale: unele determinate de condițiile structurale ale actorilor sociali, deci la nivelul necesităților, „vulgare”, comune și altele care se distanțează de necesitate, „se obiectivează prin gratificare” (*idem*, 175).

Muncitorii dau hainelor o funcție realistă, în acord cu gustul pentru necesitate (P. Bourdieu 1979/1984, 200-201), căutând mai degrabă substanța și funcția decât forma, stilurile de durată a căror achiziție reflectă banii investiți. Ignorând preocuparea burgheză de a introduce formalitatea și informalitatea hainelor aceștia adoptă nediferențiat „ținuta uniformă”: șorț și papuci de casă (pentru femei), o vestă sau pieptul dezgolit (pentru bărbați). Astfel, aceștia abia că marchează distincția dintre hainele vizibile și invizibile sau ascunse (lenjerie), spre deosebire de clasa de mijloc, care manifestă un grad de anxietate cu privire la înfățișarea fizică și la ceea ce expun în spațiul public. Opozițiile între funcționari și muncitori sunt marcate în sfera vestimentară prin culoarea gri sau albă a salopetelor (a hainelor de muncă) și albastru, între pantofii de oraș și pantofii relaxanți. Costumul specific administratorilor și directorilor este necunoscut muncitorilor al căror semn distinctiv vestimentar este reprezentat de salopeta de muncă. Când au fost întrebat cum se vor îmbrăca dacă vor fi invitate la cină de soția șefului, 33 la sută din soțiile directorilor adjuncți și funcționarilor publici, au optat pentru hainele cele mai bune pe care le dețin, comparativ cu 19 la sută din soțiile angajaților din sectorul comercial și industrial și soțiile inginerilor, care într-o proporție de 81 la sută au răspuns că își vor schimba hainele, dar fără să adopte articolele vestimentare cele mai elegante pe care le dețin (P. Bourdieu, 1979/1984, 249).

Datele cercetării au relevat faptul că numărul achizițiilor vestimentare crește direct proporțional cu ascensiunea în ierarhia socială (P. Bourdieu, 1979/1984, 201). De aici derivă și concluzia autorului că schimbarea stilului vestimentar este consonantă cu mobilitatea socială, căci „hainele devin mai clasice, mai informale și mai serioase pe măsură ce un individ urcă în ierarhia socială” (*idem*, 202).

Proporția femeilor care au răspuns că „nu țin cont de modă” – mai ridicată printre femeile casnice (59 %) – este distinctiv mai mare în categoria meșteșugarilor (61%), fermierilor (62%) și lucrătorilor manuali (55%). Dorința de a ține pasul cu moda este pregnantă printre soțiile directorilor adjuncți și cele ale funcționarilor (43%). Locul de unde le achiziționează diferă: soțiile muncitorilor își cumpără îmbrăcămintea din piață sau din raioanele magazinele populare, în timp ce soțiile aparținând clasei de mijloc optează pentru magazinele renumite de pe piața de haine (P. Bourdieu, 1979/1984, 378). Din aceste procente, se pot observa obiectivele diferite ale claselor sociale: economisirea resurselor de timp, bani și efort este o caracteristică a claselor cu un nivel socio-economic redus, în schimb „lupta pentru a adecva și a apropia simbolurile de clasă” (P. Bourdieu, 1979/1984, 249) este un obiectiv al celor care doresc să se poziționeze superior în structura socială. Aceste diferențe sunt explicate de sociologul francez, prin conceptul de *habitus*, înțeles ca „o formă a internalizării condițiilor de clasă” (P. Bourdieu, 1979/1984, 101), deseori convertit într-o serie de dispoziții, de scheme de percepție și apreciere (de gust) (*idem*, 170). Iată, cum explică Pierre Bourdieu (1992/2007, 243) originea și sensul acestui concept într-o altă lucrare, *Les règles de l'art* (1992): „*habitus*-ul este, cuvântul însuși o atestă, ceva dobândit, un bun ce poate funcționa în anumite cazuri ca un capital”, exprimând în primul rând „refuzul unei serii de alternative în care s-a închis știința socială (și, mai general, întreaga teorie antropologică): conștiință (sau

subiect) *versus* inconștient, finalism *versus* mecanicism etc” (P. Bourdieu, 1992/2007, 242).

Habitusul constă în modurile subiective de a înțelege diferențele de clasă și de a percepe lumea, în preferințele și gusturile pe care indivizii le au. Un habitus produce un stil de viață. De exemplu, va influența modul de petrecere a timpul liber, stilul vestimentar, vizionarea filmelor, lectura ziarelor. Unii antropologi recurg la expresii precum „habitus-ul purtării hainelor” (A. Bălășescu, 2007/2008, 79) sau „habitus-ul hainelor” (J. Entwistle, 2006b, 51) tocmai pentru a sublinia modul în care habitus-ul predispune indivizii în alegerea unui anumit tip de haine: de exemplu, clasa de mijloc va valoriza calitatea, și nu cantitatea (*ibidem*).

Clasele sociale se disting atât prin tipul, cât și prin cantitatea de capital pe care îl dețin. Grupurilor care au urcat în ierarhia socială prin educație le pot lipsi bunul gust al potrivirii cu cei care se află în această poziție de mai mult de o generație. Grupurile cu un capital cultural crescut, dar scăzut în capitalul economic (cum ar fi profesorii) au stiluri de viață diferite față de cei cu un capital economic ridicat, dar scăzut cultural (cum ar fi indivizii care administrează afaceri mici). Este clar că fiecare clasă sau fracțiune dezvoltă propriul *habitus* (M. Halarambos, M. Holborn și R. Heald, 1980/2008, 67).

Traducerea în limba engleză a cercetării lui Pierre Bourdieu a suscitat numeroase polemici și interpretări, printre care, cele mai virulente, au invocat faptul că lucrarea *La Distinction: Critique sociale du jugement* este o declarație de adeziune a autorului și intelectualilor francezi la politica de stânga (cf. B. M. Berger, 1986, 1451). În Statele Unite ale Americii, studiul a fost receptat ca „o etnografie tipic franceză”, în sensul că oferea o „radiografie” a mediului politic și cultural din Parisul deceniului șase al secolului trecut, deci un cadru de cercetare proiectat pentru un context socio-cultural specific, fără sferă de aplicabilitate în alte culturi (*ibidem*). Totuși, până la data apariției ediției americane a volumului *La distinction*, respectiv până în 1986, câteva cercetări (P. DiMaggio și M. Useem, 1978, 156) întreprinse în spațiul nord atlantic indicau că rata consumului cultural varia în funcție de clasa socială a indivizilor: spectacolele simfonice, de balet și de operă erau audiate în special de americanii cu statut social înalt, absolvenți cu studii superioare.

După 1984, studiul sociologului francez a alimentat o serie de cercetări ample privind receptarea bunurilor culturale, care se angajau fie să infirme (R. A. Peterson și R. M. Kern, 1996; P. DiMaggio 1987), fie să confirme (J. Galille, 2002; A. Warde *et al*, 1999; D. B. Holt, 1997) stratificarea socială a gusturilor. În acest sens, examinând originile și consecințele inegalităților de consum, Paul DiMaggio (1987, 157), profesor de sociologie de la University of Yale, arăta că persoanele cu o calificare educațională superioară se implică deopotrivă în receptarea culturii înalte, dar și în activități de consum specifice gustului popular, cum ar fi ascultarea muzicii jazz, folk sau blues. Pornind de la aceste evidențe, în 1996, sociologii americani Richard A. Peterson și Roger M. Kern, comparând datele unor cercetări pe o perioadă de zece ani (1982-1992) declarau schimbări în preferințele indivizilor, „gustul snob” (*snobbishness*) fiind înlocuit de „gustul devorator” (*omnivorousness*), adică indivizii sunt deschiși tuturor formelor de consum cultural, acesta manifestându-se și în consumul de modă vestimentară (cf. R. A. Peterson și R. M. Kern, 1996, 905). Autorii explică aceste transformări prin creșterea nivelului de trai al populației, prezentarea artei în programele media, migrația, mobilitatea socială, acestea fiind răspunzătoare de mediatizarea gustului elitelor sociale către

segmentele mai joase ale populației (*ibidem*).

Analiza câmpului de producție al modei reprezintă o altă temă reflectată de sociologi (J. Entwistle, 2006b; J. Entwistle, 2002; E. Wilson, 2007) în baza rezultatelor cercetării lui Pierre Bourdieu. O variabilă care intervine în diferențierea practicilor de semnificare și de consum a hainei este, în opinia sociologului francez, câmpul de producție, adică industria modei (P. Bourdieu, 1979/1984, 232), „un exemplu perfect al întâlnirii dintre istoria câmpului de producție, care are legi proprii de schimbare și istoria spațiului social în ansamblu său, care determină gusturile sociale” (*ibidem*). Clarificarea relației dintre habitus, capital cultural și câmp de producție înseamnă revenirea la textul lucrării *Les règles de l'art*, citatul următor fiind ilustrativ în acest sens:

[...] de la simplu obiect fabricat, unealtă sau veșmânt, până la opera de artă consacrată – traviul de fabricare materială nu înseamnă nimic în absența traviului de producere a valorii obiectului fabricat; că „haina de curte”, evocată de vechii economiști, nu are valoare decât grație curții, care, producându-se și reproducându-se ca atare, reproduce tot ceea ce compune viața de curte, adică întregul sistem de agenți și de instituții însărcinate în producerea și reproducerea *habitus*-ului și a hainelor de curte, cu satisfacerea, și, totodată, producerea „dorinței” de a purta haina de curte, pe care economistul o privește ca pe un dat. Ca o verificare aproape experimentală a acestui fapt, valoarea hainei de curte dispare odată cu curtea și cu *habitus*-urile asociate acesteia, aristocraților decăzuți nemairămânându-le altceva de făcut decât să devină, cu o vorbă a lui Marx, «maiestrii» de dans ai Europei... (P. Bourdieu, 1992/2007, 236).

Având în vedere ideile principale ale teoriei gusturilor sociale expuse anterior, meritul empiric și teoretic al lucrării *La distinction: Critique sociale du jugement* rămâne de necontestat. Îi datorăm lui Pierre Bourdieu furnizarea unor cadre explicative și empirice pentru „efectul de infiltrare” (*trickle-down*) al modei în diferite straturi ale societății.

După cum am arătat în acest articol, de la Gabriel Tarde la Pierre Bourdieu, studiul sociologic al modei a reprezentat o constantă a perioadei clasice a sociologiei. La confluența secolelor al XIX-lea și al XX-lea, sub semnătura unor sociologi de seamă ai timpului, precum Gabriel Tarde (1843-1904), Thorstein Bund Veblen (1857-1929), Georg Simmel (1858-1918), moda își făcea debutul în discursul sociologic. Astăzi, reafirmarea interesului pentru abordarea acestui fenomen are nevoie de legitimare teoretică, tocmai pentru că, ulterior dezvoltărilor elaborate de figurile emblematice ale sociologiei începutului de secol XX, „moda a avut un statut marginal printre intelectuali” (*cf.* G. Lipovetsky, 1987/2002, 25). Reflecția pe această temă poate fi integrată ansamblului de cunoștințe din psihologia politică, atât pentru redescoperirea unei pleiade de autori și lucrări clasice, după cum am argumentat pe parcursul articolului, cât și pentru faptul că moda poate constitui un „teren” de aplicație pentru teorii precum: teoria habitusului, teoria dominației, teoria interacționismului simbolic, teoria identității soicale.

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Taiwanese consciousness vs. Chinese consciousness: The national identity and the dilemma of polarizing society in Taiwan

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Abstract

The dilemma of national identity that Taiwan is facing is rooted in Taiwan's geo-historical context and contemporary cross-strait relations. Since the development of democracy and two peaceful transitions of the executive branch of government, issues relevant to group conflict and peace in Taiwan seem to be more about national identity than ethnic identity. This study aimed to demonstrate that there exist three main national identity groups, i.e. Chinese First, Taiwanese First, and Taiwanese Only, and opposite and polarized ideology of national identities and political party support, i.e. pan-blue and pan green in Taiwan. The result showed that three cluster of ideology, such as *Big-China-ism*, *Taiwan-Independence-ism*, and *Taiwan-loving-ism*. Most people are *Taiwan-loving-ism* and regard Taiwan as "small and beautiful" as well as emphasize Taiwanese collective self-esteem. *Big-China-ism* and *Taiwan-Independence-ism* correspond with pro-unification (pan-blue) and pro-independence (pan-green) had resulted in antagonism between the polarized groups.

Introduction

The people of Taiwan are facing a dilemma of national identity of being Taiwanese or Chinese, that is to be independent from or unified with Mainland China. After terminating the regimes of Chiangs' father and son (Chiang Kei-She and Chiang Ching-Kuo) and ending the Martial Law, the President of Taiwan was elected directly from people's vote since 1996, two major political parties (Kuomintang, KMT and Democratic People's Party, DPP) in turn gain control of the executive branch of government, therefore, Taiwan's government is gradually toward a western-style democracy. The DPP supports the independence of Taiwan, while the KMT opposes the idea of Taiwan's independence and builds up informally rapprochement with mainland China. This stand-off leads to an ambivalent about national identity and entails anxiety about collective identity.

How has Taiwan come to such a predicament? What is the psychological sub-

stance of these dilemmas and their historical roots or societal context? In order to understand current phenomena in Taiwan, this article examines the previous research from the historical, political, social, and psychological literature with an emphasis on psychological research.

Geohistorical context: conflict among Taiwan's ethnic groups

Taiwan is an island on the western edge of the Pacific Ocean. It lies off the southeastern coast of Asia, across the Taiwan Strait from Mainland China. Five thousand years ago, aborigines on Taiwan traded with other communities in Southeast Asia. Later, Taiwan was colonized by the Dutch, the Spanish (1624 -1662), and then Han ethnicity such as Hoklo and Hakka immigrants mostly from southeastern part of mainland China, as well as Ming loyalists, and Qing conquerors settled down in Taiwan (1662 -1895). Between the first Sino-Japanese War (1895) and World War II (1945), Taiwan was a colony of Japan. In 1945, leader of the KMT, Chiang Kei-Shek and his government took over Taiwan after Japan was defeated in World War II. The KMT controlled the whole island and imposed their rule, their language (Mandarin), and their identity on the people of Taiwan, and tried to impart to Taiwanese their dream of retaking Mainland China, which the KMT had lost to Mao's Communist Party.

Taiwan's history can be divided into several stages with different distinctive social identifications and inter-group cues associated with each stage (Li, Liu, Huang, & Chang, 2007). Those stages are: (1) the Dutch colonization period (1624-1662), (2) the immigration period (1662-1683), (3) the indigenization period, (4) the Japanese colonization period, (5) the KMT sovereign period, (6) the DPP sovereign period (the first peaceful transition of regime), and now, (7) the KMT returns (2008-today, the second peaceful transition of regime), the KMT party chairman Ma Ying-Jeou has been elected as president of Taiwan.

Nowadays Han Chinese makes up 98 percent of Taiwan's population. The remaining two percent are aborigines. The Han Chinese can be divided into three major ethnic groups. The Mingnan (also called Hoklo) group, which accounts for about 70 to 74 percent of the population, and the Hakka (12-15%) group arrived in Taiwan before 1945 are called native Taiwanese (inside-province Taiwanese). Those who arrived after 1945 with the KMT are labeled outside-province Taiwanese, and make up about 15 percent of the population.

The structural conflict between inside- and outside-province Taiwanese grew out of a massacre in 1947 labeled the 228 (February 28) Incident in which the KMT killed or imprisoned over 10,000 inside-province Taiwanese in order to suppress political dissent (Lai, Myers, & Wei, 1991). From 1949 to 1987, the KMT ruled Taiwan with authoritarian power by means of martial law. Under martial law, many public activities, such as gatherings, parades, and strikes were forbidden. Mandarin (a northern dialect of mainland China and the official language of China) became the official national language. The outside-province minority in Taiwan became the dominant ethnic group, while the Mingnan majority ethnic group, Hokka and aboriginal groups, that is, the inside-province groups, were subordinate. Throughout KMT rule, the distinction between outside-province and inside-province was significant. There was inequality in the distribution of political power, tertiary education opportunities, and work opportunities in civil service, which was reflected in economic policy (Chang, 1993; Lin & Lin, 1993; Wu, 1993), all of which favored outside-province Taiwanese. Chinese culture was also

dominant and as the symbol of the elite. In contrast, the Taiwanese (a southern dialect of mainland China, i.e. Fukien dialect) spoken by the majority was considered just a dialect, and Taiwanese culture was considered local, low, and vulgar (Wang, 1993).

Historical representations in Taiwan

From the 1950s to the 1980s, Taiwan had a period of great economic growth and became one of the Four Asian Tigers. At the same time, there was a tremendous downside: the sacrifice of democracy and social justice. The inequality of resource distribution created impetus for a social movement. In 1987, the martial law ended, and the DPP was allowed to become a legally opposition party. Then, in 1996, the first direct election of president was held and the first inside-province Taiwanese Lee Teng-hui elected as President, this marked a further step in the democratization process. The power transitioned in 2000 in which the KMT was voted out of the executive branch after 50 years of continuous rule and the DPP control the government. In other words, the government of Taiwan peacefully transitioned from an authoritarian to a democratic system.

A study surveying 828 adult Taiwanese from around the island revealed that representations of Taiwanese history are a blend of consensus and polarized disagreement (Huang et al., 2004). This study indicated that the most important event in Taiwan's history was the 228 Incident, and all groups (including outside-province Chinese) regarded this event as equally negative. The results also suggest that there is a cultural consensus in Taiwan supporting a democratic system of governance. However, this consensus disappeared when it came to evaluating political leaders, with Mingnan and outside-province Taiwanese favoring their own and denigrating leaders from the other group. That is to say, social representations of history were controversial in some domains (i.e., evaluations of political leaders), and consensual in others (i.e., the movement from authoritarian to democratic rule). This blend implies the double nature of Taiwanese representations of culture and political life, and causes ambivalence towards Taiwanese national identity. What kind of ambivalence and what does it result from?

The emergence and developing of national identity in Taiwan

Whether Taiwan is a nation or a part of China has been a controversial issue because of a divergence between substantial and international legal concerns. The Republic of China (ROC) was established in 1912. From 1928, the ROC was legally ruled by the KMT. After 1949, the KMT withdrew from China to Taiwan. In the meantime, the People's Republic of China (PRC) was established by the Chinese Communist Party in mainland China in 1949. During the early Cold War the ROC was recognized by most Western nations and the United Nations as the sole legitimate government of China. After 1970s, the ROC lost these recognitions, but the Republic of China has not formally relinquished its claim as the legitimate government of all China. In the subsequent decades, the ROC has been more commonly referred to as *Taiwan*, and evolved from a single-party state with full global recognition into a multi-party democratic state with limited international recognition.

The development of a national identity has been a core issue for Taiwanese people. By definition, *national identity* includes two components, one is the *nation*, the other is a *collective identity*. The fundamental features of a nation are "a named human population sharing a historical territory, common myths and historical memories,

a mass public culture, a common economy, and common legal rights and duties for all members” (Smith, 1991). This definition focuses on commonality, both in history and contemporary society, but neglects international relations. Taiwan as a state is not legitimate in the international community, although the people of Taiwan have a consensus on history, culture, economy, and their own legal system. As the word *nation* denotes both a legal state and a people, this dual meaning reflects the ambivalent national identity of Taiwanese.

Nationalism is a kind of index for categorizing people. Representative sampling long term surveys of identity have been conducted by the Election Study Center at National Cheng-chi University twice a year since 1992. As shown in Figure 1, from 1992 to 2008, Chinese identity declined from 26.2% to 4.7%, Taiwanese identity increased from 17.3% to 50.8%, and double identity (both Taiwanese and Chinese) moved from 45.4% to 40.8%. In other words, double identity is always most common in Taiwan, but Chinese identity and Taiwanese identity have changed inversely. The first dramatic turning point in Taiwanese identity’s increase was in 1996 when the first direct presidential election took place and the Mainland China authority threatened to attack Taiwan with missiles. It also rose after 2000 when Chen Shui-bian was elected as the first non-KMT pro-independence president. Then, after 2008 the KMT won back the executive branch and President Mao started a rapport with Mainland China. Nowadays, Taiwanese identity occupied above half of identity and becomes the most dominant and mainstream identity.




Figure 1. Changes in the Taiwanese/Chinese Identity of Taiwanese as Tracked in Surveys (1992~2008)

Sources: Election Study Center, NCCU.

Taiwanese consciousness versus Chinese consciousness

Nationalism is regarded as an “imagined community” from the perspective of social constructivism (Anderson, 1983/1991). And nationalism can be conceived of as the ideology of a modern nation-state or as any movement directed towards the establishment of a new nation-state (Diaz-Guerrero, 1997). According to these definitions, both Chinese identity and Taiwanese identity can be regarded as kinds of national identity. Due to long Chinese history, *China* simultaneously implies the meaning of politics, culture, language, and ethnicity (Huang, 1999). Because of the KMT’s rule over Taiwan

for over 50 years, “China” could be as spiritual diaspora and as “imagined community” (Huang, 2006), national identity of China has become part of the implicit ideology of the people of Taiwan. Huang (2007) pointed out that Chinese consciousness can include the following five beliefs: 1) peaceful coexistence among the five ethnicities of the people of China, 2) the five ethnicities have a homogeneous culture and the same ancestors, 3) a broad outlook on China’s long history and culture, 4) the KMT’s political legitimacy over Taiwan, and 5) the KMT’s contribution to Taiwan.

However, the national identity of Taiwan encountered a dramatic and reversed transition. In the past, Taiwan has been colonized or ruled by a number of countries or regimes, including the ROC, and the people of Taiwan always submitted themselves to powerful outsiders. The ROC, which has been the sole regime of Taiwan for more than 60 years, has not been recognized as a nation since being replaced by the PRC as a member of the United Nations in 1971 in spite of having its own land, people, constitution, government, and president. In other words, Taiwanese identity has swung between local people (as one part of “great China”) and nationals (keeping their own land, constitution, and government) as well.

Therefore, Taiwanese identity needs to make an extraordinary transition from ethnic identity (as a local people) to national identity (as a national group). By creating a democracy, Taiwan now has the freedom to make its own future. Since the end of martial law in 1987 and the first direct election of the president in 1996, immigrants from the various periods have gradually fused into *new Taiwanese* in contrast to *Chinese*. *Taiwanese* and *Chinese* can designate different national identifications with different ideologies. All ethnic groups settled in Taiwan over the various periods of history form a single community, a new nation, and an idea of forward-looking wish that uses a democratic and self-determination approach to transform a society traditionally dominated by Han immigrants and refugees into a modern nation-state (Wang, 2003; Shih, 2003). Then, *Taiwanese* can imply not only a local ethnical consciousness but also a national identification. According to discourses on Taiwanese Nationalism (Huang, 2000, Shih 2003), *Taiwanese consciousness* can include: (1) the concept of community (the will to develop Taiwan together), (2) the concept of pluralism (multiple-cultures and multiple-ethnicities that discard the grand China complex), (3) resistance and separation (resist authoritarianism, recognize and prioritize Taiwanese characteristics), and (4) loving Taiwan (encouraging current residents to emphasize Taiwanese subjectivity).

In sum, historically speaking, the national identities of China and Taiwan have entailed consciousness of imagined communities generated under strong pressure from the outside, just as Chinese identity originated from revolution led by Dr. Sun Yat-sen, Taiwanese identity emerged out of colonization by Japan and authoritative ruled by early KMT. They have been achieved through political mobilization and effort initiated by many people. This identification process is a floating one; it can move from one identification to another new and conflicting one. According to the awaking theory of ideology (Gurin, Miller, and Gurin, 1980), in recent Taiwan, Taiwanese identity which is associated with subjectivity, freedom, democracy, and autonomy has gradually replaced Chinese identity, which is associated with restoration, centralization of authority, and stagnation. But are Chinese and Taiwanese identities really incompatible? What are the components of Chinese identity and Taiwanese identity?

Purpose of Study: ideology and identity in Taiwan

The main purpose of study1 conducted in 2004 is to probe the differences among three types of identity in terms of consciousness, collective esteem, and psychological and political attitudes; and also to clarify the relationship between national identification and social issues in Taiwan.

Participants:

The responses to the self-report questionnaire from 1368 participants (667 female and 697 male with four unknown) were collected during 2004. The participants over all Taiwan were selected from convenience sampling, such as snowball sampling at the workplace, friend network, relative network, and over-sampling outside-province Taiwanese balancing the different identity. Their ages ranged from 18 to 81 years old with an average of 32.8 and standard deviation of 12.2.

MEASURES

1. National identity

A forced choice between five logically exclusive groupings of *Chinese* and *Taiwanese* was used to identify participants' national identities (Huang et al., 2004). These were: (1) I am a Chinese and a Taiwanese (*Chinese First*); (2) I am a Taiwanese and a Chinese (*Taiwanese First*); (3) I am a Taiwanese, not a Chinese (*Taiwanese Only*); (4) I am a Chinese, not a Taiwanese (*Chinese only*) (5) I am not a Taiwanese or a Chinese (*Neither*). People with a double-identity were separated into Chinese First and Taiwan First.

In this study, the three most popular were: *Chinese First* (291 participants, 21.3%), *Taiwanese First* (670 participants, 49.0%), and *Taiwanese Only* (351 participants, 25.7%). It is clear that double-identity is the most common in Taiwan with 70.3 % of participants, and Taiwanese first is the majority with 49% participants.

2. Consciousness of Chinese and Taiwanese

Consciousness of national identity was measured with a set of 40 statements with 7- point Likert scale constructed by author (Huang, 2007). Four factors were derived through factor analysis, with 11, 7, 11, and 5 items. The internal consistency alpha values were 0.93, 0.88, 0.89, and 0.79 respectively. The first factor, *Greater Chinese Consciousness*, included statements such as "Chinese culture is broad and its contributions have had great value", "Taiwanese people's forefathers are from China and this connection should not be ignored", and "the Chinese people consist of various ethnic groups and those groups should have a common consciousness". The second factor was called *KMT Legitimacy*. It was composed of items such as "the early KMT government was a legitimate representative of the Chinese people so Taiwanese are not separable from the Chinese people", and "Taiwan was at one time a province of China, and the KMT resumed governance after the Second World War and so should not be seen as a foreign power". The third factor was named *Consciousness of Being Separate and Unique* and was composed of statements including "because of the influence of aboriginal people, the Dutch, Japanese, and Americans, Taiwanese culture is a mixed marine culture and is very different from the Chinese plains culture", "Taiwan has always been controlled by foreign powers, and we should aim for self-determination", and "after the long isolation

from each other China and Taiwan have developed very different cultures and should be able to become two different nations". The last factor was *Small but Beautiful Taiwan* and was composed of statements including "Although Taiwan has a small area and not many people, it has world vision and is part of the global network", and "Although Taiwan is small, its democratic politics, modern lifestyle, and popular education make it a beautiful nation."

3. Affection of national identity:

The collective self-esteem (CSE) scale constructed by Luhtanen and Crocker (1992) with *Chinese* and *Taiwanese* as the targets of identification was used to measure affection of identity. After a revision, eight items using a 6-point Likert scale were used to measure collective self-esteem of Chinese identity and Taiwanese identity. A higher score indicated a stronger identity collective esteem. The internal consistency alpha values were 0.96 and 0.92, respectively.

4. Support for future nationhood

By definition, identification also has an action orientation dimension. In this study, supporting "*unification with mainland China*" and "*Taiwan independence*" with 9-point scales were used to measure the action orientation for national identity.

5. Others

Two 9-point-scale were introduced to measure the tendency to support for KMT and DPP.

RESULTS

1. Differences among national identity

Table 1 showed that all three types of national identities differed on all four national consciousness components. The Chinese First identity had significantly higher scores on the first and second components. The Taiwanese Only identity had higher scores on the third and fourth components. The Taiwanese *First identity* scores tended to be in between the other two types and the difference with the Chinese First scores was smaller than the difference with Taiwanese Only.

Relating to affection of national identity, table 1 also shows that the three types of national identity had different levels of identity affection toward being Chinese or Taiwanese. Even concerning imagination toward future nationhood, there was a significant difference among the three types of identity. The Chinese First group tended to support unification ($M = 5.06$) and they were clearly against Taiwan's independence ($M = 3.46$, with a median = 5, $t(287) = 7.4$, $p < .001$). The *Taiwanese Only* group were against unification ($M = 1.89$) and strongly supported Taiwan's independence ($M = 7.40$). The *Taiwanese First* group tended prefer the current status and took a neutral stance toward unification and independence ($M = 4.18$ and $M = 4.62$), although they indicated less support for unification ($t(662) = -3.2$, $p < .001$).


2. The cluster of ideology

The ideology of identification denotes the cognition, affection, and behavior tendency (Gurin et al., 1980), therefore, eight ideology components including four factors of consciousness of Chinese and Taiwanese (*Greater Chinese Consciousness*, *KMT Le-*

Table 1. Ideologies and political party support by national identity

National identity	Chinese FI (n = 291)	Taiwanese First (n = 670)	Taiwanese Only (n = 350)	Total Mean (N= 1311)	Scheffe Test M1-M3	F value (2, 1310)	Effect size
Consciousness of national identity (1-6)	M1 (SD)	M2 (SD)	M3 (SD)	M (SD)			
Consciousness of greater Chinese	4.73 (0.86)	4.27 (0.83)	2.75 (1.07)	4.00 (1.18)	1.97*	465.0*	0.41
KMT Legitimacy	4.24 (1.00)	3.78 (0.94)	2.38 (1.07)	3.50 (1.22)	1.87*	293.0*	0.34
Consciousness of being separate and unique	3.18 (0.91)	3.68 (0.83)	4.88 (0.79)	3.89 (1.05)	-1.70*	376.6*	0.36
Small but beautiful Taiwan	4.64 (0.96)	4.71 (0.85)	5.19 (0.83)	4.83 (0.90)	-0.55*	42.9*	0.06
Affection of national identity (1-6)							
Chinese collective self-esteem	4.59(1.02)	3.75 (1.09)	1.83 (7.07)	3.42 (11.5)	2.76*	639.6*	0.50
Taiwanese collective self-esteem	4.40(0.95)	4.75 (0.86)	5.42 (0.74)	4.86 (0.92)	-1.01*	121.5*	0.16
Imagination toward Future (1-9)							
Unification with China	5.06 (2.14)	4.18 (1.98)	1.89 (1.40)	3.76 (2.23)	3.18*	258.8*	0.28
Taiwan independence	3.46 (2.23)	4.62 (2.15)	7.40 (1.90)	5.11 (2.56)	-3.94*	313.3*	0.32
Political party support (1-9)							
support DDP	3.22(1.85)	4.19(1.89)	6.05(1.93)	4.48(2.15)	-2.83*	192.4*	0.23
support KMT	5.44(1.84)	4.96(1.74)	3.28(1.99)	4.61(2.01)	2.16*	134.1*	0.17

gitimacy, Consciousness of Being Separate and Unique, Small but Beautiful Taiwan, two affection of identity (CSE of Chinese and Taiwanese respectively), two different future nationhood support (unification with mainland China or independence) were used to analyze the cluster of ideology. The statistic method of factor analysis was conducted, three factors were extracted and then orthogonal rotated. The first factor's components and factor loading respectively are Greater Chinese Consciousness (0.92), KMT Legitimacy (0.89), CSE of Chinese (.087), pro- unification (0.78); the second factor includes pro-independence (-0.74) and Consciousness of Being Separate and Unique (-0.72); the third factor consists of Small but Beautiful Taiwan (0.88) and CSE of Taiwanese (0.82). These three factors can account for 75.1% of totally variances, and were each named as Big-China-ism (BS-ism), and Taiwan-Independence-ism (TI-ism), and Taiwan-loving-ism (TL-ism) as well as represented three clusters of ideology. The three clusters of ideology are schematized in figure 2.

**Figure 2. The structure of three clusters of ideology**

A structural equation model (SEM) was built to identify and tested the latent variables and ideology. As figure 3 showed that the goodness-of-fit test for the model was $\chi^2_{(17, N=1211)} = 159.6$, $GFI = .97$, $AGFI = .93$, $RMSEA = .086$, $CFI = .99$, $NFI = .98$, $SRMR = .041$. Those implied that this model is acceptable. From the SEM in Figure 2, the latent variables, i.e. *Big-China-ism*, *Taiwan-loving-ism*, and *Taiwan-independence-ism*, all had high loading on their components. The correlation between *Taiwan-loving-ism* and *Taiwan-independence-ism* was significantly positive (0.72), while *Big-China-ism* was significantly negative correlative with *Taiwan-loving-ism* (-0.40) and *Taiwan-independence-ism* (-0.91) respectively. More specifically, the ideology of *Big-China-ism* and *Taiwan-independence-ism* were nearly incompatible or antagonistic.




Figure 3. SEM model for ideology of national identity

$\chi^2 (17, N = 1211) = 159.64$, $GFI = .97$, $AGFI = .93$, $RMSEA = .086$, $CFI = .99$, $NNFI = .98$, $SRMR = .041$, $*p < .05$ $***p < .001$

Note: BS-ism=Big-China-ism; TL-ism=Taiwan-loving-ism; TI-ism=Taiwan-Independence-ism; KMT= Kuo-Min-Tang; CES=collective self-esteem.

3. Bell Shape of ideology and national identity

Furthermore, a discriminant analysis was conducted with eight ideology components as dependent variables and three kinds of national identity as independent variables. The result indicated that only one function can discriminate efficiently among three kind of national identity, Wilks' Lambda= 0.42, $\chi^2 (16, 1212) = 1033.6$, $p = .001$, eigenvalue=1.31, account for 98.5% variances, canonical correlation=0.75.

Table 3 also showed that the 70.6% of self-report identity was classified correctly. That is to say, if we used of cluster of ideology to signify the people's national identity, only 39.2% of self-report "Chinese First" could be identified correctly, but 81.8% of "Taiwanese First" could be denoted, while 75.3% of "Taiwanese Only" was correctly marked. It implied that above half (59.0%) of self-report *Chinese First* identifier had the same ideology with *Taiwanese First* identifier, and 24.4% of self-report *Taiwanese Only*

identifier had the same ideology with *Taiwanese First* identifier. In sum, the ideology of *Taiwan First*, i.e. *Small but Beautiful Taiwan* and *CSE of Taiwanese*, was the most popular ideology among Taiwanese people, and *Taiwan-loving-ism* was the mainstream ideology in Taiwan.

Table 2. Discrimination among national identity

	Identity types	Predicted national identity			Sum
		Chinese First	Taiwanese First	Taiwanese Only	
Self-report national identity	Chinese First	105 (39.2%)	158 (59.0%)	5 (1.9%)	268
	Taiwanese First	64 (10.3%)	507 (81.8%)	49 (7.9%)	620
	Taiwanese Only	1 (0.3%)	79 (24.4%)	244 (75.3%)	324
	Unable classified	8 (16.0%)	28 (56.0%)	14 (28.0%)	50
		70.6% of self-report identity was classified correctly			

4. Bell Shape ideology and M Shape of political party

The Chinese First identifiers tended to support the KMT ($M = 5.44$, a 9-point scale) rather than the DPP ($M = 3.22$). The gap is 2.22 with ($t(287) = 12.4$, $p = .000$) (see tab. 1). The Taiwanese Only identifiers, on the other hand, strongly supported the DPP ($M = 6.05$) rather than the KMT ($M = 3.28$). The difference (2.77) was significant with $t(350) = 15.3$, $p = .000$ (see Table 1). Political party support was on opposite extremes of the spectrum. This result is consistent with the earlier SEM model; those with latent *Big-China-ism* ideology tended to support the KMT, while those with latent *Taiwan-independence-ism* ideology tended to support the DPP, while those with *Taiwan-loving-ism* ideology tended to be in between.

As results show that the *Chinese First* and *Taiwanese First* identity groups have displayed high similarity in most aspects, which is the result of their double-identity and sharing Chinese consciousness. The *Taiwanese Only* identity group members distinguish themselves from Mainland China either politically or culturally, but otherwise share with *Taiwanese First* identity group in Taiwanese consciousness and regard Taiwan as first priority.

Currently people in Taiwan can be grouped into pan-blue or pan-green segments as M-shape distribution. In this study, 619(54%) participants reported themselves belonging to pan-blue, while 527(46%) participants reported themselves pan-green. That is to say, the political scene in Taiwan is divided into two camps, with the pro-unification and center-right KMT as pan-blue, and the pro-independence and center-left DPP as pan-green. In terms of national identity, the distribution has a bell-shape with the *Chinese First* identity falling into the deep-blue segment and they mostly support the KMT. The *Taiwanese Only* identity represents the deep-green segment and they support the DPP. Pan-blue and pan-green not only disagree sharply on national identity, but also




Figure 4. Ideology of national identity and Political party support

quarrel over all of social issues that are implicitly extended to be political affairs. Most of Taiwanese who belong to *Taiwanese First* identity group fall in the central part of curve and inevitably suffer the extremely conflicting discourses and opinions on public policy, and nearly lose the core values. In brief, the incompatible two segments result from national identity, i.e. pro-unification or pro-independence lead to considerable social disquiet in Taiwan.

Conclusion

The dilemma of national identity that Taiwan is facing now is rooted in Taiwan's geo-historical context and contemporary cross-strait relations. After the development of democracy and two peaceful transitions of government, issues relevant to conflict and peace in Taiwan seem to break away from colonial occupation, authoritarian governance, and inter-ethnic oppression. What is impacting Taiwan society now is more a matter of national identity and less a matter of ethnic identity. National identity may be conceptualized as both prospective and retrospective, which means that national identities are shaped not only by the interpretation of historical events, but also by contrasting perspectives on future nationhood. Many people in Taiwan are trying to figure out how to "build" their own nation, especially since they have the right to directly vote for their president.

Since the 1980's, Taiwan national consciousness supporters have asserted that collective identity is based on loving of Taiwan as a place with its own voice. But now, as research demonstrates, there exist opposite and polarized expectations for the future (independence vs. unification with China), national identity (Chinese first identity vs. Taiwanese only identity), political party support (deep blue vs. deep green) in Taiwan. Long-lasting and wide-spreading antagonisms have resulted in the mistrust between the polarized groups. Most people in Taiwan regard Taiwan as "small and beautiful", and emphasize Taiwanese collective self-esteem. But they are always stuck in an "approach and avoidance" conflict and swing on various political, cultural, and economic issues because of different ideologies of national identity. The political standoff between DDP and KMT ended when The KMT regained the presidency and increased its majority in the legislature in the 2008 presidential and legislative elections. Taiwan as a young

democracy really needs impartial judiciary, supervision system, and press freedom to avoid restoration of authoritarian government and to transcend ideological conflict, so as to lead to peaceful, growing and mature society.

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Status of political psychology in Ukraine

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The introduction of the discipline of Political Psychology in the academic curricula.

In Ukraine Political Psychology is understood as scientific discipline which spread as a result of politicization of psychology and psychologization of politics. At the same time it is considered to be a relatively independent constituent of the system of political sciences. The most general definition is the following: **Political Psychology** is the scientific field which study psychological mechanisms and regularities of definite persons', groups', masses' and societies' political awareness development and functioning; their behavior in political relations; it studies processes of political leadership, making political decisions; it works out technologies of politico-psychological influence.

In Ukraine specialists in mass communications and public relations believe that Political Psychology is interesting because it can reply in particular to the following questions: what is the political portrait of a leader and a voter, which motives can be essential for a leader making this or that decision. Thus, Political Psychology is considered to have practical implementation which is also important.

Ukrainian political scientist Bebik (1997) mentions that Political Psychology contains both realized (rational) and unrealized (irrational) elements. That is why it combines social interaction logics and logics of instincts, reflection (realized representation of reality) and reflex (unrealized form of thinking).

At Ukrainian universities Political Psychology mostly often is taught during the fourth year of study on the bachelor's level. This course is obligatory. General quantity of hours assigned for studying Political Psychology is 108, 56 of which are to be devoted to auditorium work and 56 to individual work.

The **main questions** considered in the discipline "Political Psychology" are the following:

1. History of development, subject and structure of Political Psychology. Place of Political Psychology in the system of political and psychological sciences.
2. Political culture in the system of societal relations. Psychological mechanisms and regularities of personal political socialization.
3. Psychology of political participation and electoral behavior.
4. Politico-psychological aspects of social stratification. Psychological factors of

political elites' engender, evolution, and their interaction.

5. Psychology of political power, development and functioning of domineering-submissive relations.

6. Political leadership and its psychological characteristics. Psychological portrait of a politician.

7. Psychological peculiarities of political activity and political opposition.

8. Politico-psychological phenomena of mass awareness and behavior.

9. Psychological preconditions of civil society principles establishment. Psychology of local community.

10. Ethnopsychological aspects of politics.

11. Psychological problems of institutionalization and development of group subjects (political parties, mass movements, etc.).

12. Psychological mechanisms of political communication and political influence.

13. Psychology of political destructiveness (aggression, violence, terrorism, etc.)

14. Psychological factors of conflict emergence and ways of their reconciliation.

15. Psychology of international relations and international politics.

16. Comparative psychological analysis of politics in different countries. Politico-psychological aspects of globalization.

17. Technologies of political situations, political activity, politician's personality resources, political organizations psychodiagnosis.

18. Psychotechnologies of political forecasting.

19. Technologies of political companies' psychological support, preparation and accompaniment of political action.

20. Psychotechnologies of political image formation.

21. Methodology of Political Psychology study in high school and postgraduate education. Teaching and training technologies in Political Psychology.

Among tasks solved by Political Psychology as an academic discipline we can distinguish **three main tasks** which serve as corresponding **functions**.

The first task is the understanding of psychological components in politics, awareness of "human factor" role in political processes. This task is connected with the analytical function of science (it enables people to orientate in political life choosing corresponding actions).

The second task which is somehow built over the first one is forecasting of the following role of "human factor" and in general all psychological aspects of politics. This task is realized by means of prognostic function of science: it is not enough to understand the essence of phenomenon – it is necessary to predict its development.

The third task which comes out of the previous ones is modification, change of phenomenon. This task is connected with the function of managerial and controlling influence on the political activity (it enables to realize intentions in certain political actions). It is not enough to understand, forecast – it is necessary to direct development in desirable direction.

Consequently, the basis of Political Psychology is Psychology itself as a science of psychological reflection of reality in the process of life activity, inner world of a person, certain connections with outer world and possible way of person's psyche de-

velopment.

Taking into account all above we can shape **subject, object and methods** of Political Psychology as an academic discipline.

Subject of Political Psychology in general is politics as a specific human activity which has its peculiar structure, social subject and stimulating forces. Subject of Political Psychology is the corresponding psychological processes, states and characteristics of a person which are modified in the process of interaction with power (Golovaty, 2003).

In western tradition subject of Political Psychology is psychological components of personal political behavior, which investigation and analysis enable to implement psychological knowledge in politics' understanding.

From the point of view of Soviet and post-Soviet psychologists, politics is to be analyzed in terms of general concept of social subject activity developed by Leont'ev (2005). If we are to consider inner structure, politics as an activity can be divided into separate actions, then actions – into separate operations. Activity in general corresponds to motive, actions correspond to separate certain goals, and operations correspond to tasks given in certain conditions. Thus politics as a type of activity correspond to generalized motive of human behavior management (its “optimization”). Certain political activities correspond to actions of different types: from negotiations to wars or rebels. Social subjects of politics as a type of activity can be separate individuals (e.g. politicians), small and big social groups, and spontaneous masses.

The main **object** of politico-psychological studies is political participation, political leadership, political values and beliefs, motives which influence political behavior, political socialization, individual, group and mass political awareness. The whole variety of Political Psychology objects can be divided into three main spheres: psychology of inner politics, psychology of outer politics and international relations, and military-political psychology.

In Political Psychology diagnostic, prognostic, consulting and corrective-developing **methods** are used.

It is possible to distinguish at least six main peculiarities of **Political Psychology as an academic science**.

1. Formation of Political Psychology in the process of citizens' sociopolitical activity, their practical interaction with each other, with different social subjects, and power institutions.

2. Reflection of political events and processes which has surface character. Political Psychology can not be perceived in a simple, unambiguous way without corresponding awareness.

3. A domineering role of sensitive, emotional elements of consciousness instead of rational ones. That is why it is difficult to forecast political processes, predict their social meaning.

4. Rapid and sensitive personal reaction on the change in political conditions, political situation. Such political mobility is characteristic for the majority of political subjects.

5. Ambiguous influence of different ideologies on people, to be exact on Political Psychology formation, its existence in the process of ideological clash, ideological fight.

6. Reflection of not perspective, future, but present, current interests and needs of people. That is why political processes are nearly always time determined.

Political Psychology forms of display:

- Political values, needs, interests, aspirations, hopes, will;
- Political feelings, emotions, moods, thoughts, superstitions, illusions, myths;
- Political habits, skills, traditions, dispositions;
- Political suggestions, persuasions, imitations, rumors.

Political Psychology has certain **connections with other disciplines** which have different effect on it, determine its state, following development and perspectives. Political Psychology obviously has a lot in common first of all with Psychology and in some respect with its derivatives (in particular with general, pedagogical, and ethnopsychology). It can be explained by the fact that the subject of study in Psychology is certain facts of psychological activity, psychological characteristics of a person (character, temperament, volitional qualities, etc.) namely, psychology studies facts, regularity, psyche mechanisms of people's inner world.

As far as Social Psychology is the discipline dealing with regularities of sociopsychological reality development, its structure, mechanisms of development and functioning, then Social Psychology is mostly connected to Political Psychology. Even stronger is the connection between Political Psychology and Political Sociology because its subject deals with the laws of interconnection between all structures and spheres of social activities with political, sociopolitical needs, interests, activities of individuals, social groups, ethnoses, their organizations and movements.

Other disciplines are close to Political Psychology because of notional apparatus. Notional apparatus of Political Psychology is rather close to the one of Psychology, Philosophy, Political Science, etc. At the same time Political Psychology has very specific notions which peculiarities are determined by intellectually sensitive qualities. Exactly sensitive personal perception of political situation leads to so many illogical political actions in the history of politics and political activity.

Thus, Political Psychology as an academic discipline is a relatively young branch of teaching process in higher teaching establishments, but at present the subject of the discipline is precisely shaped as well as its tasks, directions and methods of study in this sphere. The last at their turn need to be systematized and developed, as well as methodical supply of Political Psychology. On the level of teaching Political Psychology in higher teaching establishments we believe that it is perspective to unite theoretical and practical materials in this field.

Reviews and publications in Political Psychology.

Studies in the field of Political Psychology are reflected in scientific journals, newsletters, textbooks, monographs, and literature intended for wide public.

Among **scientific journals** included in the list of Higher Attestation Commission the following need mentioning:

- “Scientific Studies in Social and Political Psychology” (“Наукові студії із політичної та соціальної психології”) – edited by PhD S.D. Maksimenko, PhD M.M. Slyusarevsky;

- “Problems of Political Psychology and its Role for Ukrainian Citizen Development” (“Проблеми політичної психології та її роль у становленні громадянина

України”) – edited by PhD M.M. Slyusarevsky, PhD V.O. Tatenko;

- “Psychological Perspectives” (“Психологічні перспективи”) contains section in Political Psychology – edited by PhD M.M. Slyusarevsky, PhD V.O. Tatenko, PhD V.O. Vasyutinsky and other scientists;

- “Social Psychology” (“Соціальна психологія”) contains section in Political Psychology – edited by U. Shaigorodsky and other scientists.

Publications in “Scientific Studies in Social and Political Psychology” are devoted to vast majority of topics: methodology of Political and Social Psychology, development of personality in society, scientific-methodological basics of family psychological help, socio-psychological factors of Russian speaking inhabitants’ integration in modern Ukrainian society, group dynamics’ peculiarities in terms of higher education reformation, political socialization of young people, theoretical-methodological basics and practical potential of communicative cognitive psychology, socio-psychological basics of personal media culture formation, socio-psychological conditions of motivation and political activity skills formation among young people, psychotechnological components of mass awareness formation, theoretical and methodological basics of information influence consequences forecast on personal political attitudes, sociopolitical orientations dynamics among different socio-professional and age groups, scientific methodological basics how to monitor social situation of personal development and development of society.

In scientific journal “Problems of Political Psychology and its Role for Ukrainian Citizen Development” papers devoted to psychoanalytical basics of socio-psychological problems, problems of personal psychosocial space safety, self-development and socialization in contemporary socio-political conditions are published.

Institute of Social and Political Psychology on the basis of Ukrainian surveys published the following *newsletters*: “Media culture of Ukrainian inhabitants 2008” (edited by L.A. Naydyonova, O.P. Baryshpolets), “Political crisis and social awareness change 2007” (edited by M.M. Slyusarevsky), “Pre-election Ukraine: election intentions and inhabitants’ thoughts 2007” (edited by M.M. Slyusarevsky), “Beginning of new political year: citizens’ evaluations and their election intentions 2006” (edited by M.M. Slyusarevsky), “Hot political summer in the mirror of societal view 2006” (edited by M.M. Slyusarevsky), “Monitoring of socio-political situation in Ukraine 2005, 2006” (edited by M.M. Slyusarevsky), “Sociopolitical situation in Ukraine before political elections 2004” (edited by M.M. Slyusarevsky).

In Ukraine a rage of *books* devoted to theoretical and practical issues of Political Psychology was published. We consider some of the most interesting from them below in chronological sequence.

In the monograph “Psychology of mass political awareness and behavior” (“Психологія масової політичної свідомості та поведінки”, 1997) V.O. Vasyutinsky describes results of the study revealing Ukrainian citizens’ political awareness and behavior peculiarities. The author interprets problems of socio-psychological tension and multiparty system functioning.

In the monograph “Ethnopolitical processes in the modern Ukraine” (“Етнополітичні процеси в сучасній Україні”, 1999) M. Piren shows psychological aspect of ethnos and nation, language as an ethnoforming component, interconnection between ethnicity and religion, and institute of family in the context of Ukrainian poli-

tics.

The monograph “Peculiarities of youngsters’ socialization in terms of societal transformations” (“Особливості соціалізації молоді в умовах трансформації суспільства”, 2005) is devoted to the problem of personal socialization. Authors, G.M. Aver’yanova, N.M. Dembitska, V.V. Moskalenko, describe different models of socialization distinguishing economical, political, and gender role socialization. Factors forming personality traits which result from entrance to definite social institutions are analyzed. The monograph contains empirical material which proves main theoretical conclusions of authors.

The monograph “Interactional psychology of power” (“Інтеракційна психологія влади”, 2005) is devoted to the search of socio-psychological sources of power. The author, V. Vasyutinsky, analyses processes of domineering-submissive relations construction, he substantiates its interactional-phenomenological nature. In the monograph such important aspects of power as psychological structure of power, individual subjectivity in symbolic-discursive space of interaction, socio-psychological parameters of inter-subjective interaction, cratological dimensions of personal onthogenesis, domineering-submissive aspects of gender interaction, interactional nature of politico-ideological existence.

The monograph “Difficult youth: ways of self-realization” (“Проблемна молодь: шляхи самоздійснення”, 2007) written by B.P. Lazarenko is devoted to the investigation of regularities and socio-psychological mechanisms in education as well as difficult youth’s return to ordinary life. Modern approaches to effective prevention of negative phenomena in youth surrounding are analyzed. Special attention is given to the problem of drug addiction and HIV/AIDS spread.

In the monograph “Social psychology of influence” (“Соціальна психологія впливу”, 2008) V. Tatenko shows the results of socio-psychological study of influence problem. Determinants and factors of being influential are regarded as well as different forms of influence, and variants of their combination. Special attention is paid to onto-psychological definition of influence nature.

The monograph “Integration processes in society and political personal choice” (“Інтеграційні процеси в суспільстві та політичний вибір особистості”, 2008) shows the results of socio-psychological study concerning problems of political personal choice, socio-political awareness sphere and factors which determine its display in integration societal processes. The author, V.P. Kazmirenko, analyzes psychological mechanisms which provide for personal inclusion in social activity processes, social participation, socio-psychological identification. Integration processes in education system are described and their influence on political culture formation is studied. Much attention is paid for self-management and processes of youth’s societal activity development investigation. Results of complex empirical studies of mobilizing technologies implementation in youth political organizations are shown in this book.

In the monograph “Psychosemantic analysis of political choice in Orange Revolution period” (“Психосемантический анализ политического выбора в период помаранчевой революции”, 2008) the author, N.N. Teplyakov, shows the results of experimental studies which reconstructed political awareness of voters and their perception of such political leaders as V.A. Yuschenko, V.F. Yanukovich, Y.V. Timoshenko, L.D. Kuchma, S.V. Kivalov, V.V. Putin during Orange Revolution period. The author ana-

lyzes such topical psychological problems as political discourse, synergetic, socio-psychological, psychoanalytic, constructionist, psycho-synergetic, magic, etc. approaches and theories regarding transformation processes of political norms, values and attitudes, methodological basics of psycho-semantics, subjective semantic spaces and techniques of their construction. Phenomena of socio-cultural conflicts, legitimization of social system and dialogue between political cultures are analyzed. Particular attention is paid for the phenomenon of Orange Revolution analysis.

The manual “Technologies and methods of forecasting consequences of information influence on elder pupils’ political attitudes” (“Технології та методики прогнозування наслідків інформаційного впливу на політичні настановлення старшокласників”, 2008) introduces existing ways of personal attitudes investigation as well as ways to forecast information influence on them. Possibilities of expert investigations, methods of individual consciousness investigation, and some computer programs of text analysis are shown. The author, P.D. Frolov, suggests methods for experts’ competence assessment, investigation and monitoring of political attitudes dynamics, and methods to reveal people with heightened receptiveness to information influence.

The textbook “Political Psychology” (“Політична психологія”, 2009) describes the phenomena of Political Psychology as not much studied and systematized in Ukraine scientific and practical discipline. The author, M.F. Golovaty, determines essence, subject, and goal of Political Psychology, its structure, peculiarities and forms of study. Psychological aspects of public opinion formation, political behavior and participation, peculiarities of national elite formation are analyzed. The textbook is aimed for students, teachers, researchers, and all those who want to gain deep knowledge in the sphere of Political Psychology and politics in general.

As we can see more and more scientific and practical publications have appeared recently in Ukraine. These publications are devoted to different problems in the sphere of Political Psychology representing substantiated analysis of sociopolitical processes in modern Ukrainian psychological context.

Relevant research studies and Ukrainian researchers who published in Political Psychology.

During the last decades more and more research studies in the sphere of Political Psychology are conducted on Departments of Political Science, Sociology and Psychology in higher education establishments as well as in separate research centers. Studies conducted by Institute of Social and Political Psychology of Academy of Pedagogical Sciences (further Institute) has particular importance. The Institute was founded in 1996 by reorganization of Scientific center of Political Psychology. The Institute makes a significant contribution into development of research studies’ methodology in the sphere of Political Psychology.

The range of scientific studies covers the following topics:

- Theoretical and methodological basics of Social and Political Psychology;
- Complex analysis of social situation connected to personal and civil development of children and young people;
- Psychological mechanisms of personal socialization, enhancement of socio-adaptive abilities, personal development;
- Group dynamics problems, interpersonal and intergroup relations;

- State, regularities and development tendencies of mass consciousness and behaviour;
- Sociopsychological conditions and factors of personal participation in political activities, preparation of young people for making conscious political choice;
- Psychology of power and political leadership problems;
- Socio-psychological aspects of mass communication, media education of young people, formation of psychological resistance to socially harmful information;
- Technologies of socio-psychological consulting, forecasting of socio-political processes and influence on their change.

The main scientific departments of the Institute are the following:

- Laboratory of psycho-social and politico-psychological studies methodology,
- Laboratory of Social Psychology of personality,
- Laboratory of mass and community psychology,
- Laboratory of small groups and intergroup relations psychology,
- Laboratory of youth's political socialization psychological problems,
- Laboratory of fundamental and practical problems of communication,
- Laboratory of mass communication and media education psychology,
- Laboratory of political participation psychology,
- Laboratory of socio-political technologies,
- Laboratory of societal and political processes monitoring.

Research activity of some from the above mentioned laboratories needs to be described more precisely in this paper.

Laboratory of mass and community psychology is headed by PhD V.O. Vasyutinsky. The content of studies conducted in this laboratory include: mass political consciousness and behavior as the subjects of politico-psychological study (historical vision and present state of the problem); state and content of mass political consciousness in modern Ukraine (political attitudes' and moods' psycho-semantic characteristic of Ukrainian citizens, qualitative characteristics of politico-semantic space in modern Ukrainian society, problem of unconsciousness in personal attitude toward the state); socio-psychological tension in civil and political life (economical determinants and ideological factors of socio-psychological tension analysis, the problem of mass political consciousness and behaviour extremeness); socio-political aspects of political parties' activity and multiparty system functioning (psychological studies of political parties activity, personal political engagement as individual-psychological basis of party functioning, psychological sources, world view and sensuous-volitional mechanisms of political ideology effect, psychological mechanisms of political unity, socio-psychological factors of multiparty system functioning).

Laboratory of youth's political socialization psychological problems is headed by PhD I.V. Zhadan. Researchers of this laboratory worked out a range of important topics. The topic "Psychological peculiarities of political culture formation among pupils and students in terms of education humanization" was being investigated during 1995 – 1996, 1999. Theoretical models which show possible forms of pupils' and students' political socialization were constructed by I.V. Zhadan. Forms and stages of pedagogical influences directed at intensification of the processes connected to democratic values and norms assimilation among pupils were determined. Main principles of politically colored information organization and presentation were formulated. L.N. Ovdienko

substantiated the conclusion that in Ukraine school reformation directed at humanization based on the principles of tolerance, dialogue, and rejection from imperativeness can facilitate formation of youngsters' political culture aimed at the best achievements of modern society. In the other study conducted by Y.O. Kotlyar main sociopsychological mechanisms of young people's political culture formation were revealed. The researcher also analyzes possible ways of motivation to assimilate knowledge connected to political system and regularities of its function, determination of personal attitude toward political events. T.I. Belavina determined levels and forms of young people protest; she made a socio-political portrait of young people in transformation of socio-economic and political situation in Ukraine; stages of specific young peoples' movements arise were described. T.O. Vol'fovs'ka studied the process which resulted in formation of diverse strategies of interaction in political dialogue as a way to construct youth's political culture. The researcher determines evaluation criteria of personal communicative competence level.

The research topic "Psychological principles of youth's political education construction" was conducted during 2000-2003. Researchers investigated social expectations about political education at the stage of developing democracy in Ukraine. Main tasks and functions of political education were determined. Approaches to political education content formation were planned on different levels – fundamental, practical and mass. Psychological model of youth's political education was constructed. It contained three units of political socialization psychological effects. The formation of these units should have been the target of political education content. The units were the following: cognitive (political representations), conative (experience of political activity), and affective (system of political attitudes). The main socio-psychological mechanisms of the system of political attitudes formation were determined: identification, tolerance, responsibility and social activeness. This model was oriented on citizen-aware function of political education support.

Evaluation criteria of youth's political education effectiveness were determined:

- Personal behavior peculiarities (verbal loyalty to principles and actual behavior);
- Beliefs (affective, cognitive and evaluative);
- Motivation type (internal or external);
- Personal values (particularism or universality);
- Means and goals of political orientation and political participation.

Complex of methods evaluating political education effectiveness were worked out, four of them enabled to evaluate: elder pupils' peculiarities of political identification (O.M. Sknar), level of their political knowledge, tolerance level (I.V. Zadan), communicative orientation (T.O. Vol'fovs'ka).

At present the laboratory employees are working at the topic: "Social teaching as youth's political socialization in conditions of education system modernization". The aim of the study is to investigate social teaching influence peculiarities on youth's political socialization processes; working out technologies of political attitudes' developing through modeling means application in political education.

Laboratory of political participation psychology headed by PhD L.O. Kiyashko was working on the topic: "Socio-psychological factors of youth's political participation intensification". The aim of the study was to determine political participation level

among different age and social categories of young people in modern conditions; investigation of influence factors on the political participation level in child and youth mass organizations. Directions of the study were the following: investigation of political participation level among different age and social categories of young people in modern conditions; determination of mechanisms of political participation and main factors of its intensification in child and youth mass organizations; development of effectiveness evaluation criteria and methods to forecast consequences of youth organizations' activity, their influence on the level of youth's political participation; determination of the influence of socio-ideological beliefs and stereotypes on civil and political youth activity; development of criteria, indicators, and methods evaluating child and youth organizations activity influence on personal attitudes toward active political participation formation; investigation of civil organization's psychological climate influence on the formation youth's readiness for socio-political participation; investigation of decision making peculiarities among young Ukrainian electors connected to participation in definite political movement: factor influencing on decision change; investigation of family influence on political participation readiness pre-conditions formation among children and young people; investigation of territorial communities' self-organization as a socio-psychological factor of youth's political participation intensification.

Results of these studies were published in monographs, scientific journals, newsletters, textbooks and methodological manuals.

Conclusion.

Thus, corresponding to the analysis of Political Psychology as an academic discipline, relevant publications and scientific institutes in this sphere, we can distinguish perspectives of theoretical and practical elaborations which come from this context. The main conclusion from the analysis is the possibility to see and correlate different sides of Political Psychology development in Ukraine.

Consequently, in Ukraine Political Psychology is at the developing stage and further scientific research activity should be done through the analysis of not only specific principles of modern Political Psychology but also through subject-content direction; and the most important vector is the one concerning modern societal practice which was practically absent during Soviet period. It becomes essential since the enhancing level of political awareness in Ukrainian society after 2004 is taken into account. In addition, it is actual to analyze theoretical and methodological levels of modern psycho-political works of practical direction which makes it possible to continue search of more definite and concentrated understanding of the Political Psychology subject among psychologists in the nearest future.

Further systematization of the wide range of separated in time and in scientific principles works in the field of Political Psychology is considered to be perspective. The range of works spreads from prominent Ukrainian philosophers of the past to recent studies of Ukrainian political psychologists. It enables to construct a grounded understanding of methodological level in the field of modern Political Psychology, state of its present methodological equipment and shape the ways of further development both in theoretical and practical aspects.

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