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    Taiwanese consciousness vs. Chinese consciousness: The national identity and the dilemma of polarizing society in Taiwan

    Li-Li Huang (National Tsing Hua University, Taiwan)


    The dilemma of national identity that Taiwan is facing is rooted in Taiwan’s geo-historical context and contemporary cross-strait relations. Since the development of democracy and two peaceful transitions of the executive branch of government, issues relevant to group conflict and peace in Taiwan seem to be more about national identity than ethnic identity. This study aimed to demonstrate that there exist three main national identity groups, i.e. Chinese First, Taiwanese First, and Taiwanese Only, and opposite and polarized ideology of national identities and political party support, i.e. pan-blue and pan green in Taiwan. The result showed that three cluster of ideology, such as Big-China-ism, Taiwan-Independence-ism and Taiwan-loving-ism. Most people are Taiwan-loving-ism and regard Taiwan as “small and beautiful” as well as emphasize Taiwanese collective self-esteem. Big-China-ism and Taiwan-Independence-ism correspond with pro-unification (pan-blue) and pro-independence(pan-green) had resulted in antagonism between the polarized groups.

    The people of Taiwan are facing a dilemma of national identity of being Taiwanese or Chinese, that is to be independent from or unified with Mainland China. After terminating the regimes of Chiangs’ father and son (Chiang Kei-She and Chiang Ching-Kuo) and ending the Martial Law, the President of Taiwan was elected directly from people’s vote since 1996, two major political parties (Kuomintang, KMT and Democratic People’s Party, DPP) in turn gain control of the executive branch of government, therefore, Taiwan’s government is gradually toward a western-style democracy. The DPP supports the independence of Taiwan, while the KMT opposes the idea of Taiwan’s independence and builds up informally rapprochement with mainland China. This stand-off leads to an ambivalent about national identity and entails anxiety about collective identity.
    How has Taiwan come to such a predicament? What is the psychological substance of these dilemmas and their historical roots or societal context? In order to understand current phenomena in Taiwan, this article examines the previous research from the historical, political, social, and psychological literature with an emphasis on psychological research.
    Geohistorical context: conflict among Taiwan’s ethnic groups
    Taiwan is an island on the western edge of the Pacific Ocean. It lies off the southeastern coast of Asia, across the Taiwan Strait from Mainland China. Five thousand years ago, aborigines on Taiwan traded with other communities in Southeast Asia. Later, Taiwan was colonized by the Dutch, the Spanish (1624 -1662), and then Han ethnicity such as Hoklo and Hakka immigrants mostly from southeastern part of mainland China, as well as Ming loyalists, and Qing conquerors settled down in Taiwan (1662 -1895). Between the first Sino-Japanese War (1895) and World War II (1945), Taiwan was a colony of Japan. In 1945, leader of the KMT, Chiang Kei-Shek and his government took over Taiwan after Japan was defeated in World War II. The KMT controlled the whole island and imposed their rule, their language (Mandarin), and their identity on the people of Taiwan, and tried to impart to Taiwanese their dream of retaking Mainland China, which the KMT had lost to Mao’s Communist Party.
    Taiwan’s history can be divided into several stages with different distinctive social identifications and inter-group cues associated with each stage (Li, Liu, Huang, & Chang, 2007). Those stages are: (1) the Dutch colonization period (1624-1662), (2) the immigration period (1662-1683), (3) the indigenization period, (4) the Japanese colonization period, (5) the KMT sovereign period, (6) the DPP sovereign period (the first peaceful transition of regime), and now, (7) the KMT returns (2008-today, the second peaceful transition of regime), the KMT party chairman Ma Ying-Jeou has been elected as president of Taiwan.
    Nowadays Han Chinese makes up 98 percent of Taiwan’s population. The remaining two percent are aborigines. The Han Chinese can be divided into three major ethnic groups. The Mingnan (also called Hoklo) group, which accounts for about 70 to 74 percent of the population, and the Hakka (12-15%) group arrived in Taiwan before 1945 are called native Taiwanese (inside-province Taiwanese). Those who arrived after 1945 with the KMT are labeled outside-province Taiwanese, and make up about 15 percent of the population.
    The structural conflict between inside- and outside-province Taiwanese grew out of a massacre in 1947 labeled the 228 (February 28) Incident in which the KMT killed or imprisoned over 10,000 inside-province Taiwanese in order to suppress political dissent (Lai, Myers, & Wei, 1991). From 1949 to 1987, the KMT ruled Taiwan with authoritarian power by means of martial law. Under martial law, many public activities, such as gatherings, parades, and strikes were forbidden. Mandarin (a northern dialect of mainland China and the official language of China) became the official national language. The outside-province minority in Taiwan became the dominant ethnic group, while the Mingnan majority ethnic group, Hokka and aboriginal groups, that is, the inside-province groups, were subordinate. Throughout KMT rule, the distinction between outside-province and inside-province was significant. There was inequality in the distribution of political power, tertiary education opportunities, and work opportunities in civil service, which was reflected in economic policy (Chang, 1993; Lin & Lin, 1993; Wu, 1993), all of which favored outside-province Taiwanese. Chinese culture was also dominant and as the symbol of the elite. In contrast, the Taiwanese (a southern dialect of mainland China, i.e. Fukien dialect) spoken by the majority was considered just a dialect, and Taiwanese culture was considered local, low, and vulgar (Wang, 1993).

    Historical representations in Taiwan
    From the 1950s to the 1980s, Taiwan had a period of great economic growth and became one of the Four Asian Tigers. At the same time, there was a tremendous downside: the sacrifice of democracy and social justice. The inequality of resource distribution created impetus for a social movement. In 1987, the martial law ended, and the DPP was allowed to become a legally opposition party. Then, in 1996, the first direct election of president was held and the first inside-province Taiwanese Lee Teng-hui elected as President, this marked a further step in the democratization process. The power transited in 2000 in which the KMT was voted out of the executive branch after 50 years of continuous rule and the DPP control the government. In other words, the government of Taiwan peacefully transitioned from an authoritarian to a democratic system.
    A study surveying 828 adult Taiwanese from around the island revealed that representations of Taiwanese history are a blend of consensus and polarized disagreement (Huang et al., 2004). This study indicated that the most important event in Taiwan’s history was the 228 Incident, and all groups (including outside-province Chinese) regarded this event as equally negative. The results also suggest that there is a cultural consensus in Taiwan supporting a democratic system of governance. However, this consensus disappeared when it came to evaluating political leaders, with Mingnan and outside-province Taiwanese favoring their own and denigrating leaders from the other group. That is to say, social representations of history were controversial in some domains (i.e., evaluations of political leaders), and consensual in others (i.e., the movement from authoritarian to democratic rule). This blend implies the double nature of Taiwanese representations of culture and political life, and causes ambivalence towards Taiwanese national identity. What kind of ambivalence and what does it result from?

    The emergence and developing of national identity in Taiwan
    Whether Taiwan is a nation or a part of China has been a controversial issue because of a divergence between substantial and international legal concerns. The Republic of China (ROC) was established in 1912. From 1928, the ROC was legally ruled by the KMT. After1949, the KMT withdrew from China to Taiwan. In the meantime, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) was established by the Chinese Communist Party in mainland China in 1949. During the early Cold War the ROC was recognized by most Western nations and the United Nations as the sole legitimate government of China. After 1970s, the ROC lost these recognitions, but the Republic of China has not formally relinquished its claim as the legitimate government of all China. In the subsequent decades, the ROC has been more commonly referred to as Taiwan, and evolved from a single-party state with full global recognition into a multi-party democratic state with limited international recognition.
    The development of a national identity has been a core issue for Taiwanese people. By definition, national identity includes two components, one is the nation, the other is a collective identity. The fundamental features of a nation are “a named human population sharing a historical territory, common myths and historical memories, a mass public culture, a common economy, and common legal rights and duties for all members” (Smith, 1991). This definition focuses on commonality, both in history and contemporary society, but neglects international relations. Taiwan as a state is not legitimate in the international community, although the people of Taiwan have a consensus on history, culture, economy, and their own legal system. As the word nation denotes both a legal state and a people, this dual meaning reflects the ambivalent national identity of Taiwanese.
    Nationalism is a kind of index for categorizing people. Representative sampling long term surveys of identity have been conducted by the Election Study Center at National Cheng-chi University twice a year since 1992. As shown in Figure 1, from 1992 to 2008, Chinese identity declined from 26.2% to 4.7%, Taiwanese identity increased from 17.3% to 50.8%, and double identity (both Taiwanese and Chinese) moved from 45.4 % to 40.8%. In other words, double identity is always most common in Taiwan, but Chinese identity and Taiwanese identity have changed inversely. The first dramatic turning point in Taiwanese identity’s increase was in 1996 when the first direct presidential election took place and the Mainland China authority threatened to attack Taiwan with missiles. It also rose after 2000 when Chen Shui-bian was elected as the first non-KMT pro-independence president. Then, after 2008 the KMT won back the executive branch and President Mao started a rapport with Mainland China. Nowadays, Taiwanese identity occupied above half of identity and becomes the most dominant and mainstream identity.

    Figure 1. Changes in the Taiwaness/Chinese Identity of Taiwanese as Tracked in Surveys (1992~2008)
    Sources: Election Study Center, NCCU.

    Taiwanese consciousness versus Chinese consciousness
    Nationalism is regarded as an “imagined community” from the perspective of social constructivism ( Anderson, 1983/1991). And nationalism can be conceived of as the ideology of a modern nation-state or as any movement directed towards the establishment of a new nation-state (Diaz-Guerrero, 1997). According to these definitions, both Chinese identity and Taiwanese identity can be regarded as kinds of national identity. Due to long Chinese history, China simultaneously implies the meaning of politics, culture, language, and ethnicity (Huang, 1999). Because of the KMT’s rule over Taiwan for over 50 years, “China” could be as spiritual diaspora and as “imagined community” (Huang, 2006), national identity of China has become part of the implicit ideology of the people of Taiwan. Huang (2007) pointed out that Chinese consciousness can include the following five beliefs: 1) peaceful coexistence among the five ethnicities of the people of China, 2) the five ethnicities have a homogeneous culture and the same ancestors, 3) a broad outlook on China’s long history and culture, 4) the KMT’s political legitimacy over Taiwan, and 5) the KMT’s contribution to Taiwan.
    However, the national identity of Taiwan encountered a dramatic and reversed transition. In the past, Taiwan has been colonized or ruled by a number of countries or regimes, including the ROC, and the people of Taiwan always submitted themselves to powerful outsiders. The ROC, which has been the sole regime of Taiwan for more than 60 years, has not been recognized as a nation since being replaced by the PRC as a member of the United Nations in 1971 in spite of having its own land, people, constitution, government, and president. In other words, Taiwanese identity has swung between local people (as one part of “great China”) and nationals (keeping their own land, constitution, and government) as well.
    Therefore, Taiwanese identity needs to make an extraordinary transition from ethnic identity (as a local people) to national identity (as a national group). By creating a democracy, Taiwan now has the freedom to make its own future. Since the end of martial law in 1987 and the first direct election of the president in 1996, immigrants from the various periods have gradually fused into new Taiwanese in contrast to Chinese. Taiwanese and Chinese can designate different national identifications with different ideologies. All ethnic groups settled in Taiwan over the various periods of history form a single community, a new nation, and an idea of forward-looking wish that uses a democratic and self-determination approach to transform a society traditionally dominated by Han immigrants and refugees into a modern nation-state (Wang, 2003; Shih, 2003). Then, Taiwanese can imply not only a local ethnical consciousness but also a national identification. According to discourses on Taiwanese Nationalism (Huang, 2000, Shih 2003), Taiwanese consciousness can include: (1) the concept of community (the will to develop Taiwan together), (2) the concept of pluralism (multiple-cultures and multiple-ethnicities that discard the grand China complex), (3) resistance and separation (resist authoritarianism, recognize and prioritize Taiwanese characteristics), and (4) loving Taiwan (encouraging current residents to emphasize Taiwanese subjectivity).
    In sum, historically speaking, the national identities of China and Taiwan have entailed consciousness of imagined communities generated under strong pressure from the outside, just as Chinese identity originated from revolution led by Dr. Sun Yat-sen, Taiwanese identity emerged out of colonization by Japan and authoritative ruled by early KMT. They have been achieved through political mobilization and effort initiated by many people. This identification process is a floating one; it can move from one identification to another new and conflicting one. According to the awaking theory of ideology (Gurin, Miller, and Gurin, 1980), in recent Taiwan, Taiwanese identity which is associated with subjectivity, freedom, democracy, and autonomy has gradually replaced Chinese identity, which is associated with restoration, centralization of authority, and stagnation. But are Chinese and Taiwanese identities really incompatible? What are the components of Chinese identity and Taiwanese identity?
    Purpose of Study: ideology and identity in Taiwan
    The main purpose of study1 conducted in 2004 is to probe the differences among three types of identity in terms of consciousness, collective esteem, and psychological and political attitudes; and also to clarify the relationship between national identification and social issues in Taiwan.

    The responses to the self- report questionnaire from1368 participants (667 female and 697 male with four unknown) were collected during 2004. The participants over all Taiwan were selected from convenience sampling, such as snowball sampling at the workplace, friend network, relative network, and over-sampling outside-province Taiwanese balancing the different identity. Their ages ranged from 18 to 81 years old with an average of 32.8 and standard deviation of 12.2.

    1. National identity
    A forced choice between five logically exclusive groupings of Chinese and Taiwanese was used to identify participants’ national identities (Huang et al., 2004). These were: (1) I am a Chinese and a Taiwanese (Chinese First); (2) I am a Taiwanese and a Chinese (Taiwanese First); (3) I am a Taiwanese, not a Chinese (Taiwanese Only); (4) I am a Chinese, not a Taiwanese (Chinese only) (5) I am not a Taiwanese or a Chinese (Neither). People with a double-identity were separated into Chinese First and Taiwan First.
    In this study, the three most popular were: Chinese First (291 participants, 21.3%), Taiwanese First (670 participants, 49.0%), and Taiwanese Only (351 participants, 25.7%). It is clear that double-identity is the most common in Taiwan with 70.3 % of participants, and Taiwanese first is the majority with 49% participants.

    2. Consciousness of Chinese and Taiwanese
    Consciousness of national identity was measured with a set of 40 statements with 7- point Likert scale constructed by author (Huang, 2007). Four factors were derived through factor analysis, with 11, 7, 11, and 5 items. The internal consistency alpha values were 0.93, 0.88, 0.89, and 0.79 respectively. The first factor, Greater Chinese Consciousness, included statements such as “Chinese culture is broad and its contributions have had great value”, “Taiwanese people’s forefathers are from China and this connection should not be ignored”, and “the Chinese people consist of various ethnic groups and those groups should have a common consciousness”. The second factor was called KMT Legitimacy. It was composed of items such as “the early KMT government was a legitimate representative of the Chinese people so Taiwanese are not separable from the Chinese people”, and “Taiwan was at one time a province of China, and the KMT resumed governance after the Second World War and so should not be seen as a foreign power”. The third factor was named Consciousness of Being Separate and Unique and was composed of statements including “because of the influence of aboriginal people, the Dutch, Japanese, and Americans, Taiwanese culture is a mixed marine culture and is very different from the Chinese plains culture”, “Taiwan has always been controlled by foreign powers, and we should aim for self-determination”, and “after the long isolation from each other China and Taiwan have developed very different cultures and should be able to become two different nations”. The last factor was Small but Beautiful Taiwan and was composed of statements including “Although Taiwan has a small area and not many people, it has world vision and is part of the global network”, and “Although Taiwan is small, its democratic politics, modern lifestyle, and popular education make it a beautiful nation.”

    3. Affection of national identity:
    The collective self-esteem (CSE) scale constructed by Luhtanen and Crocker (1992) with Chinese and Taiwanese as the targets of identification was used to measure affection of identity. After a revision, eight items using a 6-point Likert scale were used to measure collective self-esteem of Chinese identity and Taiwanese identity. A higher score indicated a stronger identity collective esteem. The internal consistency alpha values were 0.96 and 0.92, respectively.

    4. Support for future nationhood
    By definition, identification also has an action orientation dimension. In this study, supporting “unification with mainland China” and “Taiwan independence” with 9-point scales were used to measure the action orientation for national identity.

    5. Others
    Two 9-point-scale were introduced to measure the tendency to support for KMT and DPP.


    1. Differences among national identity
    Table 1 showed that all three types of national identities differed on all four national consciousness components. The Chinese First identity had significantly higher scores on the first and second components. The Taiwanese Only identity had higher scores on the third and fourth components. The Taiwanese First identity scores tended to be in between the other two types and the difference with the Chinese First scores was smaller than the difference with Taiwanese Only.
    Relating to affection of national identity, table 1 also shows that the three types of national identity had different levels of identity affection toward being Chinese or Taiwanese. Even concerning imagination toward future nationhood, there was a significant difference among the three types of identity. The Chinese First group tended to support unification (M = 5.06) and they were clearly against Taiwan’s independence (M = 3.46, with a median = 5, t (287) = 7.4, p < .001). The Taiwanese Only group were against unification (M = 1.89) and strongly supported Taiwan’s independence (M = 7.40). The Taiwanese First group tended prefer the current status and took a neutral stance toward unification and independence (M = 4.18 and M = 4.62), although they indicated less support for unification (t (662) = -3.2, p < .001).

    Table 1. Ideologies and political party support by national identity

    2. The cluster of ideology
    The ideology of identification denotes the cognition, affection, and behavior tendency (Gurin et al., 1980), therefore, eight ideology components including four factors of consciousness of Chinese and Taiwanese (Greater Chinese Consciousness, KMT Legitimacy, Consciousness of Being Separate and Unique, Small but Beautiful Taiwan, two affection of identity (CSE of Chinese and Taiwanese respectively), two different future nationhood support (unification with mainland China or independence) were used to analyze the cluster of ideology. The statistic method of factor analysis was conducted, three factors were extracted and then orthogonal rotated. The first factor’s components and factor loading respectively are Greater Chinese Consciousness (0.92), KMT Legitimacy (0.89), CSE of Chinese (.087), pro- unification (0.78); the second factor includes pro-independence (-0.74) and Consciousness of Being Separate and Unique (-0.72); the third factor consists of Small but Beautiful Taiwan (0.88) and CSE of Taiwanese (0.82). These three factors canaccount for 75.1% of totally variances, and were each named as Big-China-ism (BS-ism), and Taiwan-Independence-ism (TI-ism) , and Taiwan-loving-ism (TL-ism) as well as represented three clusters of ideology. The three clusters of ideology are schematized in figure 2.

    Figure 2. The structure of three clusters of ideology
    f1= Greater Chinese Consciousness
    f2= KMT Legitimacy
    f3= Consciousness of Being Separate and Unique
    f4= Small but Beautiful Taiwan
    Chin= collective self-esteem of Chinese
    Taiw= collective self-esteem of Taiwanese
    Uni= pro-unification
    Ind= pro- independence

    A structural equation model (SEM) was built to identify and tested the latent variables and ideology. As figure 3 showed that the goodness-of-fit test for the model wasχ2 (17, N=1211) = 159.6, GFI = .97, AGFI = .93, RMSEA = .086, CFI = .99, NFI = .98, SRMR = .041. Those implied that this model is acceptable. From the SEM in Figure 2, the latent variables, i.e. Big-China-ism, Taiwan-loving-ism, and Taiwan-independence-ism, all had high loading on their components. The correlation between Taiwan-loving-ism and Taiwan-independence-ism was significantly positive (0.72), while Big-China-ism was significantly negative correlative with Taiwan-loving-ism (-0.40) and Taiwan-independence-ism (-0.91) respectively. More specifically, the ideology of Big-China-ism and Taiwan-independence-ism were nearly incompatible or antagonistic.

    Figure 3. SEM model for ideology of national identity
    χ2 (17, N = 1211) = 159.64, GFI = .97, AGFI = .93, RMSEA = .086, CFI = .99, NNFI = .98, SRMR = .041, *p<.05 ***p<.001 Note: BS-ism=Big-China-ism; TL-ism=Taiwan-loving-ism; TI-ism=Taiwan-Independence-ism; KMT= Kuo-Min-Tang; CES=collective self -esteem.

    3. Bell Shape of ideology and national identity
    Furthermore, a discriminant analysis was conducted with eight ideology components as dependent variables and three kinds of national identity as independent variables. The result indicated that only one function can discriminate efficiently among three kind of national identity, Wilks’ Lambda= 0.42, χ2 (16, 1212) = 1033.6, p= .001, eigenvalue=1.31, account for 98.5% variances, canonical correlation=0.75.
    Table 3 also showed that the 70.6% of self-report identity was classified correctly. That is to say, if we used of cluster of ideology to signify the people’s national identity, only 39.2% of self-report “Chinese First” could be identified correctly, but 81.8% of “Taiwanese First” could be denoted, while 75.3% of “Taiwanese Only” was correctly marked. It implied that above half (59.0%) of self-report Chinese First identifier had the same ideology with Taiwanese First identifier, and 24.4% of self-report Taiwanese Only identifier had the same ideology with Taiwanese First identifier. In sum, the ideology of Taiwan First, i.e. Small but Beautiful Taiwan and CSE of Taiwanese, was the most popular ideology among Taiwanese people, and Taiwan-loving-ism was the mainstream ideology in Taiwan.

    Table 2. Discrimination among national identity

    4. Bell Shape ideology and M Shape of political party
    The Chinese First identifiers tended to support the KMT (M = 5.44, a 9-point scale) rather than the DPP (M = 3.22). The gap is 2.22 with (t (287) = 12.4, p = .000(see tab. 1). The Taiwanese Only identifiers, on the other hand, strongly supported the DPP (M = 6.05) rather than the KMT (M = 3.28). The difference (2.77) was significant with t (350) = 15.3, p = .000 (see Table 1). Political party support was on opposite extremes of the spectrum. This result is consistent with the earlier SEM model; those with latent Big-China-ism ideology tended to support the KMT, while those with latent Taiwan-independence-ism ideology tended to support the DPP, while those with Taiwan-loving-ism ideology tended to be in between.
    As results show that the Chinese First and Taiwanese First identity groups have displayed high similarity in most aspects, which is the result of their double-identity and sharing Chinese consciousness. The Taiwanese Only identity group members distinguish themselves from Mainland China either politically or culturally, but otherwise share with Taiwanese First identity group in Taiwanese consciousness and regard Taiwan as first priority.
    Currently people in Taiwan can be grouped into pan-blue or pan-green segments as M-shape distribution. In this study, 619(54%) participants reported themselves belonging to pan-blue, while 527(46%) participants reported themselves pan-green. That is to say, the political scene in Taiwan is divided into two camps, with the pro-unification and center-right KMT as pas-blue, and the pro-independence and center-left DPP as pan-green. In terms of national identity, the distribution has a bell-shape with the Chinese First identity falling into the deep-blue segment and they mostly support the KMT. The Taiwanese Only identity represents the deep-green segment and they support the DDP. Pan-blue and pan-green not only disagree sharply on national identity, but also quarrel over all of social issues that are implicitly extended to be political affairs. Most of Taiwanese who belong to Taiwanese First identity group fall in the central part of curve and inevitably suffer the extremely conflicting discourses and opinions on public policy, and nearly lose the core values. In brief, the incompatible two segments result from national identity, i.e. pro-unification or pro-independence lead to considerable social disquiet in Taiwan.

    The dilemma of national identity that Taiwan is facing now is rooted in Taiwan’s geo-historical context and contemporary cross-strait relations. After the development of democracy and two peaceful transitions of government, issues relevant to conflict and peace in Taiwan seem to break away from colonial occupation, authoritarian governance, and inter-ethnic oppression. What is impacting Taiwan society now is more a matter of national identity and less a matter of ethnic identity. National identity may be conceptualized as both prospective and retrospective, which means that national identities are shaped not only by the interpretation of historical events, but also by contrasting perspectives on future nationhood. Many people in Taiwan are trying to figure out how to “build” their own nation, especially since they have the right to directly vote for their president.
    Since the 1980’s, Taiwan national consciousness supporters have asserted that collective identity is based on loving of Taiwan as a place with its own voice. But now, as research demonstrates, there exist opposite and polarized expectations for the future (independence vs. unification with China), national identity (Chinese first identity vs. Taiwanese only identity), political party support (deep blue vs. deep green) in Taiwan. Long-lasting and wide-spreading antagonisms have resulted in the mistrust between the polarized groups. Most people in Taiwan regard Taiwan as “small and beautiful”, and emphasize Taiwanese collective self-esteem. But they are always stuck in an “approach and avoidance” conflict and swing on various political, cultural, and economic issues because of different ideologies of national identity. The political standoff between DDP and KMT ended when The KMT regained the presidency and increased its majority in the legislature in the 2008 presidential and legislative elections. Taiwan as a young democracy really needs impartial judiciary, supervision system, and press freedom to avoid restoration of authoritarian government and to transcend ideological conflict, so as to lead to peaceful, growing and mature society.

    Figure 4. Ideology of national identity and Political party support

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